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ABSTRACT 
 
FROM TEXT TO LAW: ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY AND THE PRACTICAL 
HERMENEUTICS OF ABŪ JAʿFAR AḤMAD AL-ṬAḤĀWĪ (D. 321/933) 
Carolyn Anne Brunelle 
Joseph E. Lowry 
 
Scholars of Islamic law point to the absence of any extant work of legal theory between 
the Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī and the Fuṣūl of al-Jaṣṣāṣ as a major barrier to reconstructing the 
history of Islamic legal thought. However, careful analysis of three major works of the 
Ḥanafī jurist al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā  al-Qurʾān, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and Shar  mushkil al-
āthār, reveals the existence of myriad brief passages elaborating questions of legal theory 
scattered throughout their many volumes. This study reconstructs the legal thought of al-
Ṭaḥāwī as a window onto legal theory in the late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries, a 
crucial period of transformation between late formative and post-formative Islamic law. It 
argues that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works are not direct precursors to the genre of uṣūl al-fiqh, but 
instead represent a different, previously unrecognized, type of intellectual and literary 
activity. This activity, here termed practical hermeneutics, is concerned with 
demonstrating in detail how individually coherent rules of law may be derived from the 
often messy texts of revelation. The integrated reading of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s entire 
hermeneutical corpus uncovers several areas in which his legal thought departs quite 
notably from that of other jurists, suggesting that al-Ṭaḥāwī was neither as dependent on 
al-Shāfiʿī nor as closely related to mature uṣūl al-fiqh as has been suggested in previous 
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studies. Most crucially, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works unsettle accepted accounts of Islamic legal 
theory which assign varying levels of authority to a series of clearly distinguished legal 
sources—Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus, etc. This study demonstrates that, in contrast to both 
al-Shāfiʿī and later uṣūlīs, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought blurs boundaries between these 
categories and instead rests upon an underlying binary concept of legal authority which 
draws a crucial distinction between knowledge that might permissibly be reached by 
inference, and knowledge that can only have come from revelation. The authority that al-
Ṭaḥāwī grants any given source is therefore not a function of its formal characteristics, 
but rather the result of his own judgment about content and origins. 
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Introduction 
 
Background and Objectives  
By the middle of the 4
th
/10
th
 century, Muslim jurists who engaged in theorizing 
about the divine law were composing systematic texts of legal theory in the genre of uṣūl 
al-fiqh (lit., “the bases of law”). Works of the uṣūl al-fiqh genre identify the sources of 
the law, argue for a theory of textual interpretation permitting the law to be derived from 
its sources, and establish the theological, epistemological, linguistic and, at a later period, 
logical presuppositions on which those theories of interpretation and derivation rest.
1
 The 
earliest extant uṣūl work, al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl by the Ḥanafī al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980-981), 
already displays the characteristic literary form and array of topics of the mature genre.
2
 
The maturity of al-Fuṣūl suggests that it represents the culmination of a process of 
development whose earlier stages are largely unknown, although some evidence for this 
development is available in the form of passages from early theory works preserved in 
later uṣūl texts. One possible approach to studying Islamic legal theory in the period 
                                                 
1
 Discussions of formal Aristotelian logic do not begin to appear in works of uṣūl until the Mustaṣfā of al-
Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). See Wael Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments and the Formalization of Arguments 
in Sunnī Jurisprudence,” Arabica 37, no. 3 (1990): 1-5.  
2
 Earlier works entitled “Uṣūl” are either unrelated to legal theory or are interested in questions of theory 
without yet belonging to the genre of uṣūl al-fiqh. Although Norman Calder and Wael Hallaq have cited 
Uṣūl al-Shāshī as a work in the genre of uṣūl al-fiqh predating the Fuṣūl of al-Jaṣṣāṣ..Murteza Bedir has 
shown that it has been incorrectly attributed to two different 4
th
/10
th
-century jurists named al-Shāshī, and is 
in fact the work of the 7
th
/13
th
-century Niẓām al-Dīn al-Shāshī (Murteza Bedir, “The Problem of Uṣūl al-
Shāshī,” Islamic Studies 42, no. 3 (2003): 417; Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An 
Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 33; The Encyclopaedia 
of Islam, New Edition, s.v. “Fiḳh,” by Norman Calder).  
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before al-Jaṣṣāṣ is thus to attempt to reconstruct the earliest works of the uṣūl genre by 
identifying these surviving passages.
3
 
 Other studies of early Islamic legal theory focus instead on the activity of 
theorizing about the law, in whatever form that theorizing might take. Only a single work 
explicitly devoted to legal theory has been preserved from the formative period. That 
work, the well-studied Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), shares with the mature uṣūl 
tradition the goal of giving a complete account of the structure and derivation of the 
divine law, although its literary form and theological concerns are otherwise quite 
different from those of the uṣūl genre.4 Other extant texts before al-Jaṣṣāṣ are not 
primarily motivated by or structured around questions of legal theory.
5
 Nonetheless, 
many non-theory oriented works are important sources for the study of early Islamic legal 
theory, either because they employ hermeneutical techniques in ways that allow 
researchers to reconstruct the theory behind them, or because they contain occasional 
                                                 
3
 Devin Stewart is a major advocate of this approach. To date, he has worked to reconstruct the Wuṣūl ilā 
 aʿrifat al-uṣūl of Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (d. 294/909) and the Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-a  ā  of 
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) (“Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual of Jurisprudence, 
al-Wuṣūl ilā  aʿrifat al-uṣūl,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 
100-101; Stewart, “Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s al-Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-a  ā  and the Genre of Uṣūl al-
fiqh in Ninth-Century Baghdad,” in ʿ bbāsid Studies, ed. James Montgomery (Leeuven: Peeters, 2004), 
321-349.  
4
 Joseph Lowry has argued that al-Shāfiʿī cannot, in fact, be considered the founder of the uṣūl al-fiqh 
tradition as earlier scholars such as Joseph Schacht and John Burton have assumed. See Joseph Lowry, 
Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Mu ammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1, 360-
361; Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 1; 
John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 12-15.  
5
 By ‘legal theory,’ I intend to signal all questions regarding the origins, justification for and force of a 
body of laws as well as the institutions and interrelationships between the laws that make up a particular 
legal system.   
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explicit discussions of legal theory.
6
 To date, a number of articles have analyzed aspects 
of the legal theory of early jurists based on their non-theory oriented writings.
7
 
 This study similarly employs the explicitly theoretical passages contained in non-
theory oriented texts to shed light on legal theory during the late 3
rd
/9
th
 and early 4
th
/10
th
 
centuries, a critical transitional period in the history of Islamic law during which uṣūl al-
fiqh and the madhhabs (schools of legal thought) were both maturing. Specifically, I 
examine the legal thought of Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933), a major 
Egyptian Ḥanafī jurist, traditionist and theologian, many of whose works have been 
preserved and edited. Where this study departs from earlier studies of the type referred to 
above is in its depth and comprehensiveness. While most studies seeking to reconstruct 
                                                 
6
 I employ the term ‘non-theory oriented works’ to point to texts whose literary form is not primarily 
structured around questions of legal theory, even though some (like the works of al-Ṭaḥāwī analyzed in this 
study) can be considered works of theory in the sense that they treat questions of legal sources or textual 
hermeneutics in the course of their arguments. I make the distinction between theory-oriented and non-
theory oriented works in order to highlight the way in which historians of Islamic law have generally 
privileged theory-oriented works in their narratives of Islamic legal theory.  
7
 Studies taking this approach to studying early Islamic legal theory include Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “Islamic 
Juristic Terminology before Šāfi‘ī: A Semantic Analysis with Special Reference to Kūfa,” Arabica 19, no. 
3 (1972): 255-300; Murteza Bedir, “An Early Response to Shāfiʿī: ʿĪsā b. Abān on the Prophetic Report 
(Khabar),” Islamic Law and Society 9, no. 3 (2002): 285-311; Jonathan Brockopp, “Competing Theories of 
Authority in Early Mālikī Texts,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 
2002), 3-22; Joseph Lowry, “Ibn Qutayba: The Earliest Witness to al-Shāfiʿī and His Legal Doctrines,” in 
ʿ bbāsid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿ bbāsid Studies, ed. James Montgomery (Leeuven: 
Peeters, 2004), 303-319; Lowry, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba: A 
Reconsideration,” Islamic Law and Society 11, no. 1 (2004): 1-41; Lowry, “The Reception of al-Shāfiʿī’s 
Concept of Amr and Nahy in the Thought of His Student al-Muzanī,” in Law and Education in Medieval 
Islam: Studies in Memory of George Makdisi, ed. Joseph Lowry, Devin Stewart and Shawkat Toorawa 
(Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2004), 128-149; Lowry, “The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn 
al-Muqaffaʿ on Interpretation, Authority, and the Structure of the Law,” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society 128, no. 1 (2008): 25-40; Scott Lucas, “The Legal Principles of Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī 
and Their Relationship to Classical Salafī Islam,” Islamic Law and Society 13, no. 3 (2006): 289-324; 
Christopher Melchert, “Qurʾānic Abrogation across the Ninth Century: Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbayd, Muḥāsibī, and 
Ibn Qutaybah,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 75-98; 
Melchert, “Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law,” Islamic Law and Society 8, no. 3 
(2001): 383-406; Ya’akov Meron, “The Development of Legal Thought in Ḥanafī Texts,” Studia Islamica 
30 (1969): 73-118; Sahiron Syamsuddin, “Abū Ḥanīfah’s Use of the Solitary Ḥadīth as a Source of Islamic 
Law,” Islamic Studies 40, no. 2 (2001): 257-272.  
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early legal theory from non-theoretical texts inquire only into specific topics,
8
 this study 
surveys and analyzes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory as a whole as expressed across three major 
extant works,
9
    ā  al-Qurʾān (Legal Rulings of the Qurʾān), Shar   aʿānī al-āthār 
(An Elucidation of the Meaning of Reports) and Shar  mushkil al-āthār (An Elucidation 
of Problematic Reports), each of which contains numerous, if brief, discussions of 
theoretical topics.
10
   
The conclusions that this approach produces differ substantially from those 
reached by earlier, preliminary analyses of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought. Previous studies 
have generally relied on the very brief theoretical introductions to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works or 
on a necessarily limited selection of chapters within his many extant texts. While no 
independent article or book has yet been published on al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory, the most 
frequent arguments concerning him are that he brought a ‘Shāfiʿī’ attitude toward  adīth 
and legal hermeneutics to the Ḥanafī school, and that he was the jurist most responsible 
for the initial effort to justify Ḥanafī law through Prophetic  adīths.11 While strongly 
                                                 
8
 Several of the articles cited above very usefully survey the entire known legal theory of particular jurists 
of the formative period; however, none are in-depth studies.  
9
 I am mindful of the dangers of reconstructing a general theory from context-specific texts, and in 
consequence I have not attempted to impose any structure or draw any connections between different 
aspects of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought except where he himself suggests such a structure or connection. 
Nonetheless, the great majority of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s statements on questions of theory appear repeatedly across 
his works, suggesting that they constitute a separable body of thought, even if not a highly organized theory 
such as that described by al-Shāfiʿī in the Risāla.  
10
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā  al-Qurʾān al- arī , ed. Saʿd al-Dīn Ūnāl (Istanbul: T rkiye Diyanet  akf ,  sl m 
Ara t rmalar  Merkezi, 1995-1998); al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Jād al-
Ḥaqq, Muḥammad Zuhrī al-Najjār and Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 
1994); al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar  mushkil al-āthār, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1994). 
While al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other legal works, including Mukhtaṣar I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ (Disagreements of the 
Jurists), al-Shurūṭ al- abīr (Comprehensive Contract Formulary), al-Shurūṭ al-ṣaghīr (Concise Contract 
Formulary), and al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-fiqh (Concise Manual of Positive Law), sometimes mention legal 
sources or hermeneutical techniques in the course of justifying a rule of positive law, no attempt is made to 
explain or elaborate upon them. 
11
 Specific arguments made in earlier studies regarding al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory will be treated in the 
relevant chapters of this study. Studies making one or both of the arguments above include Norman Calder, 
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affirming al-Ṭaḥāwī’s importance in fitting out Ḥanafī law with a basis in  adīth,12 this 
study transforms our understanding of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory—and, by extension, the 
legal field of the late 3
rd
/9
th
 and early 4
th
/10
th
 centuries—by moving beyond labeling the 
‘Shāfiʿī’ and ‘Ḥanafī’ elements of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought to argue that his theory of the 
structure of the law was distinct from those of both al-Shāfiʿī and the later Ḥanafī legal 
theorists, although it had important ties to both. That this work has not been done until 
now is doubtless due at least in part to the difficulty of locating isolated theoretical 
discussions scattered across many volumes. Nonetheless, a number of the most important 
features of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought become visible only when far-flung passages of 
multiple works are put into dialogue with each other.  
In particular, my analysis challenges a narrative of Islamic legal history which 
holds that the exclusive identification of Prophetic authority with Prophetic  adīth—one 
of the most important arguments in the Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī—was settled by the late 3rd/9th 
century. Instead, I argue, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s continued appeal to a wide spectrum of legal 
sources that he understands to represent Prophetic authority suggests that we need a more 
complex model for thinking about the intricate relationship between Prophetic authority, 
Prophetic practice and Prophetic text. Further, while the mature uṣūl tradition would posit 
                                                                                                                                                 
Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 66; Melchert, “Traditionist-
Jurisprudents,” 397-398; Aisha Musa, Ḥadīth as Scripture: Discussions on the Authority of Prophetic 
Traditions in Islam (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 70; David Vishanoff, The Formation of 
Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law (Ann Arbor: American 
Oriental Society, 2010), 214; Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and 
Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 205; Behnam Sadeghi, The Logic of 
Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 131n12. The primary exception to this trend is found in ʿAbd Allāh Nadhīr Aḥmad’s  bū Jaʿfar al-
Ṭa āwī, which seeks to portray al-Ṭaḥāwī as closely aligned with the Ḥanafī school by describing him as 
following Ḥanafī principles of legal theory almost exclusively ( bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī: al-i ā  al-
mu addith al-faqīh (239 H-321 H) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1991), 179.  
12
 In this study, I employ ‘ adīth’ to signify both individual prophetic reports and the wider genre.  
6 
 
a hierarchy of legal authority based upon the literary form of legal sources—Qurʾānic 
verses, Prophetic  adīths, juristic consensus and analogical reasoning as well as other, 
more minor sources—al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of legal authority rests instead upon an 
underlying binary division of all Prophetic and post-Prophetic statements of the law into 
those which individuals might permissibly have arrived at by employing legal reasoning, 
and those which can only have been the result of revelatory instruction. Where al-Ṭaḥāwī 
understands a certain post-Prophetic  adīth or instance of consensus to represent 
revelatory instruction, he holds its authority sufficient to challenge and often override that 
of established Prophetic  adīths. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s vision of the structure of the law, then, 
transcends traditional hierarchies and categories of legal sources in order to assert a 
system of legal authority based not on form, but instead on judgments about content and 
origins. 
 What emerges from this study’s work of reconstruction, then, is a portrait of a 
jurist whose legal thought differs in important ways from the uṣūl al-fiqh tradition that 
would mature perhaps within half a century of his death. That some of the more 
surprising features of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought have been overlooked or smoothed away in 
studies seeking to place him within a historical trajectory of the development of legal 
thought is testament to the urgent and ongoing need for in-depth studies of the legal 
thought of individual jurists, a type of work that has become too rare in our field. Where 
monographs do exist, they investigate jurists of the post-formative period, with the 
exception of several studies on al-Shāfiʿī. 13 Existing studies also often draw primarily on 
                                                 
13 G rard Lecomte’s study of Ibn Qutayba presents a comprehensive sketch of an ʿAbbāsid intellectual, 
including Ibn Qutayba’s activities as a jurist, but does not go into great detail concerning his legal thought 
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a single major work rather than a jurist’s larger output. While the overall goals of the 
study of Islamic legal theory are rightly to discern ideas and types of development that 
transcend any one jurist, we risk glossing over crucial debates and anomalies when we 
relegate the investigation of individual jurists to article-length studies. Where the sources 
permit them, in-depth studies are particularly needed for jurists of the formative period 
like al-Ṭaḥāwī, whose works contain a rich trove of statements on a wide variety of 
theoretical topics without yet being organized to allow researchers easy access to specific 
topics of interest. One outcome of this study, therefore, is to provide future researchers 
with a firmer foundation on which to build arguments about the development of Islamic 
legal thought from the late formative into the post-formative periods.  
 
Practical Hermeneutics  
 This study does not seek to portray al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works as precursors to the 
emerging genre of uṣūl al-fiqh or to suggest that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought directly 
influenced later debates in uṣūl al-fiqh works. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī considered himself 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Ibn Qutayba (mort en 276/889): l'ho  e, son œuvre, ses id es (Damascus: Institut Fran ais de Damas, 
1965), 215-273). Joseph Lowry’s Early Islamic Legal Theory analyzes the legal thought of al-Shāfiʿī as 
expressed in his Risāla; Ahmed El Shamsy also incorporates other texts by al-Shāfiʿī in his Canonization of 
Islamic Law. For post-formative jurists, George Makdisi uses Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) as a window onto 
5
th
/11
th
-century Baghdad in Ibn ʿ qīl et la r surgence de l’islam traditionaliste au XIe siècle, Ve siècle de 
l’H gire (Damascus: Institut Fran ais de Damas, 1963). In his magisterial Search for God’s Law, Bernard 
Weiss has given a detailed, synchronic exposition of the legal thought of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 
631/1233), based primarily upon al-Āmidī’s uṣūl work, al-I  ā  fī uṣūl al-a  ā  (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 2010). Sherman Jackson analyzes certain aspects of the legal thought of al-Qarāfī 
(d. 684/1285) in his Islamic Law and the State, although he is primarily interested in the power relationship 
between jurists and the state as discussed in al-Qarāfī’s al-I  ā  fī ta yī  al-fatāwā ʿan al-a  ā  (Leiden: 
Brill, 1996). Muhammad Khalid Masud analyzes the Muwāfaqāt of al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) with a 
particular focus on maṣla a in Shāṭibī’s Philosophy of Islamic Law (Islamabad: The Islamic Research 
Institute, 1995). For a much later period, Bernard Haykel has analyzed the legal thought of al-Shawkānī (d. 
1250/1834) in the context of reform in 18
th
-century Yemen in his Revival and Reform in Islam (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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and was considered by his biographers to be a mujtahid, or jurist capable of 
independently deriving the law from its sources, he is not said to have written a work of 
uṣūl al-fiqh, nor is he reported to have been an uṣūlī (legal theorist).14 The earliest Ḥanafī 
uṣūl works do not cite his positions on questions of theory, and later uṣūl works note him 
only as a rare Ḥanafī who rejected isti sān (juristic preference).15  
Instead, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of legal theory emerge as part of a very different 
kind of intellectual activity. Where the uṣūlīs probe complex and even hypothetical 
questions of theology, epistemology and linguistics in their quest to elaborate a 
comprehensive system of textual interpretation, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s statements on legal theory 
appear only when required to support his interpretations of specific revealed texts, with 
the exception of the theory-driven introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān. Rather than being 
organized by topics of legal theory, his works are structured with the objective of 
demonstrating concretely how scholars may interpret revealed texts, individually and in 
combination with other legal sources, in order to discover a single, coherent Divine 
Message and to produce individually coherent rules. I label this work of demonstration 
‘practical hermeneutics.’  
                                                 
14
 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Lisān al-mī ān, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ 
al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1995-1996), 1:420; ʿAlī ibn Amr Allāh Qinālīzādah, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīya, ed. Muḥyi 
Hilāl al-Sarḥān (Baghdad: Dīwān al-Waqf al-Sunnī, 2005), 2.25. 
15
 In al-Fuṣūl, al-Jaṣṣāṣ mentions his own commentary on al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Mukhtaṣar, but does not otherwise 
cite al-Ṭaḥāwī (Uṣūl al-Jaṣṣāṣ al- usa  ā al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Tāmir (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 2000), 1.23, 2.40). Ibn Ḥazm  names al-Ṭaḥāwī as a Ḥanafī who rejected isti sān 
(juristic preference) in al-I  ā  fī uṣūl al-a  ā  (ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (Cairo: Maktabat 
ʿĀṭif, 1978), 2.992), and al-Zarkashī transmits the same claim from Ibn Ḥazm (al-Ba r al-mu īṭ fī uṣūl al-
fiqh, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿĀnī and ʿUmar Sulaymān al-Ashqar (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-
l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmīya, 1992), 6.88). On al-Ṭaḥāwī’s attitude toward isti sān, see Chapter Four, 
“Hermeneutics,” pp. 273-276. 
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After a brief introduction ranging from a single paragraph in Shar   aʿānī al-
āthār to seven pages in    ā  al-Qurʾān, each chapter in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical 
hermeneutics takes the same basic literary form: al-Ṭaḥāwī first adduces one or more 
revealed texts in apparent conflict or whose import is unclear, and then shows in detail 
how the uncertainty can be removed or the apparent contradiction resolved in order to 
arrive at God’s intent, usually in the form of a rule of positive law. While the specific 
methods al-Ṭaḥāwī uses to reach his conclusions vary in frequency between different 
works, his overall catalog of techniques is notably stable. These include isnād and matn 
criticism; invoking consensus or the authority of the Companions and Successors; 
abrogation; hermeneutical principles such as the primacy of the unrestricted (ʿāmm) and 
apparent (ẓāhir) meanings; ijtihād; descriptions of the range of existing opinions and the 
subsequent discrediting of all but one; and limited appeals to communal practice (ʿamal). 
Occasionally, al-Ṭaḥāwī pauses to justify or explain his use of these or other techniques 
and principles; these explicit discussions of theory constitute the major material for this 
study. While each chapter generally employs only a small selection of these techniques, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments consistently move from text to meaning. The literary form of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works thus stands in clear contrast to both the theory-driven 
discussions of the uṣūl al-fiqh genre and to the earlier Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī, in which 
practical examples illustrate al-Shāfiʿī’s theoretical claims, rather than the other way 
around. 
In the legal sphere, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical writing functions to affirm the 
relationship between texts of revelation and the rules of positive law by showing in detail 
10 
 
how specific rules may be derived from revealed texts. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutics-driven 
approach is not limited to the field of law, however. While    ā  al-Qurʾān and Shar  
 aʿānī al-āthār are exclusively concerned with demonstrating the relationship between 
revelation and positive law, his third major hermeneutical text, Shar  mushkil al-āthār, 
demonstrates the interpretation and harmonization of both legal and non-legal  adīths. 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī applies many of the same hermeneutical techniques to non-legal  adīths that 
he uses in legal derivation. However, because this study is concerned with the legal 
theory underlying al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments, I will from this point on be focusing on 
practical hermeneutics as a form of legal writing. 
Although ‘practical hermeneutics’ is not a term in general use in the field of 
Islamic intellectual history, a small number of scholars in other fields have invoked this 
term in their descriptions of modern Christian interpretive practices. In “Practical 
Hermeneutics: Noticing in Bible Study Interaction,” Esa Lehtinen frames practical 
hermeneutics as the way in which the interpretation of sacred texts is shaped by the daily, 
local context of the interpreters, such that they produce a “reading that is morally relevant 
to the participants.”16 In contrast, in Practical Hermeneutics: A Revised Agenda for 
Ministry, Charles Winquist is concerned with the interpretation of revelation as word-
event rather than as text, but similarly emphasizes how interpretation is bound to the 
“situational presence of a new consciousness in the world of historical experience.”17 
Both Lehtinen and Winquist, then, appeal to the phrase ‘practical hermeneutics’ to evoke 
                                                 
16
 Esa Lehtinen, “Practical Hermeneutics: Noticing in Bible Study Interaction,” Human Studies 32, no. 4 
(2009): 280-281.  
17
 Charles Winquist, Practical Hermeneutics: A Revised Agenda for Ministry (Ann Arbor: McNaughton & 
Gunn, 1980), 17. 
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the way in which interpretation is inevitably (and, for them, usefully) responsive to the 
needs and contexts of interpreters. Further, they employ the term ‘practical’ in order to 
highlight a perceived divide between the theoretical discussions of hermeneutics among 
academics and the applied interpretive practices of believers and clergy in a pastoral 
context.  
 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of hermeneutics is firmly intentionalist— like the 
legal theorists of the mature uṣūl tradition, he holds that the goal of scriptural 
interpretation is to discover God’s intent as encoded in revealed texts. Although al-
Ṭaḥāwī and other Muslim jurists recognize that the interpretive process may be impeded 
by questions surrounding source preservation and interaction or the sheer complexity of 
human language, they nonetheless view the meaning of revelation as unchanging and 
independent of the perspective of the interpreter.
18
 The questions concerning the role of 
the interpreter in creating meaning that arose in discussions of hermeneutics among 
European philosophers and theologians beginning in the 18
th
 century (and which shape 
the thought of Lehtinen and Winquist above) are thus entirely absent from medieval 
Muslim jurists’ approach to textual interpretation.19 Nor, when I term al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
hermeneutical writings ‘practical,’ do I mean to suggest an activity of laypeople as 
opposed to that of scholars. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics were composed 
                                                 
18
 On the intentionalism of the classical uṣūl tradition, see Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law 
(Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 52-65. In the modern period, some Muslim 
intellectuals have sought to develop a hermeneutic that is responsive to what they identify as the changing 
needs of interpreters in the modern world, drawing in particular on an expanded role for the legal theory 
concept of maṣla a (public interest). For an overview of these efforts, see Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, 
Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 500-550.  
19
 On the development of the field of hermeneutics in the 18
th
 century and later, see The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Hermeneutics” by Bjørn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal, 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/hermeneutics/>. 
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by a scholar for a scholarly audience, and he, like other Muslim jurists, would deny that 
non-experts have any role in deriving the law from revelation.  
 Instead, by the phrase ‘practical hermeneutics,’ I propose to signal, first, al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s practical aim of producing individual rules of positive law from the canon of 
revealed sources and, second, the way in which al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works serve as extended 
illustrations of his fundamental claim that a single, coherent Divine Message underlies 
the sometimes conflicting texts of revelation. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī never states this 
second claim directly, his project is implicit in the anxieties he expresses in the 
introductions to Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and Shar  mushkil al-āthār concerning those who 
see contradictions or absurdities in the corpus of Prophetic  adīths.20 Each chapter of his 
hermeneutical works then shows in detail how God’s intent may be derived from one or 
more revealed texts by means of a correct application of hermeneutical procedures. Al-
Ṭaḥāwī does not portray the interpretive process as simple or mechanical; nonetheless, 
across many hundreds of chapters, al-Ṭaḥāwī concretely demonstrates the derivation of 
meaning from text according to hermeneutical principles both implicit and explicit.  
 In one sense, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics can be understood as a 
response to a specifically Ḥanafī crisis: as the authority of Prophetic  adīth grew over the 
3
rd
/9
th
 century, the Ḥanafīs came to be widely criticized as ahl al-raʾy (the partisans of 
mere opinion), with the implication that Ḥanafī positive law was insufficiently tethered to 
revelation.
21
 In the late 3
rd
/9
th
 century, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Ḥanafī predecessor, Muḥammad ibn 
Shujāʿ al-Thaljī (d. 266/880), is reported to have responded to these criticisms by 
                                                 
20
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 1.11; Mushkil, 1.6.  
21
 On the ahl al-raʾy and ahl al- adīth, see Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna,” pp. 56-60. 
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providing Abū Ḥanīfa’s legal doctrine with a basis in  adīth, and to have composed a 
work entitled Taṣ ī  al-āthār.22 However, with only the title of Ibn Shujāʿ’s work 
surviving, the literary form of his arguments remains unknown. Later, when al-Ṭaḥāwī 
took up the task of tethering Ḥanafī fiqh to revelation, we know that he chose to do so by 
painstakingly demonstrating chapter by chapter how the correct interpretation of revealed 
texts produces established rules of Ḥanafī positive law.23  
In a larger sense, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics should be 
understood not only as a Ḥanafī phenomenon, but also as part of the broader evolution of 
Islamic law and Islamic legal writing from the formative into the post-formative periods. 
The earliest decades of the formative period of Islamic law, through most of the 2
nd
/8
th
 
century, were characterized by great diversity of doctrine, but have left little literary 
trace. The end of the 2
nd
/8
th
 century and first half of the 3
rd
/9
th
 century then witness a 
flowering of authoritative fiqh literature, including the appearance of major compendia 
associated with the jurists who would later come to be considered the eponymous 
founders of the mature madhhabs. Al-Ṭaḥāwī represents the late formative period of 
Islamic law, a period stretching from the establishment of fiqh handbooks until the 
maturation of the madhhabs and of uṣūl al-fiqh in the mid-4th/10th century. With the rules 
of positive law already set down, the jurists of the late formative period grappled with 
                                                 
22
 Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-fihrist, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: Muʾassasat al-Furqān lil-Turāth al-
Islāmī, 2009), vol. 2, pt. 1.29; Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th 
Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 48-53. 
23
 While the overall function of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics may be to provide Ḥanafī fiqh 
with a basis in revelation, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal reasoning is not exclusively instrumental. In the course of this 
study, we will see that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s fidelity to a set of hermeneutical principles sometimes leads him to 
depart from established Ḥanafī legal positions, suggesting that legal theory plays both justificatory and 
productive roles in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought. On instrumental and philosophical reasoning in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
works, see Chapter Two, “Companion and Successor Ḥadīths,” pp. 125-129. 
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two major, closely-related challenges: 1) to explain the relationship of established laws to 
revelation, including the increasingly-revered corpus of Prophetic  adīth; and 2) to 
explain the great diversity of legal doctrine. The second challenge is reflected in the 
growth of i htilāf al-fuqahāʾ literature, a genre in which al-Ṭaḥāwī composed one of the 
earliest substantial works. 
Practical hermeneutics, in contrast, can be understood as the response to the 
challenge of articulating the relationship of the doctrine found in the major compendia to 
the corpus of revealed texts. It is possible to identify a number of texts structured 
similarly to the hermeneutical works of al-Ṭaḥāwī, and I suggest that these may usefully 
be considered together under the umbrella of practical hermeneutics. For example, al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s    ā  al-Qurʾān forms part of a minor genre of a  ā  al-Qurʾān works 
expounding the rules of positive law that may be derived from Qurʾānic verses. In Kashf 
al-ẓunūn, K tip  elebi (d. 1068/1657) states that al-Shāfiʿī was the first to compose a 
work of a  ā  al-Qurʾān.24 Although al-Shāfiʿī’s text is no longer extant, it is 
unsurprising that a figure so strongly associated with the effort to insist that all law be 
grounded in revelation should also be the first author in the a  ā  al-Qurʾān genre.  
K tip  elebi lists a total of four a  ā  al-Qurʾān works preceding that of al-
Ṭaḥāwī: those of al-Shāfiʿī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Ḥajar al-Saʿdī (d. 244/ 858-859), the 
Qāḍī Abū Isḥāq Ismāʿīl ibn Isḥāq al-Azdī al-Baṣrī (d. 282/895-896) and Abū al-Ḥasan 
ʿAlī ibn Mūsā ibn Yazdād al-Qummī al-Ḥanafī (d. 305/917-918).25 None of the four is 
extant. Ibn al-Nadīm also attributes an a  ā  al-Qurʾān work to the Baṣran traditionist-
                                                 
24
 K tip  elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asā ī al-kutub wa-l-funūn, ed. Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn Yāltkāyā 
(Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, [1858]), 1.20.  
25
 K tip  elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1.20.  
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jurist Ḥafṣ al-Ḍarīr (d. 246/861).26 The author of one a  ā  work, the Ḥanafī Abū al-
Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Mūsā al-Qummī, is reported by Ibn al-Nadīm to have composed both a 
work of a  ā  al-Qurʾān and a refutation of the aspects of al-Shāfiʿī’s    ā  al-Qurʾān 
which contradicted the Iraqi jurists (Kitāb naqḍ  ā  hālafa fīhi al-Shāfiʿī al-ʿIrāqiyīn fī 
   ā  al-Qurʾān).27 It therefore appears that al-Qummī, like al-Ṭaḥāwī, employed the 
a  ā  al-Qurʾān genre to defend Ḥanafī positive law and assert its origins in revelation.  
Although a  ā  al-Qurʾān works are ostensibly concerned only with Qurʾānic 
law, the complex interaction of legal sources within Islamic hermeneutics means that 
these works must inevitably address other legal sources, especially Prophetic  adīths. 
Indeed, very few chapters in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s    ā  al-Qurʾān treat the Qurʾān only.28 
Rather, Qurʾānic verses serve as the starting point for hermeneutical discussions that 
often devote more space to addressing issues related to  adīth and other sources than to 
the Qurʾān itself. Although we cannot know the literary form of works in the a  ā  
genre before al-Ṭaḥāwī, it is notable that the chapters of later surviving works are 
structured similarly to the chapters of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s    ā  al-Qurʾān.29 For example, the 
Ḥanafī al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980-981) and the Shāfiʿī al-Kiyā al-Harāsī (d. 504/1110-1111) 
begin each chapter or subsection of a chapter of their extant    ā  al-Qurʾān works by 
citing a Qurʾānic verse and then describing the hermeneutical issues involved in deriving 
                                                 
26
 Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.108. 
27
 Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 2.32. Although Ibn al-Nadīm clearly lists these as two separate works, it 
seems possible that they represent a single text.  
28
 To give an approximation of the prevalence of  adīths in    ā  al-Qurʾān, within the 21 chapters that 
comprise Kitāb al-Ṣalāt, only 3 chapters do not contain Prophetic  adīths. Of those 3 chapters, 2 contain 
Companion  adīths. Only 1 chapter contains no  adīths at all.  
29
 It appears, however, that al-Ṭaḥāwī was unusual in the overall structure of his    ā  al-Qurʾān; where 
he organizes the book according to the normal chapters of a work of fiqh and then addresses the Qurʾānic 
verses relevant to each topic, later authors of    ā  al-Qurʾān texts generally follow the tafsīr genre by 
organizing their works according to the chapter of the Qurʾān.  
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the associated rules of positive law.
30
 Like al-Ṭaḥāwī, they acknowledge the conflicting 
interpretations of other jurists while still asserting the positive law of their own madhhab. 
The attention devoted in these works to hermeneutical issues that transcend the Qurʾān 
itself suggests that the common classification of a  ā  al-Qurʾān works as a subgenre of 
tafsīr (Qurʾānic exegesis) fails to capture the scope and purpose of a  ā  al-Qurʾān as 
an intellectual project.
31
 By labeling the a  ā  al-Qurʾān genre as part of a broader 
category of practical hermeneutical writing, I hope to draw attention to the way in which 
these works may share more in common with works of  adīth hermeneutics than they do 
with most tafsīr.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other two works of practical hermeneutics, Shar  mushkil al-āthār 
and Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, belong to a second genre closely associated with the late 
formative period: mukhtalif al- adīth (the harmonization of Prophetic reports). Once 
again, K tip  elebi attributes the first work of this genre to al-Shāfiʿī.32 In the 
introduction to his I htilāf al- adīth, al-Shāfiʿī emphasizes that the Qurʾān and Sunna 
function together to express the law.
33
 Each chapter of al-Shāfiʿī’s work then adduces one 
                                                 
30
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ,    ā  al-Qurʾān, ed. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq Qamḥāwī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 
1985); al-Kiyā al-Harāsī,    ā  al-Qurʾān, ed. Muḥammad Mūsā and ʿAzza ʿAbd ʿAṭīya (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 1985).  
31
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s    ā  al-Qurʾān is categorized as a work of tafsīr in Miṣbāḥ Allāh ʿAbd al-Bāqī, al-I ā  
 bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī wa-atharuhu fī naqd al- adīth (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2010), 64 and ʿAbd al-Majīd 
Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Majīd, al-I ā  al-Ṭa āwī mu addithan (Cairo: Dār al-Muḥaddithīn, 2008), 139. 
Hussein Abdul-Raof describes a  ā  al-Qurʾān works in general as a variety of tafsīr in Schools of 
Qurʾānic Exegesis: Genesis and Develop ent (New York: Routledge, 2010), 140. The tafsīr of al-Qurṭubī 
(d. 671/1273), entitled al-Jā iʿ li-a  ā  al-Qurʾān, appears to be an intermediate case (ed. Aḥmad al-
Burdūnī and Ibrāhīm Aṭfīsh (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīya, 1964)). Although it gives special attention to 
the rules of fiqh contained in the Qurʾān and draws upon other legal sources in doing so, it does not contain 
the complex hermeneutical arguments found in the works of al-Ṭaḥāwī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ, for example.  
32
 K tip  elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1.32.  
33
 Al-Shāfiʿī, I htilāf al- adīth, vol. 10 of Kitāb al-Umm, ed. Rifʿat Fawzī ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib (al-Manṣūra, 
Egypt: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 2005), 5-6. For a discussion of and translated excepts from al-Shāfiʿī’s I htilāf al-
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or more  adīths and resolves the attendant hermeneutical issues in order to derive a 
related law; the organization of the work seems to be influenced loosely by the chapter 
organization of fiqh works. In contrast, while the next known work in the genre, the 
Taʾwīl  u htalif al- adīth of Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), likewise begins each chapter by 
adducing one or more problematic  adīths and then resolving the apparent difficulties, 
Ibn Qutayba devotes most of his chapters to theological, rather than legal, topics.
34
 K tip 
 elebi lists a third work of this title by the Shāfiʿī Zakarīya ibn Yaḥyā al-Sājī (d. 
307/919-920), now lost.
35
  
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Shar  mushkil al-āthār and Shar   aʿānī al-āthār do not 
employ a term linguistically related to ‘i htilāf’ in their titles, they share the literary form 
and objectives of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba’s earlier mukhtalif al- adīth works. Like al-
Shāfiʿī’s I htilāf al- adīth, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Shar   aʿānī al-āthār is exclusively concerned 
with the derivation of law from revealed sources. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s work represents an 
advance over al-Shāfiʿī’s earlier work in several respects, however; it is both a much 
more substantial work—four volumes compared to the hundred or so pages of al-Shāfiʿī’s 
I htilāf—and also more rigorously organized according to the topics of fiqh. In contrast, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Shar  mushkil al-āthār more closely resembles Ibn Qutayba’s Taʾwīl 
mukhtalif al- adīth in its apparent lack of an overall organizing principle and its attention 
                                                                                                                                                 
 adīth, see Joseph Lowry, “al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820),” in Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim 
Jurists, ed. Oussama Arabi, David Powers and Susan Spectorsky (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 51-64.  
34
 Lecomte analyzes the relationship between al-Shāfiʿī’s I htilāf al- adīth and Ibn Qutayba’s Taʾwīl 
mukhtalif al- adīth in “Un exemple d'évolution de la controverse en Islam: de l'Iḫtilāf al-Ḥadīṯ d'al-Šāfiʿī 
au Muḫtalif al-Ḥadīṯ d'Ibn Qutayba,” Studia Islamica 27 (1967): 5-40.  
35
 K tip  elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1.32. 
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to both legal and non-legal topics. Once again, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 15-volume work is 
considerably more substantial than Ibn Qutayba’s single volume. 
Traditionally, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s    ā  al-Qurʾān, Shar  mushkil al-āthār and Shar  
 aʿānī al-āthār have been analyzed separately as belonging to either the a  ā  al-
Qurʾān or the mukhtalif al- adīth genres.36 By applying the label of ‘practical 
hermeneutics’ to all three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, I hope to draw attention to the way in 
which, despite their surface differences, they all share a literary form that moves from 
revealed text to law (or, sometimes in Shar  mushkil al-āthār, to non-legal meanings 
derived from revelation). This shared literary form points to a common project 
underlying all three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, and indeed all the works of practical 
hermeneutics that I have described above: the assertion that the revealed texts of Qurʾān 
and Sunna form a single, coherent Divine Message from which a coherent Divine Law 
may be derived. Nor is the concept of practical hermeneutics limited to works 
traditionally ascribed to the genres of a  ā  al-Qurʾān or mukhtalif al- adīth; the 
Tahdhīb al-āthār and Tafsīr of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s contemporary al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) both 
devote considerable attention to determining the legal implications of the revealed texts 
he adduces, even though they are not exclusively works of practical hermeneutics as 
described above. 
‘Practical hermeneutics,’ then, is a label that transcends traditional notions of 
generic boundaries by pointing to a larger intellectual project among jurists of the late 
                                                 
36
 E.g., Saʿd al-Dīn Ūnāl, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” Introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān, by Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad 
al-Ṭaḥāwī (Istanbul: T rkiye Diyanet  akf ,  sl m Ara t rmalar  Merkezi, 1995-1998), 5-7; ʿAbd al-Majīd, 
al-I ā  al-Ṭa āwī  u addithan, 297-321; ʿAbd al-Bāqī, al-I ā   bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī wa-atharuhu fī 
naqd al- adīth, 333-334. 
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formative period of Islamic law.  It cannot be coincidental that al-Shāfiʿī, who strongly 
argued for the basis of law in revelation, is identified as the author of the earliest works in 
both the mukhtalif al- adīth and the a  ā  al-Qurʾān genres. His project was, in a sense, 
completed by al-Ṭaḥāwī, who made the same argument on behalf of the Ḥanafīs, who had 
until then been criticized as ahl al-raʾy, implying that their fiqh was not based in 
revelation. That is not to say that jurists after al-Ṭaḥāwī ceased to compose works of 
mukhtalif al- adīth or a  ā  al-Qurʾān; genres, once established, often develop in ways 
that are not determined by the needs that originally inspired them. However, while a few 
Ḥanafīs before al-Ṭaḥāwī may have begun the project of grounding Ḥanafī fiqh in 
revelation as noted above, it is al-Ṭaḥāwī whose works were preserved and extensively 
commented upon by Ḥanafīs and others.37 His lifetime therefore seems to represent a 
crucial moment in the process by which the basis of law in revelation—at least in theory, 
if not as an obvious characteristic of specific rules of positive law—ceased to be an issue 
dividing jurists of the emerging madhhabs, and became unquestioned doctrine.
38
  
In fact, it seems likely that the more pressing task for jurists of the post-formative 
period would be to tether the principles of uṣūl al-fiqh, rather than the texts of revelation, 
to established rules of positive law. In his Structural Interrelations of Theory and 
Practice in Islamic Law, Ahmad Atif Ahmad identifies a genre of legal writing which he 
labels ta hrīj al-furūʿ ʿalā al-uṣūl, or ‘deriving the rules of positive law from the bases of 
the law.’ Works of this genre, which appear first at the turn of the 5th/11th century but 
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 See below, p. 41. 
38
 Hallaq labels this process the rationalist-traditionalist synthesis. He likewise locates it in the first half of 
the 4
th
/10
th
 century, although he associates the full articulation of this synthesis with the Shāfiʿī Ibn Surayj 
(d. 306/918) (Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal Theories, 33).  
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become more common in the 6
th
/12
th
 century, demonstrate how legal rules can be 
established on the basis of known principles of uṣūl in much the same way that works of 
practical hermeneutics demonstrate the derivation of law from text.
39
 Both genres 
respond to the anxieties of their own periods by asserting a connection between bodies of 
texts and ideas that had come to be perceived as insufficiently connected.  
 The close analysis of the legal theory contained in the works of practical 
hermeneutics listed above and other, yet-to-be-identified works is beyond the scope of 
this study. However, it is reasonable to assume that, like al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, other 
surviving early texts that we may label ‘practical hermeneutics’ may also prove to be 
particularly rich sources for reconstructing legal theory in the late formative period. 
Where early fiqh or  hilāf (juristic disagreement) works, for example, often provide no 
justification at all for the rules they expound or only a kind of shorthand explanation, the 
nature of practical hermeneutics is to demonstrate the relationship between text and rule. 
Within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own corpus, for example, one could learn from the Mukhtaṣar or 
I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ that he was familiar with concepts such as ij āʿ, qiyās, ʿā  : hāṣṣ 
and isti sān, but only the detailed legal derivations of his works of practical hermeneutics 
reveal the nuances of how he understood these concepts, and the ways in which his 
understandings differ sometimes quite dramatically from how they were understood by 
most theorists of the mature uṣūl tradition.  
 To some degree, the differences between the legal theories of al-Ṭaḥāwī and later 
jurists are attributable to the different periods in which they lived; al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
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 Ahmad Atif Ahmad, Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of Six 
Works of Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 16.  
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hermeneutical works are particularly valuable to researchers because they represent rare 
survivals from the transitional period between late formative and post-formative Islamic 
law. However, in the course of this study, I will indicate a number of places where the 
differences between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theories and those of the uṣūlīs seem to be due not to the 
passage of time, but rather to the different imperatives of the genres of practical 
hermeneutics and uṣūl al-fiqh. While uṣūlīs sought elegance and consistency in their 
descriptions of the workings of the law, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theories require great 
flexibility in order to be useful tools for the practical business of interpreting revealed 
texts.  
It is possible, therefore, that our current narrative of the history of Islamic legal 
theory is in need of revision. Instead of a single trajectory of development from the first 
theoretical statements of the early jurists to the canonization of uṣūl al-fiqh as a genre, we 
might instead trace two literary forms addressing questions of legal theory: one in close 
contact with the practical interpretation of texts, and another in which the elaboration of 
theory became an end in itself.
40
 Much work remains to be done on the legal theory 
contained in works of practical hermeneutics before this possibility can be confirmed or 
refuted.
41
 This study contributes to that work by offering the first full-length analysis of 
one jurist’s legal theory as reflected in his practical works of legal interpretation.  
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 Norman Calder terms this function of uṣūl al-fiqh “virtuoso patterning” (Calder, Studies in Early Muslim 
Jurisprudence, 199).  
41
 A careful comparison of al-Shāfiʿī’s legal theory in the theory-driven Risāla and in the works I have here 
labeled practical hermeneutics might be particularly instructive.  
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Approach and Structure  
 This study reconstructs al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory from the many scattered 
discussions of theoretical topics found in his works of practical hermeneutics, with 
occasional reference to his other extant legal texts. Wherever possible, I place al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s ideas in the context of other jurists of the formative and early classical periods. 
In particular, I compare al-Ṭaḥāwī’s positions to those of al-Shāfiʿī as well as earlier and 
later Ḥanafīs in order to evaluate claims regarding his intellectual debt to jurists of those 
schools. Because of the difficulty of locating theoretical passages in works of practical 
hermeneutics and of understanding the relationship of those passages to a jurist’s overall 
legal theory, my comparisons between al-Ṭaḥāwī and other jurists are of necessity 
primarily drawn from works of uṣūl al-fiqh rather than works that might be labeled 
practical hermeneutics. It is the difficulty of determining the details of a jurist’s legal 
theory from the brief, isolated passages in works of practical hermeneutics that makes the 
present study vital.  As mentioned above, much important work remains to be done 
identifying and analyzing hermeneutical texts before we will be in a position to 
characterize the relationship among texts of practical hermeneutics or that between 
practical hermeneutics and uṣūl al-fiqh. As a result, my suggestions regarding al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s place in a narrative of the development of Islamic legal thought of the late 
3
rd
/9
th
 and early 4
th
/10
th
 centuries are necessarily tentative.  
In my selection of topics I have been guided by the frequency and urgency with 
which al-Ṭaḥāwī returns to each issue of legal theory in the course of his works. Passages 
on legal theory in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works can be divided into two categories: discussions of 
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the authority and relative status of legal sources, and discussions of interpretive 
paradigms for understanding revealed texts. Because al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of legal 
sources are more complex and detailed than his discussions of hermeneutical techniques, 
I devote individual chapters to Qurʾān and Sunna (Chapter One), Companion and 
Successor Ḥadīths (Chapter Two), and Consensus and the Practice of the Community 
(Chapter Three).  
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not set out an overarching theory of legal sources, I base 
my chapter order loosely on a list that appears repeatedly across his hermeneutical works: 
Qurʾān, Sunna and Consensus.42 Al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces this list, always in the same order, 
whenever he wishes to assert that an interpretive move requires evidence to support it.
43
 
For instance, in Shar  mushkil al-āthār he refutes an interlocutor’s argument on the 
grounds that no one may depart from a certain established opinion supported by most of 
the Companions without evidence from Qurʾān, Sunna or Consensus, while in Shar  
 aʿānī al-āthār he asserts that it is impermissible to choose between two possible 
interpretations of a certain  adīth without evidence from the Qurʾān, Sunna or 
Consensus.
44
 This list thus in some sense stands in for the idea of authoritative legal 
sources. 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 1.416, 1.453, 3.10, 3.176, 4.98, 4.144;    ā , 2.335; Mushkil, 8.294-295, 9.205-
206, 9.209, 10.16, 10.108. The same list appears in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s ʿ qīda in an article stating that Muslims 
must renounce anyone who does not believe in these three sources (al-ʿ qīda al-Ṭa āwīya, ed. ʿAbd Allāh 
Ḥajjāj (Cairo: Sharikat al-Salām al-ʿĀlamīya, 1980), 101).  
43
 Al-Shāfiʿī employs similar lists of authorities in the same contexts (Joseph Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī Have a 
Theory of “Four Sources” of Law?,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 
2002), 35), although his lists are considerably less stable than al-Ṭaḥāwī’s list of Qurʾān, Sunna and 
Consensus. 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 10:16-20; Maʿānī, 1.453f. 
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Occasionally, other elements appear in these lists. Although Companion opinions 
appear only twice in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s list of authoritative sources,45 they play a far larger role 
in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical arguments in practice than these lists would seem to 
suggest. I therefore devote a chapter to exploring the role of the Companions and 
Successors in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought. Communal practice (ʿamal) does not appear at 
all in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s lists of sources and plays only a small role in his works; nonetheless, I 
include a discussion of it in my chapter on Consensus because of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s unusual 
statements concerning it and its complicated relationship with his concept of Consensus. 
Finally, al-Ṭaḥāwī sometimes mentions qiyās, naẓar or raʾy along with other sources of 
legal authority;
46
 however, several passages clarify that al-Ṭaḥāwī does not consider these 
to be legal sources in themselves, but rather a hermeneutical method to resort to in the 
absence of evidence from the authoritative sources of Qurʾān, Sunna and Consensus.47 I 
therefore discuss rational methods of legal derivation in Chapter Four, “Hermeneutics.” 
 The remainder of that chapter takes its structure from the only extended theory-
driven discussion in all of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works, the introduction to    ā  al-
Qurʾān. Within the seven pages of the introduction, al-Ṭaḥāwī establishes a hierarchical 
relationship between three sets of hermeneutical terms: mu  a : utashābih 
(unequivocal:equivocal), ẓāhir:bāṭin (apparent:non-apparent) and ʿā  : hāṣṣ 
(unrestricted:restricted), and I have made an exploration of the relationship among these 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.475-6 (Companions only); Maʿānī, 1.11 (Companions and Successors). The 
opinions of the Companions are also discussed as a source of law in a passage of al-Mukhtaṣar in which al-
Ṭaḥāwī describes the method and sources that judges should use to derive the law (Mukhtaṣar al-Ṭa āwī, 
ed. Abū al-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī (Hyderabad: Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Maʿārif al-Nuʿmānīya, 1951), 327).   
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.416, 1.475-6, 2.20; Maʿānī, 3.246. 
47
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 10.108, 10.141-142, 13.40-41 and 15.230. The final example states that qiyās is 
used in cases where there is no evidence from Qurʾān or Sunna. All other examples mention Qurʾān, Sunna 
and Consensus.  
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the subject of the first half of that chapter.
48
 In the remainder of this introductory chapter, 
I provide an overview of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s life and works before addressing questions related 
to the authorship and composition of the three works used as the major sources of this 
study.  
 
Life 
 Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Salāma al-Ṭaḥāwī was born in Ṭaḥā or the 
nearby village of Ṭaḥṭūṭ in Upper Egypt,49 most probably in 239/853,50 although some 
biographers give birth dates as early as 229/843.
51
 His ancestors, members of the Ḥajr 
branch of the Azd tribe, were likely among the earliest Arab settlers in Egypt, almost all 
of whom came from South Arabian or Yemeni tribes, including Azd.
52
 His grandfather 
Salāma was one of the army notables (wujūh al-jund) who responded to a missive from 
the anti-caliph Ibrāhīm ibn al-Mahdī calling the Egyptian jund to renounce the ʿAbbāsid 
caliph al-Maʾmūn (r. 198-218/813-833) and the Egyptian governor al-Sarī ibn al-Ḥakam 
(r. 200-201/816, 201-205/817-820) upon al-Maʾmūn’s controversial naming of ʿAlī al-
Riḍā (d. 203/818) as his heir in 202/817. After leading his troops in support of al-Sarī’s 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.59-66.  
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 Al-Samʿānī lists al-Ṭaḥāwī among the notable residents of Ṭaḥā in al- nsāb, ed. Muḥammad ʿAwāma 
(Beirut: Muḥammad Amīn Damaj, 1970), 8.217. Ibn Yūnus al-Ṣadafī reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī was not, in 
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Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 2000), 1.21). See also Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Muʿja  al-buldān (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 
1995), 4.22.   
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 Ibn Yūnus, Tārī h, 1.22; al-Samʿānī, al- nsāb, 8.218; al-Ṣaymarī,   hbār  bī Ḥanīfa wa-aṣ ābihi 
(Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1995), 168.   
51
 Al-Laknawī gives al-Ṭaḥāwī’s birth year as 229, 230 or 238 (al-Fawāʾid al-bahīya fī tarāji  al-
Ḥanafīya, ed. Aḥmad al-Zuʿbī (Beirut: Dār al-Arqām, 1998), 59, 62); al-Suyūṭī gives the year as 237 
(Ṭabaqāt al- uffāẓ, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1973), 337).   
52
 Hugh Kennedy, “Egypt as a Province in the Islamic Caliphate, 641-868,” in The Cambridge History of 
Egypt, ed. Carl Petry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1.64.  
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rival in the complicated internal power struggles in Egypt at that time, Salāma and his son 
Ibrāhīm were eventually captured, brought to Fusṭāṭ and executed on al-Sarī’s command 
in 204/819.
53
  
 Considerably less is known about al-Ṭaḥāwī’s parents. In his entry for al-Ṭaḥāwī, 
Ibn Khallikān reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s father died in 264/877-8.54 Al-Ṭaḥāwī also 
transmitted  adīth from his father,55 although the absence of any ṭabaqāt entries on 
Muḥammad suggests that he was not an important traditionist. A few passages of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s own works indicate that his father was an expert on poetry. In Shar  mushkil 
al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces a variant of a poem on his father’s authority, and in his 
transmission of al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Sunan, he gives his father as the source for two additional 
lines of a poem transmitted by al-Shāfiʿī to al-Muzanī.56 Modern studies of al-Ṭaḥāwī 
generally identify his mother as a sister of al-Muzanī, who was one of the most important 
students of al-Shāfiʿī.57 However, the earliest biographies indicate only that al-Ṭaḥāwī 
was a student of al-Muzanī.58 The first mention of a familial relationship between the two 
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jurists appears in the entry on al-Muzanī in al-Khalīlī’s (d. 446/1054) al-Irshād fī  aʿrifat 
ʿula āʾ al- adīth.59 Two centuries later, Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) again describes al-
Ṭaḥāwī as the nephew of al-Muzanī, citing al-Khalīlī as his source.60 From that time, 
their familial relationship becomes an important part of the biographical tradition.
61
 
 It is certainly possible that al-Ṭaḥāwī was the nephew of al-Muzanī and earlier 
biographers simply omitted to mention their relationship. However, it is perhaps more 
probable that the familial relationship between the two jurists was a detail added later to 
heighten the narrative drama of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s decision to affiliate with the Ḥanafīs after his 
early study of Shāfiʿī doctrine under al-Muzanī. Biographers give various accounts of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s transfer to Ḥanafism. Ibn Yūnus (d. 347/958) states only that al-Ṭaḥāwī began 
to study Ḥanafī doctrine when the Ḥanafī Aḥmad ibn Abī ʿImrān came to Egypt, and that 
al-Muzanī reproached al-Ṭaḥāwī in a dream for his abandonment of him.62 Al-Ṣaymarī 
(d. 436/1044) reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī joined the Ḥanafīs in anger at an insult from al-
Muzanī.63 Al-Khalīlī, however, portrays al-Ṭaḥāwī’s decision as an oblique act of 
deference to al-Muzanī, writing that al-Ṭaḥāwī frequently observed his uncle studying the 
books of Abū Ḥanīfa and was inspired to study them himself.64 Later biographers would 
adduce and reframe these three basic narratives in various combinations in their attempts 
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to explain a shift in madhhab affiliation that was, from the viewpoint of the mature legal 
tradition, very much in need of explanation.
65
  
 It is less clear that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s shift in affiliation was a noteworthy event by the 
standards of his own time. Although Monique Bernards and John Nawas have found that 
only about 5% of jurists who died before the year 250/864 are recorded by the 
biographical literature as having changed madhhabs, they also found that 54% of jurists 
of the same period are not reported to have belonged to any established Sunni madhhab.
66
 
Further, Nurit Tsafrir has demonstrated that later biographers sometimes claimed as 
members of their own madhhab jurists and traditionists who may have had only weak ties 
to the school.
67
 The biographical literature suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s change of madhhab 
occurred less than a decade after the end of the period under consideration by Nawas and 
Bernards.
68
 Given the wide variation in what it meant for an individual to be claimed as a 
member of a madhhab in the biographical tradition, Bernards and Nawas may be too 
quick in their conclusion that changing madhhabs has always been a “marginal and 
unique” practice.69 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī lived during an important transitional period during which the 
madhhabs were developing into their mature form. Eyyup Said Kaya points to the 
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appearance of legal handbooks (mukhtaṣars) and commentaries, the compilation of 
Prophetic traditions, the first works of legal theory, and the labeling of some jurists as 
heads of the Ḥanafī school, as evidence for the maturation of the Ḥanafī madhhab in the 
4
th
/10
th
 century.
70
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s career exemplifies many of these developments: he 
composed a Mukhtaṣar as well as commentaries on the works of his Ḥanafī predecessor 
al-Shaybānī;71 gathered Prophetic  adīths in his works of practical hermeneutics and 
perhaps in a  adīth compilation;72 and was considered by later biographers to have been 
the head of the Ḥanafīs in Egypt for his time.73 He is also reported to have written a work 
on the virtues of Abū Ḥanīfa,74 another indication of the development of madhhab 
identity.  
However, the Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī madhhabs of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time in Egypt had not 
yet developed what Melchert terms their “guild” nature; that is, they did not yet constitute 
“a body of jurisprudents with a regular method of reproducing itself” and 
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“distinguish[ing] those qualified from those not qualified.“75 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s study under al-
Muzanī and later under Ḥanafīs including Ibn Abī ʿImrān, Bakkār ibn Qutayba and 
others, was not undertaken as part of the transmission of a set canon, and his relationships 
with his Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī teachers seem to have been personal rather than institutional. 
In this context, a student’s decision to change madhhab affiliation is unlikely to have had 
the meaning that it would within the mature guild system. For al-Ṭaḥāwī, affiliation with 
a madhhab appears to have signified a personal loyalty to the doctrine of Abū Ḥanīfa, 
Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī, albeit one that did not constrain him from expressing his 
opposition to their opinions in cases where his own legal reasoning led him to a different 
result.  
Nor was al-Ṭaḥāwī, at the time of his affiliation with the Ḥanafīs, a major jurist 
whose change in loyalties would have represented a recanting of an established career 
and body of work. None of his own works are said to date from his time as a Shāfiʿī, 
although he did transmit al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Sunan al- aʾthūra from al-Muzanī. If we accept 
accounts that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s affiliation followed swiftly upon the arrival of Aḥmad ibn Abī 
ʿImrān in Egypt in 258/871-2, then al-Ṭaḥāwī was probably not yet twenty years old 
when he began to study with the Ḥanafīs.76 At the very latest, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s study with Ibn 
Abī ʿImrān predates his journey to Syria in 268-9/881-2, where he studied with the 
Ḥanafī judge Abū Khāzim (d. 292/904).77 It is therefore difficult to agree with Tsafrir that 
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“al-Ṭaḥāwī’s transfer to the Ḥanafī school must have shocked his contemporaries, 
particularly his family,” 78 although it certainly was shocking to later biographers.  
It is probably only in hindsight, from the perspective of a mature madhhab 
tradition which viewed al-Ṭaḥāwī as having been the head of the Ḥanafīs in Egypt, that 
one young man’s decision to study with the Ḥanafīs after having studied with the Shāfiʿīs 
appears particularly noteworthy. It may also be that the biographical tradition’s enduring 
interest in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s change of madhhab is due to the way in which these ‘conversion’ 
narratives dramatize al-Ṭaḥāwī’s complex relationship with both madhhabs. Far from 
completely abandoning Shāfiʿī thought upon his move to Ḥanafism, al-Ṭaḥāwī justified 
Ḥanafī law using many of the elements of al-Shāfiʿī’s traditionalism. An evaluation of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s relationship with both Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī thought is one of the major tasks of 
this study. 
Although it is not possible to reconstruct al-Ṭaḥāwī’s motivation in affiliating 
with the Ḥanafīs with any certainty from the biographical literature, we can draw some 
conclusions about the probable effects of his decision. While the majority of Egyptian 
Muslims of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time were Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs, the qāḍīs appointed by the 
ʿAbbāsids were usually Ḥanafīs, and Egyptian Ḥanafism in general was closely 
associated with the central ʿAbbāsid government in Iraq.79 When Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn (r. 
254-70/868-84) established autonomous Ṭūlūnid rule in Egypt, he allowed the ʿAbbāsid-
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appointed Ḥanafī judge Bakkār ibn Qutayba (d. 270/884) to remain in his post.80 The next 
Ṭūlūnid qāḍī was likewise an Iraqi Ḥanafī, and the first Shāfiʿī qāḍī of Egypt, Abū Zurʿa, 
was not appointed until 284/897.
81
   
In becoming a Ḥanafī, al-Ṭaḥāwī therefore aligned himself with the Egyptian 
judiciary, which was in turn closely aligned with the ʿAbbāsid governors of Egypt and, 
later, the Ṭūlūnids. His change in madhhab thus may have restored some of the access to 
power that his family had lost after his grandfather’s execution and the caliph al-
Muʿtaṣim’s (r. 218-227/833-842) later abolishment of the ʿaṭāʾ (military salary) of the 
Egyptian jund, a move that put a final end to the already declining power of the jund 
families.
82
 That al-Ṭaḥāwī may have had a political motive in becoming a Ḥanafī is 
suggested by his earliest biographer, Ibn Yūnus, who quotes al-Ṭaḥāwī as saying that, 
“when Aḥmad ibn Abī ʿImrān came to us as a qāḍī over Egypt, I became his disciple and 
adopted his doctrine.”83 In fact, Ibn Abī ʿImrān appears to have served briefly as a judge 
in Egypt only after the death of Bakkār ibn Qutayba in 270/884, more than a decade after 
Ibn Abī ʿImrān’s probable arrival in Egypt, if he ever was in fact a judge at all.84 By 
noting Ibn Abī ʿImrān’s role as qāḍī, Ibn Yūnus draws a connection between the 
judiciary and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s affiliation with the Ḥanafīs. 
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The little we know of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s subsequent career suggests that he succeeded in 
forging close ties with the Ḥanafī qāḍīs of Egypt and, through them, the Egyptian court. 
We have already observed that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s first Ḥanafī teacher was Aḥmad ibn Abī 
ʿImrān, a Baghdādī Ḥanafī who came to Egypt in the company of a tax collector for the 
ʿAbbāsids and later may have served briefly as qāḍī.85 In 268-9/881-2, al-Ṭaḥāwī traveled 
to Syria, where he studied with the Baghdādī Ḥanafī Abū Khāzim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 292/904), who was then qāḍī of Damascus.86 Another Ḥanafī qāḍī of 
Egypt, the Baṣran Bakkār ibn Qutayba (d. 270/883), also served as al-Ṭaḥāwī’s teacher in 
 adīth and perhaps in fiqh.87 In his professional life, al-Ṭaḥāwī served as  ātib (secretary) 
for both Bakkār ibn Qutayba and for his successor, the Ḥanafī qāḍī Muḥammad ibn 
ʿAbda ibn Ḥarb (277 or 278/890 or 891-283/896). He was also the latter’s deputy 
(nāʾib).88  
In addition, various literary sources portray al-Ṭaḥāwī as closely connected with 
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn: one anecdote shows al-Ṭaḥāwī convincing Ibn Ṭūlūn to restore to him 
the title on one of his grandfather’s seized estates in Upper Egypt,89 while another 
suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s journey to Damascus was undertaken at Ibn Ṭūlūn’s behest in 
order to confirm a technical detail of a charitable trust (waqf) for a hospital.
90
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al-Ṭaḥāwī is described as part of Ibn Ṭūlūn’s retinue ( in  hāṣṣatihi).91 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
close ties to the Ṭūlūnids also caused him to be suspected of corruption: in the Fihrist, 
Ibn al-Nadīm reports al-Ṭaḥāwī composed a work at Ibn Ṭūlūn’s behest justifying the 
latter’s improper marriage to a slave girl.92 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s ties to the judiciary also made 
him vulnerable to court politics. Ibn Zūlāq reports that when the qāḍī Muḥammad ibn 
ʿAbda hid in his home for ten years in order to avoid persecution from the new Ṭūlūnid 
ruler, Hārūn (r. 283/896-292/904), the governor instead pursued Ibn ʿAbda’s associates, 
imprisoning al-Ṭaḥāwī for a time.93 
After the restoration of ʿAbbāsid rule in Egypt in 292/905, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to 
have retained his close ties to the judiciary, even as the qāḍīs sent from Baghdad began to 
represent a wider range of madhhabs. The Shāfiʿī qāḍī Abū ʿUbayd ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn 
ibn Ḥarb (293/906-311/24) was so eager to appoint al-Ṭaḥāwī as a court witness (shāhid) 
that he took advantage of the absence of other court witnesses on the Hajj in 306/919 to 
make the appointment over their objections.
94
 When the ʿAbbāsid ruler replaced Abū 
ʿUbayd as qāḍī with the Baghdādī ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Mukram, the latter wrote 
to al-Ṭaḥāwī and three other important Egyptians, asking them to select a deputy so that 
he would not need to come to Egypt himself.
95
 Ibn Zūlāq reports anecdotes about the 
deference shown to al-Ṭaḥāwī by a number of qāḍīs including the Ḥanafī ʿAbd al-
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Raḥmān ibn Isḥāq al-Jawharī (313/925-314/926), the Shāfiʿī ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn 
Zabr (317/929), and the Mālikī Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Ḥammād (321/933-322/934).96  
In addition to his activities as a jurist, al-Ṭaḥāwī was also an active traditionist 
who both collected  adīths and practiced isnād criticism.97 As the Ṭūlūnid court became 
a major cultural center in the second half of the 3
rd
/9
th
 century, Egypt drew traditionists 
from across the Islamic world. As a result, al-Ṭaḥāwī was able to collect  adīths from 
important traditionists without making the multiple study journeys typical of many of the 
ahl al- adīth.98 Al-Ṭaḥāwī was also unusual for a Ḥanafī of his time in that he 
consistently adduced the  adīths he collected in support of his legal positions in works 
including    ā  al-Qurʾān, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and Shar  mushkil al-āthār.99 Indeed, 
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handbooks, the briefest perusal of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics demonstrates that the 
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al-Ṭaḥāwī’s most significant and lasting contribution to Ḥanafism was to provide 
established Ḥanafī fiqh with a foundation in Prophetic  adīth.100 The biographical 
tradition dramatizes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s unusual joining of Ḥanafī fiqh and  adīth study in the 
form of an anecdote that Ibn Ḥajar transmits from Ibn Zūlāq (d. 387/997). After attending 
the study circle of the qāḍī Muḥammad ibn ʿAbda, a mysterious but important stranger 
asks al-Ṭaḥāwī and a Shāfiʿī jurist, Abū Saʿīd al-Fāryābī, to remain behind. When the 
stranger tests the two jurists by asking about an obscure isnād, al-Fāryābī is reduced to 
silence, while al-Ṭaḥāwī recites the isnād and accompanying  adīth flawlessly. In 
response, the mysterious stranger exclaims, “Don’t you know what you have just said? 
…This evening I have seen you among the jurists (fuqahāʾ) acting in their sphere, and 
now I see you acting in the sphere of the traditionists (ahl al- adīth). How few are those 
who combine the two!”101  
Although later biographers would consider al-Ṭaḥāwī the head of the Egyptian 
Ḥanafīs of his day,102 he had no important students in law, perhaps reflecting the weak 
roots of Ḥanafism in Egypt at the time. Very few jurists are reported to have studied 
under him, although biographers record a number of those who transmitted  adīth from 
                                                                                                                                                 
absence of explanation is a characteristic of the Mukhtaṣar genre in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time, not a characteristic of 
his style of legal thought. 
100
 I discuss this point in detail in Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna.” See also Melchert, “Traditionist-
Jurisprudents,” 397-398, for the roles of both al-Ṭaḥāwī and Ibn Shujāʿ al-Thaljī (d. 266/880) in this 
process. 
101
 Ibn Ḥajar, Lisān al- ī ān, 1.419. For a shortened version of the same anecdote, see al-Dhahabī, 
Tadhkirat al- uffāẓ, 3.22.  
102
 Al-Laknawī, al-Fawāʾid al-bahīya, 62; al-Ṣaymarī,   hbār  bī Ḥanīfa, 168; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-
fuqahāʾ, 142; al-Suyūṭī, Ṭabaqāt al- uffāẓ, 337; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārī h Di ashq, 5.369. Given the incomplete 
institutionalization of Ḥanafism during al-Ṭaḥāwī’s lifetime, it is likely only in retrospect, taking into 
account his stature and intellectual output, that he could be considered the head of the Egyptian Ḥanafīs. 
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him.
103
 His few students in law include his own son, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-
Ṭaḥāwī (fl. 350/961-2).104 The only other jurists reported to be al-Ṭaḥāwī’s students in 
law in Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ’s al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya are the qāḍī Muḥammad ibn Badr ibn 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ṣayrafī (d. 330/941), Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Damaghānī 
(n.d.) and Saʿīd ibn Muḥammad al-Bardaʿī (n.d.).105 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s importance within the 
Ḥanafī madhhab instead derives from his works, a number of which attracted 
commentary traditions, discussed below. Al-Ṭaḥāwī died in Egypt in Dhū al-Qaʿda 
321/933, most likely in his early eighties.
106
 He is buried in a mausoleum in the Qarāfa 
cemetery of present-day Cairo.
107
  
 
An Overview of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Works  
The substantial body of extant works available to scholars studying al-Ṭaḥāwī 
distinguishes him from other late 3
rd
/9
th
 and early 4
th
/10
th
-century jurists, as the briefest 
perusal of Sezgin’s Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums will confirm.108 The most 
complete catalog of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works in the biographical tradition is found in al-
Jawāhir al-muḍīya of Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ (d. 775/1373), which is the source for titles listed 
                                                 
103
 See p. 35n98 above.  
104
 Ibn Ḥajar, Lisān al- ī ān, 1.418; Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ, al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya, 1.166, 2.156.  
105
 Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ, al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya, 2.320, 2.193, 1.401. The latter is reported to be one of the 
disciples (aṣ āb) of al-Ṭaḥāwī; it is not entirely clear whether he studied law or only  adīth with him.  
106
 Ibn Yūnus, Tārī h, 1.22; al-Samʿānī, al- nsāb, 8.218; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya, ed. ʿAlī 
Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 2005), 
11.187; al-Dhahabī, Tadhkirat al- uffāẓ, 3.22. Ibn al-Nadīm disagrees, stating that al-Ṭaḥāwī died in 
322/934 (Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.31).   
107
 Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān, 1.71. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī provides a description of and 
directions to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s mausoleum according to modern geography (al-Ḥāwī fī sīrat al-I ā  al-Ṭa āwī 
(Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Azharīya lil-Turāth, 1995), 42).  
108
 Sezgin’s entry on al-Ṭaḥāwī can be found in Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums (Leiden: Brill, 
1967-1994), 1.439-442; for other jurists of the late 3
rd
/9
th
 and early 4
th
/10
th
 centuries, see 1.433ff.   
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below except where otherwise indicated.
109
 In the following pages I give a brief overview 
of all of the works attributed to al-Ṭaḥāwī, both lost and extant, in order to suggest the 
wide scope of his intellectual activity in the fields of theology, exegesis, 
history/biography,  adīth and law. The three works that are the subject of this study, 
however, transcend individual categories such as law,  adīth or exegesis. Shar   aʿānī 
al-āthār and Shar  mushkil al-āthār can be considered works on both law and  adīth, 
while    ā  al-Qurʾān has been described as a specialized form of exegesis. What 
unites all three works and distinguishes them from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other extant compositions 
is the kind of intellectual activity they represent—an activity that I have termed practical 
hermeneutics. 
 
Theology 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s well-known ʿ qīda (Creed), along with that of his contemporary al-
Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-6), represents one of the earliest statements of Sunni belief of 
undoubted authenticity.
110
 The ʿ qīda remains the focus of an active commentary 
tradition today.
111
 Two short theological treatises (or perhaps two versions of the same 
                                                 
109
 Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ, al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya, 1.165-7. The earliest substantial list of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works is 
found in Ibn al-Nadīm’s Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.31-2; it contains all of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s authenticated works that 
are extant today, as well as some lost works. Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ’s list contains almost all of the works found 
in Ibn al-Nadīm and includes approximately ten additional titles. These appear to be minor works, except 
for al-Tārī h al- abīr and al-Tafsīr, both of which the biographical tradition suggests were major 
compendiums. I have not identified Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ’s source for these additional titles. Other extensive 
lists of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works can be found in al-Laknawī, al-Fawāʾid al-bahīya, 60 and Qinālīzādah, Ṭabaqāt 
al-Ḥanafīya, 2.26, but these appear to be derivative of Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ. 
110
 On both, see W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Creeds: A Selection (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1994), 41-56. Curiously, Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ does not include the ʿ qīda in his list of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
works; however, it is mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.32.  
111
 The commentaries on the ʿ qīda are too numerous to list here; the most important of them is that of Ibn 
Abī al-ʿIzz al-Ḥanafī (d. 792/1390), Shar  al-ʿ qīda al-Ṭa āwīya, ed. ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-
Turkī and Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1987). A number of medieval and modern 
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treatise) bound together and attributed to al-Ṭaḥāwī are held by the Princeton University 
Libraries, although they remain unauthenticated and are not reported in the biographical 
tradition.
112
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī may also have written a heresiography entitled Kitāb al-ni al wa-
a  ā ihā wa-ṣifātihā wa-ajnāsihā (Religious Sects: Their Laws, Characteristics and 
Types).
113
 
 
Biography/History 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s major historical and biographical work, al-Tārī h al- abīr (The 
Comprehensive Chronicle), is no longer extant, but was a source (perhaps indirectly) for 
Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ’s al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya.114 Also lost are al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Manāqib  bī 
Ḥanīfa ( irtues of Abū Ḥanīfa) and his Radd ʿalā  bī ʿUbayd fī ā a hṭaʾa fīhā (A 
Refutation of Abū ʿUbayd’s Errors), which is about the Kitāb al-nasab (Genealogy) of 
Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. ca. 224/838).115 
 
Exegesis 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī is reported to have written one thousand pages on the Qurʾān. That 
work may be identical to the unauthenticated manuscript entitled Tafsīr al-Qurʾān 
                                                                                                                                                 
commentaries have been gathered in the three-volume Jā iʿ al-shurū  wa-l-taʿlīqāt al-ʿil īya ʿalā al-
ʿ qīda al-Ṭa āwīya (Cairo: Dār Bidāya lil-Iʿlām wa-l-Nashr, 2010). 
112
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, “Hādhā kitāb al-Ṭaḥāwī fī uṣūl al-dīn,” ms., Princeton, Arabic, Third Series, no. 288. Fol. 
1a-6b., 1714; al-Ṭaḥāwī, “Kitāb al-Ṭaḥāwī li-uṣūl al-dīn,” ms., Princeton, Arabic, Third Series, no. 288. 
Fol. 108a-125b., 1714.  
113
 Al-Kawtharī mentions the work in al-Ḥāwī fī sīrat al-I ā  al-Ṭa āwī, 38, without citing his source; I 
have not located any mention of it in the earlier biographical tradition.  
114
 On borrowings from al-Tārī h al- abīr in Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ, see Tsafrir, “Semi-Ḥanafīs and Ḥanafī 
Biographical Sources,” 74.  
115
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī nonetheless cites Abū ʿUbayd’s Kitāb al-nasab in Shar  mushkil al-āthār; see below, p. 
49n161. 
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(Exegesis of the Qurʾān) discovered at the Jā iʿ al-Shaykh in Alexandria bearing al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s name and beginning with Q 8/al- nfāl.116 The partially extant    ā  al-
Qurʾān (The Legal Rulings of the Qurʾān) has been described in other studies as a 
specialized form of Qurʾānic exegesis, because it systematically expounds the legal 
rulings that can be derived from each legal verse in conjunction with other sources of the 
law.
117
 As I have argued above,
118
 however, labeling al-Ṭaḥāwī’s    ā  al-Qurʾān a 
work of tafsīr does not do justice to its hermeneutical ambitions, and I treat it in this 
study as a work of practical hermeneutics. 
 
Ḥadīth 
 Three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s major works, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār (An Elucidation of the 
Meaning of Reports), Shar  mushkil al-āthār (An Elucidation of Problematic Reports) 
and    ā  al-Qurʾān (The Legal Rulings of the Qurʾān), all contain substantial 
discussion of the authority of Prophetic  adīth and varying degrees of discussion of the 
reliability of particular  adīths and transmitters. The first two are fully extant and have 
been published in multiple editions;
119
 the latter has been described above under 
                                                 
116
 Institute of Arabic Manuscripts, Fihris al-makhṭūṭāt al-muṣawwara, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid (Cairo: Dār al-
Riyāḍ, 1954-1963), 1.29-30.  
117
 The first two of the original four volumes of this work are extant in unicum. Saʿd al-Dīn Ūnāl, the text’s 
modern editor, notes that the final two volumes appear to have been lost or stolen from the library in the 
Amasya province of northeastern Turkey where the manuscript was found, based on the fact that the 
catalog numbers indicate four volumes (Ūnāl, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” 11). Unlike a traditional exegesis, 
however, it is organized according to the chapters of a fiqh work, not the chapters of the Qurʾān. The first 
volume contains chapters on ṣalāt (prayer) to iʿti āf (seclusion in a mosque), while the second volume 
begins with the Ḥajj (pilgrimage) and ends with  u ātaba (contract of manumission). I have not found 
mention of a commentary tradition for    ā  al-Qurʾān, although the work is widely reported in the 
biographical tradition. 
118
 See above, p. 16. 
119
 Shar   aʿānī al-āthār was first published in two volumes in India in the late 19th century (Lucknow: Al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Muṣtafāʾī, 1882-1883). This study uses the indexed edition, al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, 
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“Exegesis.” Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and Shar  mushkil al-āthār were influential within the 
Ḥanafī tradition for their justification of Ḥanafī law on the basis of Prophetic  adīth.  
Shar   aʿānī al-āthār in particular attracted a number of commentaries and 
abridgements. The Mamluk Sulṭān al-Muʾayyad (r. 815/1412-824/1421) created a chair 
dedicated to teaching Shar   aʿānī al-āthār upon building the Muʿayyadīya Mosque in 
Cairo.
120
 The chair was given to the Ḥanafī Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1451), who 
composed two commentaries on the book.
121
 Other scholars who wrote commentaries on 
or abridgements of Shar   aʿānī al-āthār include Ibn Rushd al-Jadd (d. 520/1126) and 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s biographer, the Ḥanafī Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ.122 While Shar  mushkil al-āthār 
did not attract a similar commentary tradition, it was abridged by the Andalusian Mālikī 
jurist Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081) and then further abridged by Yūsuf ibn Mūsā 
ibn Muḥammad al-Malaṭī (d. 803/1400),123 a Ḥanafī judge active in Cairo and one of the 
teachers of Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī. Another abridgement is attributed to Ibn Rushd al-
Jadd.
124
  
 A very short treatise on  adīth terminology by al-Ṭaḥāwī, al-Taswiya bayn 
 addathanā wa a hbaranā (The Equivalence of “He Transmitted [Directly] to Us” and 
                                                                                                                                                 
ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Jad al-Ḥaqq, Muḥammad Zuhrī al-Najjār, and Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī, 
5 vols. in 4 (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1994). The earliest printed edition of Shar  mushkil al-āthār 
(Hyderabad: Maṭbaʿa Majlis Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-Niẓāmīya al-Kāʾina fī al-Hind, 1914-1915) contains 
about half of the work. The full text can be found in al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar  mushkil al-āthār, ed. Shuʿayb al-
Arnāʾūṭ, 16 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1994), which is the edition used in this study.. 
120
 Al-Kawtharī, al-Ḥāwī, 33-34.  
121
 Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, Maghānī al-a hyār fī shar  asā ī rijāl Ma ānī al-āthār, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan 
Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 2006); al-ʿAynī, Nukhab al-af ār fī tanqīh 
 abānī al-a hbār fī Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, ed. Abū Tamīm Yāsir b. Ibrāhīm (Beirut: Dār al-Nawādir, 
2008). 
122
 For a list of commentaries and abridgements of Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, see Ūnāl, “Muqaddimat al-
taḥqīq,” 43-44.   
123
 Sezgin, Geschichte, 1.440. Yūsuf ibn Mūsā al-Ḥanafī’s abridgement has been published as al-Muʿtaṣar 
min al-Mukhtaṣar min Shar  mushkil al-āthār (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1976). 
124
 Ūnāl, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” 43. 
42 
 
“He Informed Us”), is also extant.125 In it, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues against traditionists who 
hold that ‘ addathanā’ exclusively indicates a  adīth recited by the transmitter, while 
‘a hbaranā’ should be used for cases in which the recipient of a  adīth recites it to its 
original transmitter, who then confirms that the recitation was correct. Instead, he argues, 
the Qurʾān and Sunna use the verbs akhbara and  addatha interchangeably, and so too 
may  adīth transmitters.  
In Shar  mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī also references another work on  adīth 
criticism, now lost, entitled Naqḍ al-Mudallisīn lil-Karabīsī (Refutation of the Book 
Entitled Those Who Conceal Defects in the Transmission of Prophetic Reports by al-
Karabīsī).126 We have also already had occasion above to note that al-Ṭaḥāwī is the 
transmitter of al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Sunan through al-Muzanī. Finally, the Khuda Baksh Library 
in Patna, India holds a manuscript attributed to al-Ṭaḥāwī entitled Ṣa ī  al-āthār;127 
however, no biographer attributes such a work to al-Ṭaḥāwī. To the best of my 
knowledge, no one has yet authenticated the manuscript or described its contents.  
 
Law 
 A number of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s major legal works are both extant and published. The 
three works that form the subject of this study, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, Shar  mushkil al-
                                                 
125
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, al-Taswiya bayn  addathanā wa a hbaranā, in Kha s rasāʾil fī ʿulū  al- adīth, ed. ʿAbd 
al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islamīya, 2002). This treatise does not appear in Ibn Abī 
al-Wafāʾ’s catalog, but is mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm (Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.32).  
126
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 6.382. In Shar  mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī merely indicates that he wrote a book 
on al-Karabīsī; the longer title given above is taken from the biographical tradition. Al-Karabīsī (d. 245/859 
or 248/862) was a traditionist and jurist initially associated with the Ḥanafīs who later became associated 
with the Shāfiʿīs. His book al-Mudallisūn is reported to criticize the traditionist and Qur’an reader al-
Aʿmash (d. 148/765).  
127
 Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur (Leiden: Brill, 1943), G I, 173; Khuda Bakhsh 
H.L. No. 548, Catalog No. 308. Law. 
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āthār and    ā  al-Qurʾān, treat law as well as  adīth. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s al-Mukhtaṣar fī-l-
fiqh (Concise Manual of Legal Doctrine) represents the first Ḥanafī mukhtaṣar, and it 
attracted numerous commentaries from later Ḥanafīs including al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980-981) 
and al-Sarakhsī (d. ca. 483/1090).128 In al-Mukhtaṣar, al-Ṭaḥāwī sets out the rules of 
Ḥanafī positive law almost entirely without justification or explanation, although he does 
state his own opinion on many of the legal questions disagreed upon by earlier 
Ḥanafīs.129 His lengthy I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ (Disagreements of the Jurists), extant only in 
an abridgement by al-Jaṣṣāṣ, records controversies among Sunni jurists of all schools and 
preserves important opinions of early jurists.
130
 Although al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s abridgement 
contains occasional justifications of legal positions by al-Ṭaḥāwī, it, too, primarily 
catalogs rules of positive law propounded by different jurists and schools. Because al-
Mukhtaṣar and I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ are concerned with legal rules rather than how those 
rules were reached, they feature only rarely in this study.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī is also important as the author of an early Ḥanafī Shurūṭ (Contract 
Formulary) work. Jeanette Wakin has edited, analyzed and translated the chapters on 
sales of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s partially extant al-Shurūṭ al- abīr (Comprehensive Contract 
                                                 
128
 A list of commentaries is found in K tip  elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2.1627. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s commentary has 
been published as Shar  Mukhtaṣar al-Ṭa āwī fī al-fiqh al-Ḥanafī, ed. ʿIṣmat Allāh ʿInāyat Allāh 
Muḥammad et al. (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmīya, 2010). K tip  elebi reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī 
composed both extended and concise versions of this work (Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2.1627); the one-volume 
extant work is the concise Mukhtaṣar. 
129
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s disinterest in resolving differences of opinion or establishing a hierarchy of authority 
among early Ḥanafī figures may be contrasted with the later Mukhtaṣar genre of the 7th/13th century, which 
Mohammad Fadel describes as working to classify systematically the authoritative opinions of the school 
(“The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhtaṣar,” Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): 
215-219).  
130
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Mukhtaṣar I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Nadhīr Aḥmad (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-
Islāmīya, 1995). 
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Formulary) in her Function of Documents in Islamic Law;
131
 two additional fragments of 
the work have been edited by Schacht.
132
 In contrast, al-Shurūṭ al-ṣaghīr (Concise 
Contract Formulary) is fully extant and has been published with footnotes incorporating 
the existing fragments of al-Shurūṭ al- abīr.133 The Shurūṭ al-awsaṭ (Medium Contract 
Formulary) mentioned by Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ and others is now lost. 
 The biographical tradition also attributes many other legal works to al-Ṭaḥāwī 
that are no longer extant. His Shar  al-Jā iʿ al- abīr (Commentary on the Major 
Compendium) and Shar  al-Jā iʿ al-ṣaghīr (Commentary on the Minor Compendium) 
refer to two of the major works of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805). 
Ibn al-Nadīm lists works entitled al-Ma ādīr wa-l-sijjilāt (Minutes of the Court and 
Records of the Qāḍī’s Judgments), al-Waṣāya (Bequests) and al-Farāʾiḍ (Inheritance 
Shares) in his entry on al-Ṭaḥāwī. However, these are most likely identical to chapters 
with those titles found within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s larger compendiums.134 Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ also 
reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī wrote “a book based upon the “Chapter on Coitus Interruptus as a 
Technique of Birth Control” ( itāb aṣluhu  itāb al-ʿazl). Other lost legal works include 
al-Nawādir al-fiqhīya (Legal Rarities), Ḥu   arāḍī Ma  a (The Legal Status of the 
Lands Surrounding Mecca), Qasm al-fayʾ wa-l-ghanāʾi  (The Division of Spoils and 
Booty), I htilāf al-riwāyāt ʿalā  adhhab al-Kufīyīn (Divergent Legal Opinions of Kūfan 
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 The Function of Documents in Islamic Law, ed. Jeanette Wakin (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1972).  
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Das Kitāb ad ār al- uqūq war-ruhūn aus de  al- ā iʿ al- abīr fi - urūṭ des  bū  aʿfar 
   ad ibn Mu a  ad aṭ-Ṭa āwī, ed. Joseph Schacht (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1927) and al-Ṭaḥāwī, Das 
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Awzān (Baghdad: Dīwān al-Awqāf, 1974). 
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 The first three are chapters in al-Shurūṭ al-ṣaghīr; the latter two are found in al-Mukhtaṣar.  
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School), al-Ashriba ((Alcoholic) Beverages)
135
 and al-Radd ʿalā ʿĪsā ibn  bān 
(Refutation of ʿĪsā ibn Abān).136  
 
Lost Works of Undetermined Subject  
Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī wrote a work called al-Nawādir wa-l-
 i āyāt (Rarities and Recountings). In al-Ḥāwī fī sīrat al-I ā  al-Ṭa āwī, al-Kawtharī 
mentions a work by al-Ṭaḥāwī on ri  īya (calamities) for which he gives no source.137 
Ismāʿīl Pāshā also attributes works entitled al-Khiṭābāt (Discourses) and al-Mish āt (The 
Lamp) to al-Ṭaḥāwī, likewise giving no indication of the source for his citations.138 
 
Authorship and Composition 
 In the course of this study I reconstruct al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought by bringing 
together passages from his three hermeneutical works. My approach rests upon the 
assumption that all of these texts can meaningfully be said to be the work of a single 
jurist, an assumption that Norman Calder has questioned by labeling Shar   aʿānī al-
āthār and Shar  mushkil al-āthār as “school texts, accumulating over time, and subject 
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 Al-Kawtharī mentions Kitāb al-ashriba in al-Ḥāwī, 38, saying that it was one of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s books 
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 century (Fihrisat Ibn Khayr al-Ishbīlī, ed. 
Muḥammad Fuʾād Manṣūr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 1998), 168, 229). However, Arnāʾūṭ notes that 
the next transmitter in the isnād of Shar  mushkil al-āthār, Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Aḥmad al-Tamīmī 
al-Qurṭubī (d. 416/1025), traveled to Egypt, where he met al-Ruʿaynī, so it may be the al-Ruʿaynī did not 
personally transmit these works to North Africa (Shuʿayb Arnāʿūṭ, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” Introduction to 
Shar  mushkil al-āthār (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2010), 18).   
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 ʿĪsā b. Abān (d. 189/804) was a proto-Ḥanafī. Apart from Kitāb al-ashriba, the works mentioned in this 
paragraph are all found in Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ. 
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 Al-Kawtharī, al-Ḥāwī, 38.  
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 Ismāʿīl Pasha, Hadīyat al-ʿārifīn as āʾ al- uʾallifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-
Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1951), 1.58.  
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perhaps to redactional supervision by Ṭaḥāwī.”139 That is, although Calder accepts that 
the works attributed to al-Ṭaḥāwī likely date from his lifetime, he does not view them as 
reflecting a single, unified authorial voice. My own more extensive analysis of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works does not support this conclusion. When Calder composed 
his Studies in Islamic Jurisprudence, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s    ā  al-Qurʾān had yet to be 
discovered, and the only printed edition of Shar  mushkil al-āthār contained about half of 
the full text. My analysis of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical writing is therefore based on a 
larger body of textual evidence than was available to Calder as well as a closer study of 
that material.  
 By tracing several important markers across the twenty-one total volumes of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s extant hermeneutical works, I have found strong evidence that they represent a 
single authorial voice. The three works employ a consistent range of hermeneutical 
techniques and a stable technical vocabulary. The same phrases and sentences often 
reappear across works in association with particular theoretical topics. They also appeal 
to a consistent set of legal authorities: if a jurist is of sufficient importance to al-Ṭaḥāwī 
that he cites his legal opinions at least five times in the course of his works, then that 
jurist will almost certainly be mentioned in all three texts.
140
 In addition, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
positions on questions of legal theory are consistent across works with only one 
exception: Shar   aʿānī al-āthār appears in several places to permit the abrogation of 
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 Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, 229.  
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 The major apparent exception to this rule is the absence from Shar   aʿānī al-āthār of any explicit 
mention of al-Shāfiʿī, who appears regularly in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other works. This absence is stylistic rather 
than substantive, however; although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not refer to al-Shāfiʿī by name, he cites al-Shāfiʿī’s 
ideas anonymously. In general, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār contains fewer named references to jurists than al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s other hermeneutical works.  
47 
 
Prophetic  adīth by Companion consensus, while Shar  mushkil al-āthār vehemently 
denies the possibility.
141
  
The observations above suggest that it is justifiable to reconstruct al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
legal theory by combining statements from these three works. Questions remain, 
however, concerning how these texts were composed and consumed. Many of the 
muṣannafāt (textual compilations) of 3rd/9th-century scholars cannot be considered true 
books; that is, they are not systematic works composed in writing and intended for 
written publication.
142
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works bear many of the features 
associated with true books, however. They begin with introductions, however brief, 
describing the author’s goals and approach. Although the introductions do not contain a 
list of each book’s contents, al-Ṭaḥāwī often signals the transition between chapters in 
   ā  al-Qurʾān by announcing that a certain chapter has concluded.143 In the 
introduction to each work, al-Ṭaḥāwī also refers to himself as composing a book ( itāb); 
the introduction to Shar   aʿānī al-āthār contains the conventional claim that he is 
writing at the request of an unnamed colleague.
144
 
Each of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works also contains internal cross-references 
to discussions that have appeared in earlier chapters or will appear in later chapters. Such 
references are strongly associated with books and written composition, because they 
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 I suggest a possible explanation of this discrepancy in Chapter Three, “Consensus and the Practice of the 
Community,” pp. 197-207.  
142
 On the development of books among Muslim scholars, see Gregor Schoeler, The Genesis of Literature 
in Islam: From the Aural to the Read, trans. Shawkat Toorawa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2009), 8, 62-3, 87-8.  
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 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.66, 1.457. 1.485, 2.315. Shar   aʿānī al-āthār likewise contains statements 
signaling transitions, but it is not clear to me whether these are from al-Ṭaḥāwī or are the addition of the 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 1.11;    ā , 1.65-66; Mushkil, 6, 9.  
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reveal that the author has a mental conception of his work as a sequential whole.
145
 
Examining a selection of internal references within    ā  al-Qurʾān, I had no difficulty 
in locating the passages referred to for extant parts of the work.
146
 Perhaps more telling 
are the internal references within Shar  mushkil al-āthār, a text with no apparent overall 
structure, although chapters in close proximity with each other often treat similar 
issues.
147
 To test the accuracy of these references, I examined Volume 7, in which I 
identified 11 mentions of earlier passages and 8 mentions of upcoming passages, for a 
total of 19 internal references.
148
 Of these, I was able to identify 14 of the passages 
referred to, although one passage stated that a certain topic would be discussed in a future 
chapter, when in fact I located the discussion in an earlier chapter.
 149
 Although most 
references were to passages that were no more than 20 pages away, 4 references 
concerned passages in other volumes.
150
 I was unable to identify the passages referred to 
in 5 references;
151
 however, it is possible that the  adīths mentioned appear as support for 
an argument without being clearly connected to the subject of the chapter, which would 
make them nearly impossible to locate in the absence of a word-searchable text. The 
frequency and overall accuracy of the internal references with Shar  mushkil al-āthār 
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 Schoeler, The Genesis of Literature in Islam, 88. 
146
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.398, 1.411, 1.424, 2.302.  
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 For example, Chapters 114-116 all deal with  adīths mentioning the supernatural, while Chapters 710-
714 treat the adultery of non-Muslims. I also have the impression that chapters in close proximity to each 
other often are linked by similar hermeneutical or linguistic issues, even when their subject matter is 
otherwise quite different. I would tentatively describe the structure of Shar  mushkil al-āthār as 
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 I selected Volume 7 because of its position midway through the fifteen-volume work, so that I could 
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 I was able to identify the passages in question for the following internal references: 7.51, 7.81, 7.95, 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 7.81 refers to 12.70; 7.250 refers to 5.97-98; 7.273 refers to 11.214; and 7.287 
refers to 2.215-218. 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 7.38, 7.165, 7.400, 7.434, and 7.453. 
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suggests that, despite the apparent disorganization of the text, it was composed as a book, 
perhaps intended to be edited later.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works also show evidence of belonging to a fledging 
world of books making intertextual reference to each other. Although his works do not 
quote or reference other books on the same scale that would become common in later 
centuries, he refers to a number of works by title. In law, he cites titles from each of the 
three major madhhabs of his day as well as the Kitāb al-a wāl of the early jurist Abū 
ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 224/838).152 The Ḥanafī works quoted are Abū Yūsuf’s 
(d. 182/798) Kitāb al-i lāʾ153 and al-Shaybānī’s (d. 189/805) al-Siyar al- abīr, al-
Ziyādāt and al-Nawādir;154 he also draws upon Mālik’s (d. 179/795) al-Muwaṭṭaʾ,155 the 
Mālikī Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam’s (d. 214/829) al-Mukhtaṣar al-ṣaghīr,156 al-Shāfiʿī’s al-
Waṣāyā,157 and al-Muzanī’s (d. 264/868) al-Mukhtaṣar.158 In the fields of biography and 
history, he cites al-Maghā ī by Ibn Isḥāq (d. 150/767),159 al-Siyar by al-Wāqidī (d. 
207/822),
160
 al-Nasab by Abū ʿUbayd,161 al-Ṭabaqāt by Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/845)162 and al-
Tārī h al- abīr by al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870).163 In  adīth, linguistics, and Qurʾān, he refers 
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to Gharīb al- adīth and al-Qirāʾāt by Abū ʿUbayd,164 an unnamed Kitāb on  adīth by 
Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn (d. 233/847),165 Maʿānī al-Qurʾān by al-Farrāʾ (d. 207/833),166 and the 
Iṣlā  al-manṭiq by Ibn al-Sikkīt (d. 244/858).167  
Most importantly, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works accurately cross-
reference each other, confirming that that they should be considered books representing 
the corpus of a single jurist. In Shar  mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī accurately refers the 
reader to discussions in his earlier works of    ā  al-Qurʾān and Shar   aʿānī al-
āthār.168    ā  al-Qurʾān in turn makes reference to Shar   aʿānī al-āthār.169 The 
latter contains no references to earlier or later works. These internal references suggest a 
composition order of (1) Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, (2)    ā  al-Qurʾān and, finally, (3) 
Shar  mushkil al-āthār. The biographical tradition likewise identifies Shar   aʿānī al-
āthār as al-Ṭaḥāwī’s first work and Shar  mushkil al-āthār as his last work;170 however, 
this information may well have been extracted from these same internal references and so 
cannot necessarily be taken as independent confirmation.  
While there is strong evidence for considering    ā  al-Qurʾān, Shar   aʿānī 
al-āthār and Shar  mushkil al-āthār to be the written compositions of al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar  
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mushkil al-āthār contains some evidence of subsequent oral transmission in the form of 
statements at the beginning of a number of chapters indicating that Abū al-Qāsim Hishām 
al-Ruʿaynī (d. 376/986) transmitted the ensuing material from al-Ṭaḥāwī.171 Given the 
independence of individual chapters within these works, they also lend themselves to 
being taught orally. While the length and complexity of some individual chapters would 
seem to require written consumption, many other chapters are brief and suitable for oral 
publication. Further, it is possible that Calder is correct that some of the material for al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s works came from earlier texts, oral or written. However, any such earlier 
material has been brought so thoroughly under the control of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s distinctive 
authorial voice that it is reasonable to consider all material in these works to be his.
172
 In 
consequence, I treat al-Ṭaḥāwī’s authorship of Shar   aʿānī al-āthār,    ā  al-Qurʾān 
and Shar  mushkil al-āthār as unproblematic in the chapters that follow.
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 In addition, given that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works largely concern the status and interpretation of 
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Chapter One: Qurʾān and Sunna 
 
 The mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition understood Islamic law to be grounded in two 
textual sources, the Qurʾān and Sunna, both of which were revealed through the Prophet 
Muḥammad gradually over the course of about twenty years, from 610 CE until his death 
in 632 CE. While Muḥammad served as God’s conduit for both kinds of revelation, legal 
theorists carefully distinguished between them. The Qurʾān was wa y  atlū (recited 
revelation), a miraculous text recording God’s direct speech. The Sunna, in contrast, was 
wa y ghayr  atlū (non-recited revelation), a collection of reports about the statements 
and actions of Muḥammad that only over time came to be viewed as revelation.
173
 Jurists distinguished between the Qurʾān and Sunna in other ways as well. While the 
Qurʾān was a single, well-defined text whose authenticity and accuracy were held to be 
epistemologically certain, the Sunna was an amorphous body of reports whose 
epistemological status individually and collectively was subject to debate.
174
 In order to 
assure the status of the Sunna as revelation, jurists developed theories of the immunity of 
Muḥammad to disobedience against God and to many kinds of error.175 
 This chapter examines the Qurʾān and Sunna in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought as expressed 
across his hermeneutical works of    ā  al-Qurʾān, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and Shar  
mushkil al-āthār. In addition to comparing his theories to those of the mature uṣūl al-fiqh 
tradition, I will consider his ideas against those of other early jurists, with special 
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emphasis on al-Shāfiʿī, whom one recent study has portrayed as the major source for al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of the Sunna.176 After examining al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments for the 
revelatory status of Qurʾān and Sunna, I will argue that, in contrast to both al-Shāfiʿī and 
the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition, al-Ṭaḥāwī did not draw an absolute ontological 
distinction between Qurʾān and Sunna.  
I will then turn to issues affecting only the Sunna, including  adīth epistemology 
and terminology, to argue that al-Ṭaḥāwī also does not draw a strong distinction between 
Prophetic and post-Prophetic  adīth, a theme which will be further explored in the next 
chapter. Finally, I will look at al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of Muḥammad’s ijtihād (legal 
reasoning) to show that, while al-Ṭaḥāwī and later jurists both use discussions of 
Muḥammad’s infallibility to support the status of the Sunna as revelation, they do so in 
very different ways. While many later jurists would claim that Muḥammad is infallible 
even in his ijtihād, since God would not permit him to continue in an error, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
uses Muḥammad’s ijtihād as a kind of safety valve to explain potentially embarrassing 
 adīths which might cast doubt on the status of Muḥammad’s words as revelation.  
 
Qurʾān  
 Unsurprisingly, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant legal works largely take for granted the 
Qurʾān as a source of law. Like the authors of later uṣūl al-fiqh texts, al-Ṭaḥāwī feels it 
unnecessary to argue in his legal works for the Qurʾān’s status as revelation.177 The only 
question related to the legal standing of the Qurʾān that al-Ṭaḥāwī addresses concerns the 
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 Like other theologians, al-Ṭaḥāwī does address the status of the Qurʾān as God’s speech in his creed (al-
Ṭaḥāwī, al-ʿ qīda, 8).  
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persistence of the Qurʾān’s legal provisions after Muḥammad’s death. In response to Abū 
Yūsuf’s (d. 182/798) claim that certain legal verses (here, the command in Q 4/al-
Nisāʾ:102 to undertake the prayer of fear) are addressed specifically to Muḥammad and 
therefore cease to apply after his death, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the verse in question is an 
example of a text that has a specific ( hāṣṣ) addressee without intending to exclude other 
addressees.
 178
 While there are indeed some (unspecified) legal verses which require 
Muḥammad’s physical presence for their application, this verse is not one of them. Here, 
the caliphs may fill Muḥammad’s role. There are also other verses in the Qurʾān which 
address some or all of Muḥammad’s contemporaries which nonetheless extend to all 
legally competent Muslims in perpetuity. For example, Q 2/al-Baqara:185 states that “all 
of you” who witness the new month of Ramadan should fast, yet does not intend only 
those who were legally competent Muslims at the time of revelation.
179
 The legal 
obligations (farāʾiḍ) in these verses are not abolished with the death of the Qurʾān’s 
original audience; rather, all those acquiring the legal status of the original addressees 
become addressees as well.  
It is important to note that al-Ṭaḥāwī is not arguing here for the general 
persistence of Qurʾānic obligations after the death of Muḥammad, a principle he takes for 
granted. Instead, he is considering a more limited subset of legal verses—those addressed 
specifically to Muḥammad or to a restricted set of his contemporaries—in order to 
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head—there may be a redemption”); Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:101 (“When you travel in the land, it is no sin for you to 
curtail your prayer”); and Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:25 (“That is for those among you who fear sin”). 
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determine which verses are temporally bound to his lifetime and which have more 
general application. The unusual length of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s response, at six paragraphs, 
suggests that he found Abū Yūsuf’s claim particularly threatening to his understanding of 
the Qurʾān as a stable and persistent source of law—in fact, the source that guarantees the 
authority of all other legal sources. In addition, the atypically large number of Qurʾānic 
examples adduced serves to preemptively protect other Qurʾānic verses from this kind of 
restrictive reading, which, if taken seriously, could disrupt such foundational legal 
matters as the Ramadan fast and the permission to shorten prayer while traveling. Despite 
the anxieties in this passage, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī generally considers the status of the 
Qurʾān as a source of law unproblematic, and I have located no other similar discussions 
in his extant works.  
 
Sunna 
Historical Development 
The same cannot be said for the status of the Sunna as a source of law. While 
classical and modern Islamic legal theorists overwhelmingly recognize the Sunna as a 
second form of revelation on par with the Qurʾān, early Islamic legal thought was much 
more diverse in its understanding of the status accorded to Muḥammad’s words and 
actions. This diversity reflects the fact that Islamic law emerged only gradually in the 
first two centuries of Islamic history as a result of the efforts of private individuals 
seeking to understand how God wished them to act in different situations. Over time, 
recognizable trends emerged in how these pious individuals approached legal problems, 
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and jurists collectively achieved a religious authority within Muslim societies—an 
authority that both guaranteed and stood apart from the authority of the state. 
Nonetheless, the legal field as a whole remained quite diverse until the maturation of the 
madhhabs (schools of legal thought) in the second half of the 4
th
/10
th
 century.  
One thing that appears to be true of all these proto-jurists is that they considered 
the Qurʾān, which had been canonized during the 1st/7th century, to be legally 
authoritative in a general sense, even if a small number of rules of positive law seem to 
have developed independently of the relevant Qurʾānic material.180 However, the Qurʾān 
is not primarily a legal document, and it contains no guidance for many situations in 
which one might wish to know the law. To compensate for this paucity of legal guidance, 
pious individuals sought legal rulings for the young Muslim community through a variety 
of methods, including looking to raʾy (discretionary reasoning) and sunna (a pre-Islamic 
concept indicating the practice of the community or of important individuals within it).
181
 
Throughout most of the 1
st
/7
th
 century, the term sunna did not refer primarily to the 
Prophet’s example, as it would later come to do.182 Instead, the term embraced both the 
exemplary actions of individuals and the customary behavior of the community as a 
whole.
183
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It is at the end of the 1
st
/7
th
 century and the beginning of the 2
nd
/8
th
 century that 
Muḥammad’s Sunna (sunnat rasūl  llāh) appears alongside and then eventually 
overtakes the more general concept of sunna. The interest in Muḥammad’s Sunna 
indicates the growing importance attached to basing the law on specifically Islamic 
sources.
184
 Concurrent with the rise of interest in Muḥammad’s Sunna among legal 
specialists, another, partially overlapping group of pious individuals became particularly 
interested in the transmission and, eventually, the recording of  adīths, which concretize 
Muḥammad’s Sunna in the form of reports in the voices of those who witnessed his 
words and actions. The traditionists, or scholars interested in the collection and recording 
of  adīths, produced several important early  adīth collections in the 2nd/8th century, 
including the Muṣannaf of Ibn Jurayj (d. 150/767), the Jā iʿ al- abīr and al-Jā iʿ al-
ṣaghīr of Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) and, slightly later, the Musnad of al-Ṭayālisī (d. 
204/819).
185
 Although these collections do not exclusively contain Prophetic  adīths, 
they indicate a growing interest in preserving the Sunna of Muḥammad as text.186 
In the second half of the 2
nd
/8
th
 century, jurists began to justify their legal 
doctrines with reference to Prophetic  adīth.187 As this practice took hold, some jurists 
started to perceive the legal field as divided into two camps: the ahl al- adīth, or those 
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who relied on traditions to support their legal opinions, and the ahl al-raʾy, or those who 
held that they could use their considered opinion to answer legal questions. As the 2
nd
/8
th
 
and 3
rd
/9
th
 centuries progressed, the term ahl al-raʾy, most associated with the proto-
Ḥanafīs, acquired an increasingly negative connotation. The polemical language of ahl 
al- adīth/ahl al-raʾy, however, obscures considerable diversity and complexity in how 
early jurists engaged with Prophetic reports. For example, the proto-Ḥanafī jurists, 
accused of being ahl al-raʾy, acknowledged the legal force of the Sunna just as the 
traditionists did. Where they differed from the traditionists was in their method of legal 
writing, which did not frequently cite  adīth, even while acknowledging their authority. 
The proto-Ḥanafīs also demanded a higher standard of evidence than the traditionalists 
for recognizing the authenticity of individual  adīths, a requirement which radically 
reduced the number of  adīths available to support a given legal argument.188  
Neither were the ahl al- adīth a monolithic group. Some scholars were motivated 
by their pious desire for closeness with the Prophet to devote their energies to preserving 
and transmitting  adīth, while others, whom Christopher Melchert has labeled 
“traditionist-jurisprudents” and who were often associated with the proto-Ḥanafī school, 
wrote about legal questions by adducing large numbers of  adīth, usually without 
offering further argument.
189
 Instead, the form of argumentation relied upon by both 
traditionists and traditionist-jurisprudents concerned the authentification of  adīth by 
means of rijāl (transmitter) criticism, which inquired into the moral probity of each link 
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in the chain of authorities who transmitted a  adīth from generation to generation. Even 
among traditionists, Prophetic  adīth was far from established as the exclusive extra-
Qurʾānic source of the law; through much of the 3rd/9th century, traditionists cited mostly 
Companion and Successor  adīths in their collections except when engaging polemically 
with the ahl al-raʾy.190  
Other jurists combined elements of the two approaches, contributing to a process 
that over time would lead to the disappearance of the ahl al- adīth and ahl al-raʾy as 
opposing groups in favor of a shared understanding of the role of Prophetic Sunna among 
jurists. The best known of these “compromisers” is, of course, al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), 
who reasoned about the law and its structure, but who understood legal reasoning 
primarily as textual hermeneutics and thus, like traditionalists, accorded great importance 
to  adīth.191 Unlike the traditionists, however, he does not engage in significant isnād 
criticism.
192
 Among the proto-Ḥanafīs, ʿĪsā b. Abān (d. 221/836) exemplifies a growing 
interest in  adīth; he is the first proto-Ḥanafī to write systematically about  adīth 
epistemology, although he does not consistently incorporate  adīths into his legal 
arguments.
193
 Likewise, the Iraqi Ḥanafī Ibn Shujāʿ al-Thaljī (d. 266/880) is reported to 
have strengthened Abū Ḥanīfa’s jurisprudence by means of  adīth, although he is also 
said to have had a higher allegiance to the doctrine of Abū Ḥanīfa than to Prophetic 
 adīth.194 
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The growth of a shared understanding of the role of Sunna is strongly evident in 
the works of al-Ṭaḥāwī. Although he still deems it necessary to argue explicitly for the 
authority of Prophetic  adīth, I have identified only one direct reference in his works to 
the divide between ahl al- adīth and ahl al-raʾy. In the Mukhtaṣar, al-Ṭaḥāwī declares 
that a judgeship may be given “neither to a proponent of raʾy (ṣā ib al-raʾy), who has no 
knowledge of Sunna and  adīth, nor to a proponent of  adīth (ṣā ib al- adīth), who has 
no knowledge of jurisprudence (fiqh).”195 Further, it was al-Ṭaḥāwī who would engage 
systematically in the work of supporting Ḥanafī fiqh with reference to the Sunna. Unlike 
earlier Ḥanafīs, he provides full isnāds for the  adīths he adduces and sometimes 
practices isnād criticism. Both are characteristics of traditionist jurisprudence.196  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s central role in the systematic justification of Ḥanafī positive law 
through Prophetic  adīth is widely acknowledged by those who have written on al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought, including Joseph Schacht, Norman Calder, Behnam Sadeghi and 
Ahmed El Shamsy.
197
 What has received less attention is al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought regarding 
the Sunna and its relationship to the Qurʾān. A careful study of his statements on this 
topic reveals that al-Ṭaḥāwī was not, as is often stated or implied by those writing about 
his role justifying Ḥanafī law through  adīth, merely continuing a project begun by al-
Shāfiʿī after his change of allegiance from Shāfiʿism to Ḥanafism. Instead, al-Ṭaḥāwī has 
a theory of the relationship between Qurʾān and Sunna that is distinct from both that of 
al-Shāfiʿī and later jurists.  
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The Authority of the Sunna  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues for the authority of Prophetic Sunna in the introductions to two 
of his works,    ā  al-Qurʾān and Shar  mushkil al-āthār. The relevant passage in 
   ā  al-Qurʾān follows a discussion of the equivocal ( utashābih) verses of the 
Qurʾān.198 Mutashābih verses, he tells us, are clarified either in another, unequivocal 
(mu kam) Qurʾānic verse or by a rule expressed in the Prophet’s Sunna. Having 
established that the Sunna can explain the Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī pauses to state his argument 
for the authority of the Prophetic word in general. He writes that “God has commanded 
us to accept what comes from His Messenger orally (qawlan), just as He has commanded 
us to accept from him His Book as a recitation (qabūl  itābihi  inhu qurʾānan).”199  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces three kinds of evidence in support of this claim. First, he cites 
three Qurʾānic proof texts: (1) Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7 (“Whatever the messenger gives you, take 
it. Whatever he forbids you to have, leave it alone”); (2) Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:64 (“We did not 
send any messenger except that he might be obeyed by God’s permission”); and (3) Q 
14/Ibrāhīm:4 (“We never sent any messenger except using the language of his people, for 
him to make [the message] clear to them”). The only comment he offers on these verses 
is that they affirm our obligation to accept what God sends us through the Prophet [i.e., 
the Sunna], which is like our obligation to accept his recitation of the Qurʾān.200 Beyond 
this commentary, we may note that the first two verses concern the command to obey 
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Muḥammad, while the third defines Muḥammad’s role as clarifying God’s message. Al-
Ṭaḥāwī next supports the authority of  adīth with  adīth by citing several versions of a 
report in which the Prophet condemns those who, after receiving an order from him, 
continue to laze about, saying that they only follow the Qurʾān.201 Finally, he argues that 
the confirmed historical occurrence of abrogation between the Qurʾān and Sunna 
demonstrates that the Sunna must be from God, because otherwise it could not have 
abrogated the Qurʾān.202 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument for the authority of the Sunna in the introduction to Shar  
mushkil al-āthār is considerably less detailed. After stating that God sent Muḥammad as 
the seal of the prophets and the Qurʾān as the seal of the scriptures, al-Ṭaḥāwī observes 
that Muḥammad is different from other Muslims. They owe him special deference 
because he speaks revelation: 
God commanded the Believers not to raise their voices above that of the Prophet 
or to place themselves ahead of him. In Q 53/al-Najm:3-4 (“Nor does he speak 
out of caprice. This is simply a revelation that is being revealed”), He informed 
them that He had entrusted [Muḥammad with authority] in his speech.203 
 
His next statement, again supported by a Qurʾānic proof text, concerns the obligation to 
obey Muḥammad: 
 
In Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7 (“Whatever the messenger gives you, take it. Whatever he 
forbids you to have, leave it alone”), He commanded them to accept what He sent 
them through the Prophet, and to refrain from what He prohibited through him.
204
 
  
The last two proof texts contain warnings for those who fail to heed this obligation: 
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In Q 49/al-Ḥujurāt:2 (“Do not raise your voices above that of the prophet, and do 
not speak loudly to him, as you do to one another”) He prohibited them from 
acting toward him as they act toward each other. He warned them “lest their 
works fail while they were unaware.”205 
 
In Q 24/al-Nūr:63 (“Let those who dissent from His command beware lest a trial 
or a painful punishment befall them”), He likewise warned those who disobey the 
Prophet’s command.206  
 
These verses conclude al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument for the authority of the Sunna in 
Shar  mushkil al-āthār. We may note that all of his evidence comes from Qurʾānic proof 
texts, and that only one of those proof texts (Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7) also appears in the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān. His argument in Shar  mushkil al-āthār is immediately 
followed by a description of the difficulty some jurists have in understanding  adīth 
correctly, which leads them to the dangerous delusion that  adīths contradict one another. 
His purpose in writing this book is to clarify the meanings of difficult  adīths for such 
people.
207
 The authority of the Sunna and jurists’ misapprehensions concerning the 
coherence of  adīth thus appear to be related issues for al-Ṭaḥāwī.208  
 On the basis of these outlines of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments for the authority of the 
Sunna, we may evaluate a comment by Ahmed El Shamsy that al-Ṭaḥāwī “adopted al-
Shāfiʿī’s justification for the systematic incorporation of Hadith into jurisprudence.”209 
Three successive chapters of al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla argue for the authority of Prophetic 
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 adīth.210 Lowry usefully summarizes their argument as follows: “Shāfiʿī first shows that 
the Qurʾān has required faith in God and faith in Muḥammad. He next argues that the 
Qurʾān refers to itself and the Sunna whenever it uses the pair  itāb and  ikma, 
respectively. Finally, God, in the Qurʾān, has specifically required obedience to 
Muḥammad.”211  
Al-Shāfiʿī’s first point concerns faith: Muslims are required to believe in God’s 
Messenger as well as God Himself.
212
 This argument does not appear in either of the 
passages from al-Ṭaḥāwī discussed above, although he does cite belief in Muḥammad as 
an obligation in his ʿ qīda (Creed).213 It appears that, for al-Ṭaḥāwī, faith in Muḥammad 
is a theological principle, but not an argument for the authority of Prophetic  adīth. Al-
Shāfiʿī’s second argument equates the  ikma (wisdom) mentioned in the Qurʾān with the 
Sunna,
214
 a claim not found in any of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works. Al-Shāfiʿī’s final point, that 
God commanded us to obey Muḥammad, is the only argument that the two jurists share 
in common. Even here, however, only one of the proof texts adduced by al-Shāfiʿī (Q 
24/al-Nūr:63, “Let those who dissent from His command beware lest a trial or a painful 
punishment befall them”), is also adduced by al-Ṭaḥāwī.215 Further, al-Ṭaḥāwī makes 
arguments not found in the Risāla: that the authority of the Sunna is supported by  adīth 
and that it is supported by the confirmed occurrence of abrogation between the Qurʾān 
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and Sunna. In light of these substantial differences, it is difficult to accept the claim that 
al-Ṭaḥāwī was employing al-Shāfiʿī’s justifications. 
A second claim concerning the relationship between the two jurists’ arguments 
appears in Aisha Musa’s Ḥadīth as Scripture, where she argues that “unlike the works of 
al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s work is not a direct response to any outright 
denial or criticism of the Ḥadīth that he has encountered; rather it addresses what he sees 
in the Ḥadīth that others may perceive as problematic because of their lack of knowledge 
or understanding.”216 Later she writes that “his change from the defensive, adversarial 
tone that characterizes the works of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba is an indication of the 
relative success of the concept of the duality of revelation and the increasing confidence 
of its adherents.”217  
Musa is correct in observing that al-Ṭaḥāwī never accuses any individual or group 
of denying the legal force of the Sunna. She is surely also correct in noting the more 
widespread acceptance of the authority of the Sunna by the time of al-Ṭaḥāwī, which 
must be a factor contributing to his less adversarial language. However, Musa’s analysis 
overstates al-Ṭaḥāwī’s confidence in the general acceptance of the Sunna, because it fails 
to take into account his intended audience. While Ibn Qutayba might write a long diatribe 
against those who deny the Sunna,
218
 al-Ṭaḥāwī could not, because he identified himself 
with the very proto-Ḥanafīs who were accused of not relying sufficiently on  adīth in 
their legal arguments. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works are not polemical condemnations of a 
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villainized Other, but are rather intended to convince the jurists of his own proto-Ḥanafī 
school that all of their laws are justifiable by  adīth and that they should engage in the 
work of that justification.  
That al-Ṭaḥāwī still perceived the Sunna to require justification is demonstrated 
by the introductions to    ā  al-Qurʾān and Shar  mushkil al-āthār. Very little of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s writing consists of extended arguments; the fact that he dedicates much of two 
of the only overtly theoretical passages in his works to this argument suggests that he was 
not confident that the authority of the Sunna was self-evident. Further, in a number of 
passages within the body of his works, al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts that Prophetic  adīth may not 
be ignored in favor of naẓar (juristic speculation) or any other non-revelatory source of 
the law.
219
 These assertions appear in response to discrete legal opinions of other jurists 
that are in conflict with  adīth. That al-Ṭaḥāwī does not label as  adīth deniers these 
jurists whose opinions conflict with  adīth must be a function of their mutual 
identification with the proto-Ḥanafī school.  
Likewise, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s sustained attention to “what he sees in the  adīth that 
others may perceive as problematic” is not separate from his need to justify the authority 
of the Sunna.
220
 Rather, his underlying argument appears to be that some jurists have not 
been properly relying on  adīth because they do not fully understand them.221 In both 
   ā  al-Qurʾān and Shar  mushkil al-āthār, after arguing for the authority of the 
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Sunna, al-Ṭaḥāwī devotes the remainder of the text to demonstrating that  adīths do not 
conflict with each other and that they underlie the rules of Ḥanafī fiqh. In this sense, these 
works are extended arguments for the authority of the Sunna, and they betray an 
underlying anxiety that this authority is not universally acknowledged. Were it so, then 
al-Ṭaḥāwī would no more have needed to write three lengthy works demonstrating the 
coherence of the Sunna than he needed to demonstrate the authority and coherence of the 
Qurʾān. While Musa is doubtless correct about the overall movement toward universal 
acceptance of the Sunna as a source of law, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concerns about the authority of 
the Sunna are still surprisingly close to those of al-Shāfiʿī. Although al-Shāfiʿī and al-
Ṭaḥāwī employ quite different sets of arguments to justify the authority of the Sunna and 
to deny that the appearance of contradiction among  adīths casts that authority into 
doubt, notably little change has occurred in the central questions about the authority of 
the Sunna during the intervening two generations.  
 
The Relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna 
Bayān  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī thus takes the authority of the Qurʾān for granted while devoting two 
of the very rare theory-driven discussions within his surviving works of practical 
hermeneutics to the authority of Prophetic  adīth. To understand al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of 
revelation, however, we must also consider how he perceives the Qurʾān and Sunna in 
relation to each other. Here, again, El Shamsy sees al-Ṭaḥāwī’s “indebtedness” to al-
Shāfiʿī, writing that the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān “mirrors closely al-Shāfiʿī’s 
68 
 
discussion of the issue of bayān in the Risāla.”222 To evaluate this claim, we must first 
briefly discuss the concept of bayān (clearness; legislative statement) in the Risāla. 
Immediately following his introductory chapter, al-Shāfiʿī sets out four modes of bayān: 
(1) rules which appear in an explicit text (naṣṣ) of the Qurʾān; (2) rules which appear in 
the Qurʾān and are explained in the Sunna; (3) rules which appear only in the Sunna; and 
(4) rules which must be derived by ijtihād, because they do not appear in the Qurʾān or 
Sunna.
223
 Lowry observes that al-Shāfiʿī employs the term bayān to “denote a mechanical 
or architectural feature of the divine law, specifically the finite number of ways that God 
uses the two revealed legal source texts—the Qurʾān and the Sunna—to express rules of 
law.”224 The key points here are that bayān refers to a “catalog” 225 of ways in which the 
law is expressed, and that this catalog is both finite and comprehensive. Elsewhere, 
Lowry has demonstrated that al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of bayān is driven by his overriding 
concern with establishing that the Qurʾān and Sunna do not contradict one another, but 
rather function together to form a single, coherent expression of the law.
226
 
 Returning to the introduction of    ā  al-Qurʾān, we may summarize the 
relevant points of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument as follows: God informed us in His Book (Q 
3/Āl ʿImrān:7) that the Qurʾān contains both mu kam (unequivocal) and  utashābih 
(equivocal) verses. The ruling contained in the equivocal verses should be sought first in 
                                                 
222
 El Shamsy, Canonization of Islamic Law, 205.  
223
 Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 7-9. In a series of chapters in which al-Shāfiʿī offers examples of each type of 
bayān, he expands his list to five modes by distinguishing between two varieties of the earlier second mode 
(rules which appear in the Qurʾān and are explained in the Sunna). In the first, the Sunna echoes the rule 
already stated in the Qurʾān, while in the second the Sunna adds significant information to the Qurʾānic 
rule (al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 10-12).  
224
 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 24-25.  
225
 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 24.  
226
 Joseph E. Lowry, “Some Preliminary Observations on al-Šāfiʿī and Later Usul al-Fiqh: The Case of the 
Term Bayān,” Arabica 5, no. 5/6 (2008): 525-527. 
69 
 
the unequivocal verses, then in the rulings that God promulgated through the Prophet in 
order to illustrate what was ambiguous in the Book.
227
 El Shamsy identifies the mu kam 
verses as those in which the Qurʾān is sufficient to state a rule, while the  utashābih 
verses require the Qurʾān to be supplemented by the Sunna; both situations are 
encompassed by al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of bayān.228 El Shamsy’s summary overlooks an 
important aspect of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument, however, which is that the meaning of the 
equivocal verses must first be sought in the unequivocal verses of the Qurʾān, before it is 
then (thumma) sought in the Sunna. That is, al-Ṭaḥāwī is describing a methodology for 
determining the meaning of equivocal verses rather than setting out a catalog of the ways 
in which God expresses the law.  
 That al-Ṭaḥāwī’s purpose in the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān is different than 
al-Shāfiʿī’s purpose in the Risāla is confirmed by the fact that al-Ṭaḥāwī mentions no 
further modes for expressing legal rules in this passage. Indeed, nowhere in any of his 
extant works does al-Ṭaḥāwī set out a catalog of the ways in which Qurʾān and Sunna 
may combine to express the law. In this he resembles later legal theorists, who were not 
concerned with presenting a unified theory of the “law’s architecture” as was al-
Shāfiʿī.229 All this is not to say that al-Ṭaḥāwī would not have recognized and approved 
of al-Shāfiʿī’s modes of bayān; in the course of his works he discusses rules promulgated 
through Qurʾān alone, Qurʾān explained by Sunna, Sunna alone, and ijtihād. If he were to 
create a catalog of these modes, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī would need to add a possibility not 
discussed by al-Shāfiʿī: a rule which appears in the Sunna and is explained by the Qurʾān. 
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In a variety of situations al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that a certain  adīth cannot be interpreted or 
is otherwise not adequate to establish the law. In such cases, an indication must be sought 
from the Qurʾān, Sunna, or Consensus.230 It is important to note that al-Ṭaḥāwī does not 
use terms from the root b-y-n while discussing the elucidation of the Sunna by the Qurʾān 
as he often does when referring to the clarification of the Qurʾān by the Sunna; 
nonetheless, his understanding of the relationship between Qurʾān and Sunna displays a 
symmetry missing from al-Shāfiʿī, who does not envision the Qurʾān supplementing the 
Sunna.
231
 
 While al-Ṭaḥāwī frequently uses words from the root b-y-n to discuss rules in the 
Qurʾān or rules expressed by the Qurʾān and supplemented by the Sunna, his 
understanding of bayān is distinct from that of al-Shāfiʿī. Al-Shāfiʿī employs bayān as a 
technical term referring to a ‘“statement’ of the law.”232 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, uses 
words from this root to signify a communicative process in which something is made 
clear, such as God making a ruling clear in the Qurʾān, or clarifying the Qurʾān by means 
of the Sunna. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s association of bayān with a language-based process of 
clarification is in accord with the later uṣūl tradition.233 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, for instance, describes 
several types of bayān, including the restriction of an unrestricted expression (takhṣīṣ al-
ʿu ū ), the transfer of meaning from the literal to the figurative (ṣarf al- alā  ʿan al-
 aqīqa ilā al- ajā ), the explanation of the intent of a statement that cannot provide a 
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ruling on its own, or abrogation.
234
 All of these are processes in which one text bears on 
another in order to bring out or clarify a meaning that was not available from the original 
text. Likewise, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s most frequent use of a term from the root b-y-n is the 
statement that the Sunna clarifies the Qurʾān on a certain question.235 In other cases, a 
Qurʾānic verse is clarified (yubayyan) by another Qurʾānic verse.236  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī almost never uses the noun bayān, preferring instead the verb bayyana 
to refer to clarification as an action or process, in contrast to al-Shāfiʿī’s more static 
characterization of bayān as the architecture of the law. Perhaps what is most notable 
about al-Ṭaḥāwī’s departure from al-Shāfiʿī’s conception of bayān is that al-Ṭaḥāwī, too, 
is overwhelmingly concerned in his works with demonstrating the consistency of Qurʾān 
and Sunna. We therefore might have expected him to employ bayān to support that 
argument, as does al-Shāfiʿī. However, it appears that, for al-Ṭaḥāwī, bayān has become 
firmly associated with communicative clarity, a concern that anticipates later jurists’ 
conviction of the centrality of linguistic interpretation to uṣūl al-fiqh.237 While al-Ṭaḥāwī 
still shares many of al-Shāfiʿī’s concerns about the authority and status of  adīth, his 
arguments nonetheless draw on the tools and concepts of his own time.  
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 brogation between the Qurʾān and Sunna  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of abrogation (naskh) provides further evidence for his 
understanding of the relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna. None of his extant 
works contains a definition of abrogation, but we may piece one together from relevant 
discussions: abrogation is a process in which the revelation of a new rule
238
 in the Qurʾān 
or Sunna lifts (rafʿ)239 the obligation to apply an earlier rule240 established in either of the 
two sources.
241
 What concerns us here is the interaction of Qurʾān and Sunna within this 
theory. Like most authors of later uṣūl al-fiqh texts, al-Ṭaḥāwī holds that there are four 
possible modes of abrogation: (1) the Qurʾān abrogating the Qurʾān; (2) the Qurʾān 
abrogating the Sunna; (3) the Sunna abrogating the Qurʾān, and (4) the Sunna abrogating 
the Sunna.
242
  
In contrast, al-Shāfiʿī famously held that only the Qurʾān could abrogate the 
Qurʾān and the Sunna abrogate the Sunna. He writes in the Risāla that “God stated to 
them [in the Qurʾān] that He only abrogates things in the Book by means of the Book, 
and that the Prophetic Practice does not abrogate the Book. It is instead subordinate to the 
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Book.”243 Al-Shāfiʿī thus claims that his theory of abrogation is that of the Qurʾān itself. 
Lowry further argues that al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of abrogation rests on his belief that the 
Qurʾān and Sunna are “ontologically distinct” as well as on anxieties that the Qurʾān 
would “overwhelm the Sunna in all cases of asserted conflict between the two” as a result 
of the Qurʾān’s superior epistemological status.244 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, employs his discussions of abrogation to assert the 
ontological similarity of Qurʾān and Sunna. In one passage he states that “it is our 
position that the Sunna can abrogate the Qurʾān, because each one of them is from God. 
He may abrogate what He wishes of them using what He wishes of them.”245 Here his 
emphasis is on the similarity of Qurʾān and Sunna in terms of their shared status as 
revelation. Likewise, in the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly states 
that the Sunna is of the same ‘form’ as the Qurʾān. He writes:  
The legal rulings (a  ā ) preceding the revelation of a [certain] Qurʾānic verse in 
Islam [that is, legal rulings derived from the Sunna] were legally effective and 
were not invalidated (yanquḍ) by the revelation of a Qurʾānic verse conflicting 
with them. Instead, they were abrogated (yansakh) by it, because they were of the 
same form (shakl). Therefore, when something appears from the Prophet after the 
revelation of a Qurʾānic verse it likewise abrogates that verse in cases where they 
conflict.
246
 
 
This statement may be contrasted with al-Shāfiʿī’s argument that “the Sunna may only be 
abrogated by its like (mithl), and it has no like except the Sunna.”247 Although al-Shāfiʿī 
uses the term ‘mithl’ while al-Ṭaḥāwī uses ‘shakl,’ these statements reveal the quite 
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different stances of al-Ṭaḥāwī and al-Shāfiʿī on the ontological relationship between 
Qurʾān and Sunna.  
 To support his argument that the Qurʾān may abrogate the Sunna and the Sunna 
the Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī appeals to historical evidence, giving examples of known laws 
which can only be justified by positing that the Qurʾān was abrogated by the Sunna. In 
both passages mentioned above al-Ṭaḥāwī discusses Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:15 (“Those of your 
women who commit indecency – call four of you as witnesses against them. If [the four] 
give their testimony, confine them in their houses until death takes them or God appoints 
a way for them”), arguing that ‘the way’ referred to in the verse was indicated in a 
Prophetic  adīth. The  adīth constituted an abrogation of the verse because it changed 
the prescribed punishment.
248
  
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not say so directly, his second example of the Qurʾān 
being abrogated by the Sunna demonstrates that he held that khabar al-wā id (a report 
transmitted by fewer than the number required to achieve epistemological certainty) also 
had the power to abrogate the Qurʾān, a position which elevates the khabar al-wā id to 
the epistemological status of the Qurʾān and the khabar al- utawātir (a report 
transmitted by sufficient numbers to assure its authenticity).
249
 In an example commonly 
adduced by other jurists espousing this opinion, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Q 2/al-Baqara:180 
(“Prescribed for you, when death comes to one of you, if he leaves goods, are bequests 
for parents and kinsmen according to what is recognized as proper, as a duty to those who 
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protect themselves”) was abrogated by the Prophetic  adīth “There is no bequest in favor 
of a Qurʾānic heir.”250 For al-Ṭaḥāwī, the two examples he adduces constitute self-
evident proof that abrogation of the Qurʾān by the Sunna has actually occurred, and 
therefore must be possible. After each, he cites the objections of an unnamed interlocutor, 
whom we may assume to be al-Shāfiʿī, claiming that in each case the verse in question 
was in fact abrogated by another Qurʾānic verse.251 In both cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī responds by 
demonstrating how the Qurʾānic verse his interlocutor adduces is insufficient to explain 
the law as it stands, and therefore abrogation of the Qurʾān by the Sunna must have 
occurred.
252
  
 The self-evidence of the occurrence of Qurʾān-Sunna and Sunna-Qurʾān 
abrogation for al-Ṭaḥāwī is crucial for understanding the function of this passage within 
the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s purpose is not to make an argument 
for the various possible modes of abrogation; he does not even mention the possibility of 
Qurʾān-Qurʾān or Sunna-Sunna abrogation here, aside from criticizing those who say that 
only the Qurʾān can abrogate the Qurʾān. Instead, he introduces the topic of Qurʾān-
Sunna and Sunna-Qurʾān abrogation in order to provide evidence for his central argument 
that the Sunna is revelation and has legal force. After a two and a half page discussion of 
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the necessity of obeying the Sunna, al-Ṭaḥāwī introduces the topic of abrogation by 
saying: 
God’s Messenger, from whom we received the Qurʾān, informed us that we must 
accept what he says to us, what he commands, and what he prohibits, even if it is 
not a Qurʾānic verse, just as we must accept the Qurʾānic verses he recites to us. 
We also find things practiced as an obligation in Islam that are not mentioned in 
the Qurʾān…which God then abrogated by what He revealed in the Book.253 
 
The argument that follows is that if the Qurʾān can abrogate the Sunna (and the Sunna the 
Qurʾān), that is because they are of the same form (shakl)—i.e., the Sunna is 
revelation.
254
  
 That al-Ṭaḥāwī’s purpose in discussing abrogation is to assert the ontological 
equivalence of Qurʾān and Sunna is again reinforced at the end of this passage, when al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s interlocutor suggests that the meaning of Q 10/Yūnus:15 (“Say, ‘It is not for me 
to change it of my own accord. I follow only what is revealed to me’”) is that only 
something from God, that is, the Qurʾān, may change the Qurʾān. Al-Ṭaḥāwī responds, 
“And who told you that the rule which abrogated the Qurʾānic verses is not from God, or 
that the Sunna is not from God? Rather, they are both from Him, and He abrogates the 
Qurʾān with whichever of them He wishes, just as He abrogates the Sunna with 
whichever of them He wishes.”255 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s entire discussion of abrogation is thus an 
argument for the status of the Sunna: the Sunna must be obeyed because it is like the 
Qurʾān—it is of its shakl. We know that because the Qurʾān and Sunna can and do 
abrogate each other. 
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 brogation of the Qurʾān  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of abrogation provides one further piece of evidence 
concerning the relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna, related specifically to the 
abrogation of the Qurʾān. John Burton identifies three modes of Qurʾānic abrogation 
discussed in mature uṣūl texts: 
1) The abrogation of both the verse and the ruling (naskh al- ukm wa-l-tilāwa) 
2) The abrogation of the ruling but not the verse (naskh al- u   dūn al-tilāwa) 
3) The abrogation of the verse but not the ruling (naskh al-tilāwa dūn al-
 ukm)256 
 
The most controversial of these is the third mode, the abrogation of the verse but not the 
ruling. Burton argues that this mode was only necessary for jurists like al-Shāfiʿī, who 
denied the possibility of the Sunna abrogating the Qurʾān, but who still needed to explain 
how certain rules (i.e., stoning for adultery) were justified.
257
  
 We may compare with Burton’s model of Qurʾānic abrogation al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
discussion in a very unusual chapter of Shar  mushkil al-āthār. While most chapters in 
this book set out one or more contradictory or otherwise problematic  adīths and then 
resolve the apparent difficulties, this chapter cites Q 2/al-Baqara:106 (“Whatever signs 
we annul or cause to be forgotten, We bring better or the like”) and then proceeds to set 
out a typology of Qurʾānic abrogation with examples of each type. He states that there are 
two kinds of abrogation of the Qurʾān: 
1) The abrogation of the practices in the abrogated verses while the verses 
remain part of the Qurʾān (nusikha al-ʿamal bi- ā fī al-āy al- ansū ha, wa-in 
 ānat al-āy al- ansū ha qurʾānan  a ā hiya) 
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2) The removal of the verse from the Qurʾān (i hrājuhā  in al-Qurʾān)  
a. preserved in memory (ma fūẓa fī al-qulūb)  
   or 
b. not preserved in memory ( hārija  in al-qulūb, ghayr  a fūẓa)258 
 
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not use the language of the later uṣūl scholars, his first category 
is clearly equivalent to Burton’s second mode (abrogation of the rule but not the verse), 
and Category 2b is equivalent to Burton’s first mode (abrogation of both the rule and the 
verse).  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Category 2a (abrogation of the verse but not the memory), however, 
is not quite the same as Burton’s third mode (abrogation of the verse but not the rule). 
The importance of the third mode for the jurists who subscribe to it is the continuance of 
the ruling—they need to explain how a law that does not appear to be Qurʾānic actually is 
based on a Qurʾānic verse.259 Al-Ṭaḥāwī would not disagree that the ruling remains in 
effect, as evidenced by his citation of the stoning verse and the verse concerning the 
number of breastfeedings necessary to establish a blood relationship as examples of this 
category of abrogation.
260
 However, he never states that the ruling remains in effect, and 
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that is not the crucial point for him. Instead, he is concerned with the preservation of the 
verse in memory.  
 What al-Ṭaḥāwī means by ‘preservation’ is revealed in three chapters appearing 
shortly after his typology of abrogation. In each chapter he argues that, after a certain 
verse was abrogated from the Qurʾān, it became part of the Sunna.261 At the end of the 
last of these chapters, he concludes that 
It is the same for everything which is reported as being part of the Qurʾān, but 
which we do not find in our physical Qurʾāns (maṣā ifunā). All such verses were 
part of the Qurʾān, but were abrogated and removed from it, then returned to the 
Sunna and made part of it.
262
  
 
This claim is important for what it says about al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the 
relationship between Qurʾān and Sunna. Other jurists discussing the third mode content 
themselves with stating that the ruling remains while the verse is abrogated, without 
getting into the details of the form in which it remains.
263
 Al-Taftazānī, for instance, still 
considers an abrogated verse part of the Qurʾān.264 Al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts clearly and 
repeatedly that the verse is transformed into a Sunna, thus implying that the boundary 
between Qurʾān and Sunna is, at least in some cases, permeable. 
 
The Per eability of the Boundary between Qurʾān and Sunna 
 In the section above we established that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the 
relationship between Qurʾān and Sunna is radically different from that of al-Shāfiʿī. 
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Where al-Shāfiʿī views the two as “ontologically distinct,”265 al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that they 
are of the same form (shakl)
266
 and that in certain cases Qurʾānic verses may be 
transformed into Sunna, apparently without needing to be revealed a second time.
267
 In 
another passage Al-Ṭaḥāwī further blurs the boundaries between Qurʾān and Sunna by 
arguing that “What is in God’s Book is what is textually stipulated (manṣūṣ) in it or what 
God’s Messenger said.” 268 This rather startling statement defines the Sunna as part of the 
Qurʾān. It appears in response to the Prophetic  adīth “Every condition (sharṭ) that is not 
in God’s Book is invalid” as a way of accepting the  adīth while still preserving for 
Muslims the right to make contract stipulations not mentioned in the Qurʾān. Al-Ṭaḥāwī 
then goes on to explain why the Sunna may be considered part of the Kitāb: it is because 
the acceptance of the Sunna is mandated by the Kitāb in Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7 (“Whatever the 
messenger gives you, take it. Whatever he forbids you to have, leave it alone”).  
 Almost the same argument appears as in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of the 
Companion  adīth “there is no revelation but the Qurʾān.” Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that by the 
Qurʾān, Ibn ʿAbbās meant “the Qurʾān and what the Qurʾān commands that is accepted 
only because of Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7.” Shortly afterward he states that the Sunna is included 
within the scope of the Qurʾān (dā hilan fī al-Qurʾān) because of that verse.269 While al-
Ṭaḥāwī generally makes a firm distinction between the Qurʾān and the Sunna, it is 
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striking that he is willing to include one within the scope of the other for the purposes of 
making his argument in these two passages.
270
  
 
The Episte ological Status of Qurʾān and Sunna 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s portrayal of the relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna is 
unusual in one further sense. For most legal theorists, a major distinction between the two 
kinds of revelation is that the entirety of the Qurʾānic text is epistemologically certain 
while the authenticity of individual  adīths is open to doubt.271 For the most part, al-
Ṭaḥāwī concurs, objecting to  adīths suggesting that certain verses might be missing 
from the canonized Qurʾānic text. He argues that, if that were the case, it would be 
possible that something missing from the canonized Qurʾān would abrogate something 
currently within it, and the obligation to act would be lifted.
272
 However, a number of 
chapters in Shar  mushkil al-āthār blur the distinction in epistemological status between 
the Qurʾān and Sunna. Some examples suggest insecurity in the bounds of the Qurʾānic 
corpus by recounting the Companions’ confusion regarding what belongs within the 
Qurʾān, while others point to that same insecurity by describing the somewhat messy 
process of compiling the Qurʾān.273  
 Undoubtedly, the reason that al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces so many  adīths suggesting 
insecurity in the text of the Qurʾān while other legal theorists do not is that Shar  mushkil 
al-āthār is primarily a work on problematic  adīths, to which category the traditions in 
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question certainly belong. The effect is somewhat jarring in a work which also treats a 
great deal of legal theory, however—so much so that the modern editor of Shar  mushkil 
al-āthār felt moved to quote Aḥmad Shākir on the necessity of rejecting one of the 
 adīths in question, because it casts doubt on our knowledge of the chapters of the 
Qurʾān, which knowledge is epistemologically certain (qaṭʿī) by means of multiple 
transmission (tawātur).274  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to have no such qualms about transmitting material that casts 
doubt on the text of the Qurʾān, as is evident from a discussion of the meaning of the verb 
‘istaʾnasa’ in Q 24/al-Nūr: 27 (“Do not enter houses other than your own until you have 
tastaʾnisū”). In explanation, al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces a tradition from Ibn ʿAbbās saying that 
the copyist of the Qurʾān made a mistake (akhṭaʾat al- ātib), and the verb should be 
‘tastaʾdhinū’ (to ask permission).275 Al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes his chapter by citing several 
versions of this tradition, content to record without comment the suggestion that there is a 
mistake in the text of the Qurʾān as we know it.276 While al-Ṭaḥāwī clearly did not 
adduce these  adīths with the explicit intent to assert the epistemological equivalence of 
the Qurʾān and Sunna, their presence contributes to the impression that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
theory of the sources of revelation does not depend on an ontological distinction between 
Qurʾān and Sunna.  
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The Hierarchy of Qurʾān and Sunna  
Despite the occasional blurring of the boundaries between the two, we may ask whether 
al-Ṭaḥāwī viewed the Qurʾān and Sunna as forming a hierarchy. The mature uṣūl al-fiqh 
tradition, while fully embracing the Sunna as a form of revelation, nonetheless held that 
the Qurʾān is a higher source of law. This claim is made especially strongly by the mature 
Ḥanafī school.277 For a much earlier period Lowry finds this same attitude implicit in al-
Shāfiʿī’s Risāla.278 Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī is not generally explicit about the relative 
status of the Qurʾān and Sunna, although he, like al-Shāfiʿī, does consistently list the 
Qurʾān before Sunna in the thirty or so lists of legal sources scattered throughout his 
books, which suggests its primacy.
279
 Few passages explicitly indicate the relationship 
between the two sources, however. In one, after discussing a  adīth on how to give 
witness, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that he will turn to “something higher ( ā huwa aʿlā), which is 
what God said in His Book.”280 This example is inconclusive, because it is not clear 
whether al-Ṭaḥāwī is suggesting that the Qurʾān is a higher source than Sunna in general, 
or if that is merely true of their relative usefulness for settling the question at hand.  
The only unambiguous statement of the superiority of the Qurʾān that I have been 
able to locate in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works appears in his discussion of a Companion 
report in which Ibn ʿAbbās states that “there is no revelation except for the Qurʾān (lā 
wa y illā al-Qurʾān).”281 This claim appears to be in serious contradiction with other 
 adīths asserting that Muḥammad’s Sunna is also revelation. We have already 
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encountered above one of the solutions which al-Ṭaḥāwī offers for this embarrassment: 
he argues that the Sunna is within the scope of the Qurʾān. Al-Ṭaḥāwī also offers a 
second explanation, however, appealing to a linguistic principle which appears many 
times in his works: statements in the form ‘there is no X but Y’ mean that other things 
than Y can also be X, but not the very highest form of X. In this case, Muḥammad’s 
Sunna can also be revelation, but not the very highest form of revelation.
282
 By invoking 
this principle al-Ṭaḥāwī has explained how Ibn ʿAbbās’s statement does not preclude 
Sunna being revelation, but he has also conceded the inferiority of Sunna to the Qurʾān. 
While it may appear that it was only al-Ṭaḥāwī’s consistent application of his linguistic 
principle that led him to this conclusion, it also seems clear that he need not have made 
this argument at all, since he had already resolved the difficulty by claiming the Sunna as 
within the scope of the Qurʾān. His willingness to apply his linguistic principle in this 
case suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī does indeed at some level consider the Qurʾān a higher 
source of law, even if statements to that effect are extremely rare in his works.  
It appears, then, that for al-Ṭaḥāwī the relationship between the Qurʾān and the 
Sunna was more complex than it was for either al-Shāfiʿī or for the later tradition. While 
the Qurʾān and Sunna on the whole constitute two separate and identifiable bodies of 
revelation and relate to each other hierarchically, they are nonetheless neither 
epistemologically nor ontologically completely separate from each other. In asking why 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of their relationship is so distinct from that of al-Shāfiʿī or the 
later tradition, we may observe that al-Ṭaḥāwī was writing with quite different goals and 
constraints than either al-Shāfiʿī or later theorists. In the case of later uṣūl al-fiqh, 
                                                 
282
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 14.471.  
85 
 
theorists were writing at a remove from the actual texts of the Qurʾān and Sunna, and 
therefore may have been able to create neat, clearly defined categories with considerably 
more freedom than that afforded al-Ṭaḥāwī, whose theoretical discussions almost without 
exception arise in response to issues within the sources. His theories are not driven by 
theological concerns (although he is sensitive to these) or by a desire to create order, but 
rather by the need to make sense of texts. Although it is true that most of al-Shāfiʿī’s 
Risāla is taken up with example problems, and that these examples do not always neatly 
illustrate his theories, it is nonetheless also the case that it is theory that controls the 
Risāla’s structure. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, is engaged in practical hermeneutics, the 
messy business of deriving meaning from revelation. Neat, clearly differentiated 
categories may only have been possible for jurists who formulated their theories in 
conversation with, but nonetheless slightly removed from, the raw material of revelation.  
 
Ḥadīth Epistemology  
 Beyond the question of the relative epistemological statuses of Qurʾān and Sunna, 
Muslim jurists devoted significant attention to the question of the epistemological 
certainty engendered by different types of  adīth. Considering the central role that 
evaluating the soundness of individual  adīths plays in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments, it is 
noteworthy that this type of discussion is almost entirely absent from his extant works. In 
this sense his approach is akin to that of the  adīth scholars, who tend to be more 
interested in individual  adīth transmitters and less in epistemological questions related 
86 
 
to transmission than the uṣūl scholars.283 From various passing mentions, we may glean 
that al-Ṭaḥāwī posited two grades of  adīth corresponding to the uṣūl scholars’ khabar 
 utawātir (a report transmitted by a number so large as to engender epistemological 
certainty) and khabar al-wā id (a report transmitted by fewer than the number required to 
engender epistemological certainty). Unlike his Ḥanafī predecessor ʿĪsā b. Abān as well 
as later Ḥanafīs including al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not appear to recognize a third, 
intermediate category, the  ashhūr tradition (a report which began as a  habar wā id but 
then became widespread among the early generations of Muslims).
284
 In at least some 
cases, he describes as mutawātir traditions that later Ḥanafīs would call  ashhūr.285 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s terminology for discussing the two grades of  adīth is not entirely 
stable. He does employ khabar al-wā id and al-ā ād as technical terms,286 although the 
rarity with which he does so is notable considering how frequently his arguments consist 
of preferring one  adīth over another due to a greater number of transmitters. More often, 
he simply states that someone was alone (tafarrada bi-, etc.) in transmitting a certain 
 adīth.287 While ‘tawātur’ and ‘ utawātir’ appear more frequently than khabar al-wā id 
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it is not clear if they are technical terms for al-Ṭaḥāwī. Like other 3rd/9th century scholars 
including al-Shāfiʿī, he uses words derived from the w-t-r root to indicate widespread 
transmission, but not obviously in the technical sense of later theorists.
288
 Nowhere in his 
extant works does he explain what constitutes  utawātir transmission, although we do 
learn that he is in agreement with the later tradition that the transmission of a  adīth may 
still be considered  utawātir even if certain individuals in their chains of transmission 
are suspect.
289
  
 Concerning the level of certainty engendered by each grade of  adīth and the 
connection between a  adīth’s epistemological status and the requirement to act upon it, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī is oblique. In one passage he argues that a certain  adīth has been transmitted 
in a  utawātir fashion, and so it is obligatory (wajiba) to adopt the position outlined in 
it.
290
 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not state explicitly here or elsewhere that  utawātir 
reports engender epistemological certainty, that seems to be the implication. Similarly, in 
another passage we learn that naql al-ja āʿa (group transmission) is exempt (barīʾ) from 
the possibility of omitting part of Muḥammad’s message on a certain topic, unlike naql 
al-ā ād.291 Again, the implication is that  utawātir transmission leads to certainty. 
Finally, in the most important passage concerning the distinction between the two grades 
of transmission, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that transmission by consensus (al-naql bi-l-ij āʿ) has 
legal force ( ujja) such that anyone who disbelieves (kafara) in the smallest part of it is 
an infidel who may be killed unless he repents. This ruling does not apply, however, to 
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those who disbelieve in something transmitted by al-a hbār al-ā ād, only to transmission 
by al-ja āʿa.292 The attribution of unbelief to those who reject a  utawātir transmission 
is a feature of later uṣūl discussions.293 
 While many of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments rest on the acceptance or rejection of 
individual a hbār ā ād, he makes few general statements concerning the conditions 
under which they should be acted upon. In one chapter, he argues that a  habar wā id 
(although he does not use the term) from ʿAlī should be accepted, although he knows of 
no one else who accepts it, because the opinions is a sound one (qawl  asan) and putting 
the  adīth into practice revives a sunna of the Prophet.294 This appears to be an argument 
in favor of acting upon khabar al-wā id even in the absence of epistemological certainty. 
His optimism concerning khabar al-wā id aligns with that of his later Ḥanafī colleague 
al-Sarakhsī, who argued for the presumption of trustworthiness on the part of traditions 
and transmitters; the Ḥanafī al-Dabūsī, on the other hand, was hesitant to act upon khabar 
al-wā id in the absence of firm evidence for fear of improperly attributing words to the 
Prophet.
295
  
  In other places al-Ṭaḥāwī refers obliquely to the controversies surrounding the 
khabar al-wā id by mentioning ‘those who accept the legal force ( ujja) of the khabar 
al-wā id.’296 This may be a reference to the Shāfiʿīs, whom the later Ḥanafīs portrayed as 
elevating the khabar al-wā id almost to the level of the Qurʾān.297 His point in these 
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passages is not to support or refute their position, however, but rather to make an 
argument concerning what that position commits them to regarding a certain legal 
question. One such passage contains the clearest evidence in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extent works 
that he understood al-khabar al- utawātir and khabar al-wā id as opposing categories. 
While arguing that a certain  adīth from Ibn Masʿūd should be discarded, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
states that its transmission is such that it has legal force ( ujja) neither for those who 
accept the khabar al-wā id nor for those who [only] act upon reports whose transmission 
is plural (tawātara).298  
 
Ḥadīth Terminology  
 In addition to the epistemological terms khabar al-ā ād and tawātur/ utawātir, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī employs a range of terminology related to  adīth and Sunna. At the most 
general level, he opposes revelation in the form of the Kitāb (Book) to revelation through 
the words (ʿalā lisān) of Muḥammad. This pairing, found also in al-Shāfiʿī’s exposition 
of his concept of bayān in the Risāla,299 is used to introduce the discussion of non-
Qurʾānic revelation in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān.300 The same pairing 
serves as a structuring device in many chapters of    ā  al-Qurʾān: after quoting a 
Qurʾānic verse, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that a certain part of the verse was not explained (lam 
yubayyan) in the Kitāb, but it was explained (yubayyan) in the words of the Prophet.301 
This transitional statement then allows him to enter into the main work of most chapters 
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of A  ā  al-Qurʾān, which is in fact to discuss the Sunna, not the Qurʾān. Most of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s language, however, does not so clearly distinguish between Prophetic and post-
Prophetic material. 
The word ‘ adīth,’ for instance, invariably refers to a specific report consisting of 
an isnād (chain of authorities) and matn (stable verbal form of a report).302 Similar to Abū 
Yūsuf in his al-Radd ʿalā Siyar al- w āʿī,303 al-Ṭaḥāwī usually but not exclusively 
applies the term ‘ adīth’ to Prophetic reports; at other times he cites a “ adīth of ʿAlī” or 
a “ adīth of Salmān.”304 This usage stands in contrast with that of later jurists, among 
whom ‘ adīth’ would come to be exclusively associated with Prophetic reports.305 
Apparently synonymous with ‘ adīth’ is the rarer ‘khabar.’306 More than once al-Ṭaḥāwī 
successively labels the same Prophetic report “ adīth” and “khabar,” demonstrating that 
he, like Ibn Qutayba, does not make a distinction between ‘ adīth’ as religious reports 
and ‘khabar’ as secular reports.307  Like ‘ adīth,’ ‘khabar’ can refer to Companion as 
well as Prophetic reports.
308
 
Where later jurists would come to use ‘ adīth’ as a collective term for Prophetic 
reports, al-Ṭaḥāwī only employs ‘ adīth’ to designate the specific report under 
discussion. Very rarely, he uses the plural ‘a ādīth’ to refer to multiple reports, but even 
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then he intends only a few specific reports.
309
 To refer to a larger body of reports relevant 
to a legal topic or to the phenomenon of reports in general, he uses ‘āthār.’310 This 
abstract usage of ‘āthār’ to refer to the general phenomenon of reports appears as a 
structuring device in many chapters of Shar   aʿānī al-āthār. After weighing the  adīth 
evidence for different positions on a legal question and stating his conclusion, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
frequently states that “this is the ruling ( ukm) on this topic according to the method 
(ṭarīq) of āthār.” He almost invariably then goes on to discuss what the ruling on the 
same question would be according to naẓar (reasoned speculation).311 While āthār 
sometimes refers to post-Prophetic reports,
312
 it more often refers to Prophetic material. 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s definition of ‘āthār’ contrasts sharply with that of both al-Shāfiʿī and later 
jurists, for most of whom ‘āthār’ refers to non-Prophetic reports. For al-Shāfiʿī, ‘āthār’ 
were generally post-Companion reports which fell outside of the bounds of revelation.
313
 
For other jurists āthār was either a wider category including Prophetic and non-Prophetic 
reports or else a term restricted to Companion reports.
314
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s equation of āthār 
with  adīth is therefore unusual. 
 While ‘ adīth’, ‘khabar’ and ‘āthār’ refer to verbal reports, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs 
‘sunna’ more generally to encompass the practices concretized in those reports.315 
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Frequently, the term appears as a pair with ‘Qurʾān’ or ‘Kitāb,’316 and in one instance al-
Ṭaḥāwī explicitly contrasts them by asserting that a sunna is something that was not 
revealed in the Kitāb.317 In the overwhelming majority of cases al-Ṭaḥāwī implicitly or 
explicitly uses the term ‘sunna’ to refer to the exemplary practice of the Prophet (sunnat 
rasūl  llāh).318 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s habitual association of sunna with the Prophet represents a 
late stage in the evolution of this pre-Islamic term, which originally seems to have 
referred to the practice or traditions of the community or of individuals. While the 
Prophet’s practice gained a special status early in Islamic history, it is not until the 
beginning of the 3
rd
/9
th
 century that the association with Muḥammad became 
predominant.
319
 The Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī, for example, strongly associates sunna with the 
Prophet and argues for its authority.
320
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī follows al-Shāfiʿī in his overwhelming association of sunna with 
Muḥammad, and yet he occasionally refers to the sunna of ʿUmar, the Companions, or 
the first four caliphs (al-rāshidūn).321 Very rarely, he employs sunna without reference to 
a person to mean the legal practice concerning a certain thing, i.e., the sunna of the call to 
prayer (adhān).322 One passage in Shar   aʿānī al-āthār captures this controversy: a 
group of jurists claims that the reference to sunna in a  adīth means that the  adīth must 
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be Prophetic, even though it does not appear to be, because sunna only comes from the 
Prophet. Their opponents, with whom al-Ṭaḥāwī implicitly agrees, argues that the term 
sunna can also indicate that person’s opinion (raʾy) or something they took from 
someone after the time of the Prophet.
323
 It is notable that, while al-Shāfiʿī argues for the 
exclusive association of sunna with the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that that need not 
always be the case. 
The pattern that emerges from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of all of these terms is that they 
usually, but not exclusively, refer to Prophetic reports. This pattern indicates the central 
importance of Prophetic material to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s conception of the law and its sources. At 
the same time, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not feel the need to make the absolute distinction 
between Prophetic and post-Prophetic material that would be indicated by separate 
technical terms. His disinterest in doing so suggests that, as we will see in the following 
chapter, Prophetic and post-Prophetic materials do not fall into two epistemologically 
distinct categories for al-Ṭaḥāwī representing revelation and non-revelation.  
 
The Status of Muḥammad’s Words and Actions 
 While al-Ṭaḥāwī gives little attention to describing the varieties of  adīth and 
their respective levels of epistemological certainty, he is considerably more concerned 
with another issue related to the authoritativeness of  adīth as a source of law, and that is 
determining which kinds of reports about Muḥammad’s words and actions establish legal 
obligations. Like al-Shāfiʿī as well as authors of mature uṣūl al-fiqh works, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
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held that Muḥammad could not act against God’s commands.324 However, where both al-
Shāfiʿī and later authors use the root ʿ-ṣ-m ( aʿṣū , ʿiṣma) to indicate Muḥammad’s 
infallibility, al-Ṭaḥāwī simply states that it is impossible (mu āl) that Muḥammad do 
something that God had prohibited.
325
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s statement is categorical in a way that 
many other jurists’ discussions of infallibility are not. He does not entertain the 
possibility of Muḥammad temporarily disobeying God, although already in his time many 
jurists held that the concept of Muḥammad’s infallibility prevented only his persisting in 
error.
326
 For all of these jurists, the claim of prophetic infallibility is fundamental to 
assuring the status of  adīth as a source of law; if Muḥammad could disobey God, then 
his actions would not be a reliable means of discovering the law.  
 Prophetic infallibility does not imply that all of Muḥammad’s actions represent 
legal obligations, however. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, like later jurists, denies evidentiary value to 
anything Muḥammad did or said while asleep.327 In al-Fuṣūl, al-Jaṣṣāṣ considers whether 
the presumptive approach to Muḥammad’s actions should be to consider those actions 
obligatory, recommended or merely permitted. He concludes that they are merely 
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permitted in the absence of an indication (dalīl) to the contrary.328 Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not 
explicitly discuss any of these possibilities in his extant works. Nonetheless, we can 
surmise that he, like his fellow Ḥanafī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, held that Muḥammad’s actions indicate 
the mere permissibility of performing that action in the absence of a further indication. At 
several points in Shar   aʿānī al-āthār he argues that his opponents have no evidence for 
holding that a certain  adīth entails obligation, since there is nothing in that  adīth that 
indicates (yadull) that Muḥammad’s action is not simply showing his personal inclination 
or establishing a preferred, but not obligatory, course of action.
329
 
 Where al-Ṭaḥāwī diverges most from his Ḥanafī successors is in his discussion of 
Muḥammad’s words and actions that are not inspired by God. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, al-Jaṣṣāṣ and 
al-Sarakhsī all affirm that Muḥammad could and did sometimes speak from ijtihād al-
raʾy (the exertion of effort to come to a correct reasoned opinion) in situations where 
there was no revealed text to provide guidance.
330
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s motivations for making 
this claim differ significantly from those of al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī, however. The latter 
two jurists are interested in explaining, first, why Muḥammad sometimes consulted 
( ushāwara) with his Companions and took their advice when his status as a prophet 
might seem to preclude that
331
 and, second, how it is that Muḥammad was permitted to 
use his reasoning to make statements concerning rules of positive law (a  ā ) that were 
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later changed by revelation.
332
 The crucial point for both jurists is that, although 
Muḥammad may have employed ijtihād, his ijtihād was not really like that of other 
people, since God would not allow him to continue in an error. Given that his ijtihād 
must either be correct to begin with or would be corrected by God, it is in effect not 
ijtihād at all, but in fact something akin to revelation.333 Thus, no one may act against 
Muḥammad’s ijtihād.334 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of Muḥammad’s ijtihād is largely the opposite. He 
writes that “God’s messenger informed us that he is like the rest of humanity in what he 
says by way of reasoned speculation (ẓann). It is what he says from God that does not 
permit opposition.”335 In other words, Muḥammad’s ijtihād is entirely unlike revelation 
and creates no legal obligations for other Muslims. The discussions of Muḥammad’s 
ijtihād in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works fall into two related categories. In the first, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
appeals to Muḥammad’s ijtihād in order to explain away a potentially embarrassing 
 adīth, such as a report in which Muḥammad expresses doubt about the benefit of 
pollinating date palms. When the Muslims heed him and cease to pollinate them, the 
dates do not grow properly. Confronted with this result, Muḥammad’s response is that he 
is no farmer, and the Muslims should go ahead and pollinate their trees.
336
 In his 
discussion of this  adīth, al-Ṭaḥāwī proposes that Muḥammad probably thought that non-
human females do not require anything from the male in order to be fertile. In this he 
spoke from speculation (ẓann), in which he is equal to other humans. In this kind of 
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statement people may disagree, and it will become clear who is knowledgeable and who 
is not. Here, the Prophet was not one of those who are knowledgeable, since he came 
from Mecca, a city with no date palms at that time.
337
 
 In another  adīth Muḥammad warns men not to have sexual intercourse with their 
pregnant wives (lit., to kill their children secretly) lest they be overtaken by the dead fetus 
while they are on horseback and be thrown from their horses.
338
 A separate  adīth 
revokes the warning, saying that the Persians and Anatolians (al-Rū ) come to no harm 
from the practice, and therefore Muslims will not either.
339
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī comments that 
Muḥammad stated the original prohibition on intercourse during pregnancy out of fear of 
the harm it could cause, but this was not a prohibition like that found in revelation or law. 
Rather, it was based on what was in Muḥammad’s heart and was merely a warning.340 Al-
Ṭaḥāwī suspects that Muḥammad took his original view from what was commonly held 
among the Arabs, a claim he also makes in other cases where Muḥammad’s statement or 
action is not meant to set a precedent.
341
 Both of the above examples show Muḥammad 
giving orders unsupported by fact. Al-Ṭaḥāwī neutralizes these potentially embarrassing 
reports by appealing to Muḥammad’s ijtihād and by portraying that ijtihād as radically 
opposed to revelation, and therefore non-threatening to the status of the  adīth as a 
source of law.  
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī also appeals to Muḥammad’s ijtihād as a technique to neutralize 
apparently contradictory  adīths. When confronted with a  adīth in which Muḥammad 
gives the command not to take oaths (qasam), al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that this case is like the 
one in which Muḥammad ordered men not to have intercourse with their pregnant wives: 
he was speaking out of concern for his addressee, not establishing a legal standard. Other 
 adīths establish the permissibility of taking oaths.342 Similarly, concerning a  adīth 
which appears to set a legal obligation concerning what a man owes to his divorced wife 
during her waiting period (ʿidda), al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Muḥammad was not making a 
legal ruling (ya kum) but rather giving a legal opinion (futyā). The ruling concerning 
divorced women comes from other, revelatory  adīth.343  
 While revelation does establish a correct answer in the above questions, al-
Ṭaḥāwī does not suggest that God revealed new  adīths in order to correct any erroneous 
ijtihād on the part of Muḥammad; in fact, al-Ṭaḥāwī never states that God must correct 
Muḥammad’s errant opinions, indicating that he considers them ontologically distinct 
from revelation. Returning to the idea of prophetic infallibility, we might say that al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s categorical tone in stating that it is impossible for Muḥammad to disobey God 
or to be in error comes from his conviction that incorrect ijtihād is not error.344 Humans, 
including Muḥammad, are tasked with undertaking ijtihād in the absence of revelation, 
but they are not tasked with arriving at the objectively correct answer.
345
 In contrast, al-
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Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī have Muḥammad’s ijtihād in mind when they state that the 
Prophet cannot continue in an error, but will instead be corrected by God.  
The differences in these two positions suggest a significant difference in how these jurists 
view Muḥammad’s prophethood. Al-Ṭaḥāwī understands Muḥammad as being both a 
prophet, who infallibly conveys God’s speech and follows God’s commands, and an 
ordinary human, who can make mistakes and speak contrary to fact just like anyone else. 
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī, in contrast, seek to erase the fallible, ordinary side of 
Muḥammad by arguing that his ijtihād amounts to a form of revelation. Changing 
perceptions of Muḥammad no doubt contribute to this disparity in views; the section on 
the revelatory status of Muḥammad’s ijtihād is much more extensive and strongly stated 
in al-Sarakhsī (d. ca. 483/1090) than in al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980-981).  
It is also likely, however, that the difference is due in part to the different genres 
in which these jurists are writing. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī are composing manuals of 
legal theory. While they do adduce  adīths in support of and as examples of their claims, 
the power of selection is in their own hands. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī has set out in his 
works of practical hermeneutics to tackle a very large body of problematic  adīth in order 
to demonstrate that apparent conflicts among them are not real. His materials are not 
selected to support elegant theoretical discussions; rather, his theories are constantly 
forced to grapple with the raw material of revelation. It is questionable whether the 
elegant, comprehensive theories of Islamic law characteristic of the later legal theorists 
could have coexisted in the same texts with such a diverse body of material. There may 
be something necessary about the fact that legal theory was written in a genre of texts 
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separate from, though closely related to, the messy business of confronting the raw 
material of revelation.  
Here, in order to accommodate certain problematic Prophetic  adīths without 
calling the authority of all Prophetic  adīths into question, al-Ṭaḥāwī has posited a 
fundamental distinction between  adīths that result from revelatory instruction and those 
that represent the Prophet’s personal inference. In asserting this instruction/inference 
divide, al-Ṭaḥāwī has effectively created a two-tiered system: Prophetic  adīths which 
represent revelation are authoritative legal sources, while those which record the 
Prophet’s own legal reasoning have no special authority. There is, then, no single degree 
of legal authority that can be assigned a priori to Prophetic  adīth as a category. Of 
course, legal theorists also recognized different degrees of authority in  adīth based upon 
epistemological certainty, as we have seen above. However, when legal theorists claim 
that a  habar wā id does not possess the same authority as a  habar  utawātir, they are 
concerned only with how the report was transmitted after Muḥammad’s death; both 
singly and widely transmitted  adīths originally represented the same kind of 
authority.
346
  
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s typology of Prophetic  adīths is based upon content. 
Some  adīths, from the moment of their inception, cannot serve as the basis for deriving 
the law, because they merely preserve Muḥammad’s own inference. In his discussion of 
Prophetic  adīths, then, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs an instruction/inference binary as a kind of 
safety valve that allows him to downplay the authority of a certain set of problematic 
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 adīths. In the following chapter, we will see that he draws upon the very same binary to 
augment the authority of certain Companion and Successor  adīths such that they 
represent revelatory authority. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s repeated invocations of the 
instruction/inference divide in different contexts suggest that this binary is fundamental 
to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s vision of the structure of the Divine Law. 
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Chapter Two: Companion and Successor Ḥadīths 
 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works are overwhelmingly concerned with 
demonstrating the mechanics of how Prophetic  adīths may be interpreted in light of 
other Prophetic  adīths and the Qurʾān in order to reveal coherent rules of positive law.
347
 Despite the centrality of Prophetic  adīth to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s project, however, Companion 
and Successor  adīths appear in the great majority of his arguments in    ā  al-Qurʾān 
and Shar   aʿānī al-āthār.348 They play a lesser but still notable role in his third 
hermeneutical work, Shar  mushkil al-āthār.349 In the course of these three texts, al-
Ṭaḥāwī cites  adīths from well over a hundred different Companions and Successors, 
many of whom feature habitually in his arguments.
350
 In most chapters, Companion and 
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Successor  adīths serve simply as evidence for those individuals’ legal opinions on a 
similar level of authority to the opinions of later jurists. In other chapters, however, 
Companion and Successor  adīths stand in for legally authoritative Prophetic  adīths in a 
way that suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s willingness to blur boundaries between categories of 
legal sources extends beyond the revealed sources of Qurʾān and Sunna.  
 This chapter examines the nature of Companion and Successor authority and the 
function of Companion and Successor  adīths in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works. It 
argues that al-Ṭaḥāwī almost always understands the special authority of the Companions 
and Successors to derive from their role in mimetically preserving knowledge of 
Prophetic practice. Crucially, this function points to his assumption of the failure of the 
corpus of Prophetic  adīths to adequately capture Prophetic practice. In cases where al-
Ṭaḥāwī does hold that the Companions or Successors are mimetically preserving 
Prophetic practice, he invokes the instruction/inference divide described in the previous 
chapter in order to claim revelatory authority for the  adīths in question. In a very few 
places, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought also preserves traces of an older conception of religious 
authority which places the Companions in competition with the Prophet. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
ambivalent approach to the Companions and his heavy reliance on post-Prophetic  adīth, 
after the time when established narratives of Islamic legal history report that juristic 
dependence on Companion reports had ceased,
351
 suggests that existing accounts of the 
triumph of Prophetic  adīth in the later 3rd/9th century give too neat a picture of this 
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period. This chapter adds complexity to our understanding of this pivotal time by 
suggesting the ways in which the question of the authority of post-Prophetic  adīths was 
tied to changing conceptions of what it meant to preserve Prophetic practice.  
 
Historical Background 
 By al-Ṭaḥāwī’s lifetime, both jurists and traditionists had come to perceive a clear 
distinction between Prophetic and post-Prophetic  adīths and to accord the former the 
status of revelation. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the 1
st
/7
th
 and 2
nd
/8
th
 
centuries the sunna of Muḥammad was in competition with the sunan of other exemplary 
individuals and previous generations as a model for the Muslim community.
352
 Although 
the sunna of the Companions, the first caliphs or the Muslims of a particular locale was 
generally understood to be an extension of the Prophet’s practice, this early concept of 
sunna valorized the continuous yet evolving practice of the Muslim Community in a way 
that the later concept of Prophetic Sunna as an unchanging and mimetic textual record of 
Muḥammad’s practice would not. The growth of the concept of Prophetic authority can 
be traced to the late 2
nd
/8
th
 and early 3
rd
/9
th
 centuries, when jurists began more 
systematically to justify their legal doctrines on the basis of Prophetic  adīth.353 
Nonetheless, jurists of that period still had relatively few Prophetic  adīths available to 
them and continued to rely heavily upon Companion and Successors  adīths.354 As a 
corollary to the rise in Prophetic authority, many opinions and statements which had 
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previously been associated with the Companions, Successors and others began to be 
attributed to the Prophet in the form of Prophetic  adīths,355 thus preserving the authority 
of material which had not previously needed to be labeled Prophetic in order to be 
normative.  
Although the growth of Prophetic authority and the appeal to Prophetic  adīth 
were related processes, it is important to distinguish between the Prophet as sole locus of 
authority and Prophetic  adīth as the form in which that authority was transmitted. A 
jurist might, for example, subscribe to a Prophetic model of authority while holding that 
the Prophet’s words and actions are known not only through Prophetic  adīths, but also 
through Companion or Successor  adīths, consensus or the practice of the community. 
Indeed, it was deference to Prophetic authority without a concomitant exclusive devotion 
to Prophetic  adīths that characterized what Hallaq labels the “practice-based sunna” of 
the jurists of the 1
st
/7
th
 and 2
nd
/8
th
 centuries. While these jurists looked to Companion 
practice as a source of law, Companion practice in turn preserved Prophetic practice.
356
 
Thus, the authority underlying “practice-based sunna” was ultimately understood to be 
Prophetic, even if, for them, Companion practice was an evolving extension of Prophetic 
practice rather than a stable record of it.
357
 Even when jurists began to articulate more 
forcefully the idea of an exclusively Prophetic authority at the end of the 2
nd
/8
th
 century, 
that authority was not necessarily embodied only in Prophetic  adīth form. As Schacht 
and Hallaq have noted, al-Shaybānī held that the Qurʾān and the Prophet were the sole 
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legal authorities, yet he employed a significant number of Companion  adīths in his legal 
arguments.
358
  
 In the early 3
rd
/9
th
 century, al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of bayān for the first time asserted 
that Prophetic authority and Prophetic  adīth were necessarily linked. All law, he argued, 
was revealed by God to humans through Muḥammad in the form of recited revelation or 
in the speech and actions of the Prophet. Al-Shāfiʿī held that Qurʾān and Prophetic  adīth 
are the complete and exclusive sources through which later generations may come to 
know revelation and the law, although he did struggle to account for apparently extra-
revelatory sources such as Companion reports and consensus within his account of the 
structure of the law.
359
   
Reliance upon Companion and Successor reports did not immediately cease, 
however. Until the appearance of al-Bukhārī’s (d. 256/870) Ṣa ī  in the late 3rd/9th 
century, even traditionists freely mingled Companion and Successor reports with 
Prophetic material in their  adīth compilations.360 While al-Bukhārī, too, included 
Companion and Successor reports in his Ṣa ī , for him their authority was clearly 
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distinguished from and secondary to that of the Prophet’s Sunna. Hallaq and Melchert 
identify this same period, the second half of the 3
rd
/9
th
 century, as the time when jurists 
abandoned Companion  adīths in favor of exclusively citing Prophetic  adīths.361 
Vishanoff largely agrees, although he characterizes the late 3
rd
/9
th
 century as the time 
when jurists ceased to “rely heavily” on post-Prophetic reports, leaving open the 
possibility of some degree of reliance.
362
  
 
Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Works 
Writing in the early 4
th
/10
th
 century, al-Ṭaḥāwī understood Prophetic  adīth as 
revelation and a source of law equal to the Qurʾān. Despite his acceptance of the superior 
status of Prophetic  adīth, however, post-Prophetic  adīths appear with great frequency 
in his works. He habitually cites Companion and Successor opinions along with those of 
later jurists as corroborating authority for his own position or as evidence of opposing 
positions.
363
 While the later jurists are simply listed, he provides at least one  adīth with 
a full isnād for each Companion or Successor opinion he cites, meaning that the 
Companions and Successors occupy a physical space on the pages of his works far 
greater than that of later jurists, including the jurists of his own school.
364
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Further, al-Ṭaḥāwī frames many chapters of his hermeneutical works as 
disagreements among Companions and Successors, citing them at the outset of the 
chapter as proponents of the various opinions he will evaluate.
365
 Only after resolving the 
disagreement among the Companions and Successors in such chapters does he conclude 
by mentioning the later jurists who are in agreement with him. While there certainly are 
plenty of chapters in his hermeneutical works which frame debates as conflicts between 
legal schools, the presence of so many chapters in which the narrative drama is based 
upon the conflicts among Companions and Successors indicates their centrality to al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s vision of the field of juristic debate.  
The preceding observations concern the juxtaposition of Companion or Successor 
 adīths with the opinions of later jurists and the way in which the Companions and 
Successors often appear to physically crowd out later jurists within the pages of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works. The primary interest of this chapter, however, is the 
juxtaposition of Prophetic and post-Prophetic  adīths in these same works. On the whole, 
the relative authority of Prophetic and post-Prophetic  adīths appears to be a settled issue 
for al-Ṭaḥāwī, in keeping with the narrative presented above. Neither he nor his 
interlocutors suggest that individual Companions or Successors possess authority 
independent from or in competition with that of the Prophet, although, as we will see 
below, he is less categorical about the collective authority of the Companions.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī refers to the superior authority of Prophetic over post-Prophetic 
 adīths in the course of a number of discussions of discrete legal issues. In one, an 
unnamed interlocutor argues that a report from Ibn ʿUmar provides the best practice for 
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supererogatory prayer. Al-Ṭaḥāwī responds that, first, his interlocutor has misinterpreted 
Ibn ʿUmar’s report and, second, what has been transmitted from the Prophet is better 
(awlā) than the report from Ibn ʿUmar.366 In several other passages detailing Companion 
disagreement on legal questions, al-Ṭaḥāwī adopts the Companion opinion that is in 
agreement with a Prophetic  adīth.367 In two of these passages, he cites the conflicting 
Companion  adīths before stating that “since they disagreed” (la  ā i htalafū) he will 
look to what has been transmitted from the Prophet.
368
 In another, he writes that “this is 
one of the things on which disagreement occurred among the Companions of God’s 
Messenger. The best of what they said is that which is in agreement with what we have 
transmitted from the Prophet.”369 In a different example concerning disagreement among 
later jurists rather than among the Companions, al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes that the best opinion 
is that which is supported by what has been transmitted from the Prophet, and then what 
has been transmitted from the Companions.
370
 
In all of these discussions al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts the authority of Prophetic  adīths 
over post-Prophetic  adīths in cases where they conflict. What is notable, however, is the 
degree to which these passages also emphasize the importance that al-Ṭaḥāwī grants 
Companion  adīths. In the first example, al-Ṭaḥāwī could merely have stated that the 
Prophetic  adīth is more authoritative than the opinion of Ibn ʿUmar. Instead, he pauses 
to argue that his interlocutor has misinterpreted Ibn ʿUmar’s  adīth, and it is in fact in 
agreement with his own opinion. In other examples, al-Ṭaḥāwī has Prophetic  adīth 
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available to settle an issue, yet he takes the time to adduce Companion opinions and only 
looks to the Prophetic example “since they disagreed.” Although the final example 
asserts the priority of Prophetic  adīth, it also instructs jurists to look to Companion 
 adīths to settle their disagreements.  
Likewise, in a chapter of Shar  mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī presents Companion 
 adīths apparently in conflict with a Prophetic  adīth. Rather than simply dismissing the 
Companion  adīths as inferior to the Prophetic  adīth and therefore irrelevant to 
determining the law, al-Ṭaḥāwī applies the harmonization techniques to them that he 
generally uses on apparently conflicting Prophetic  adīths. His application of 
harmonization techniques to apparent conflicts between Companion and Prophetic 
 adīths stands in stark contrast to the position of al-Shāfiʿī, who held that Companion 
 adīths could not be harmonized with Prophetic  adīths because the latter were 
revelation while the former were not.
371
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes the chapter by stating that, 
“Thanks be to God, what we have transmitted from the Companions of God’s Messenger 
emerges as being in agreement with what we have transmitted from God’s 
Messenger.”372 In this example and those previous, al-Ṭaḥāwī evinces a notable concern 
for Companion  adīths and their agreement with Prophetic  adīths even while assuming 
the superior authority of Prophetic material.  
In a striking example of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s deference to Companion  adīths, he devotes 
a chapter of Shar  mushkil al-āthār to explaining Ibn ʿAbbās’s statement that “there is no 
revelation except for the Qurʾān.” As discussed in the previous chapter of this study, al-
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Ṭaḥāwī harmonizes Ibn ʿAbbās’s assertion with Prophetic  adīths stating that the 
Prophet’s Sunna is also revelation by arguing that the Sunna falls within the scope of the 
Qurʾān.373 The fact that al-Ṭaḥāwī elected to dedicate a chapter to harmonizing Ibn 
ʿAbbās’s statement with Prophetic  adīth, as well as the unusual argument he employs to 
do so, suggests that he does not understand Companion  adīths as being so ontologically 
distinct from Prophetic  adīths that they can simply be dismissed when they contradict 
established Prophetic  adīths.374 Further, by framing the chapter as one about Ibn 
ʿAbbās’s  adīth, rather than the Prophetic  adīths with which it is apparently in conflict, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī makes a Companion report his central concern.375  
 
The Relative Status of the Companions and the Successors  
 We will see in this chapter that al-Ṭaḥāwī claims special authority for both 
Companion and Successor  adīths, although Successors represent Prophetic authority 
much less frequently than do the Companions. In the authority he grants to Successor 
 adīths, al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from the later tradition; while the earliest Ḥanafī uṣūl works 
contain chapters on aspects of the authority of the Companions, the Successors appear to 
hold no special status. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s elevation of Successor  adīths does appear to have at 
least some elements in common with the thought of one of his contemporaries, the 
                                                 
373
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 14.466-471. For a discussion of this argument, see p. 80 of this study.  
374
 It is worth considering whether al-Ṭaḥāwī grants Ibn ʿAbbās authority as a member of the ahl al-bayt 
rather than as a Companion; however, the large number of cases in which al-Ṭaḥāwī grants Prophetic status 
to  adīths by Companions who are not ahl al-bayt suggests that it is Ibn ʿAbbās’s status as Companion that 
is relevant here. 
375
 A few other chapters of Shar  mushkil al-āthār are likewise framed as explaining Companion, rather 
than Prophetic  adīth. See, for example, Mushkil, 14.465.  
112 
 
 
traditionist Ibn Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 327/939), however.376 In his introduction to Kitāb 
al-Jar  wa-l-taʿdīl Ibn Abī Ḥātim argues for the probity of both the Companions and the 
Successors. As is the case with the Companions, he states, there is no distinction among 
the Successors, for they are all imams.
377
 Although Ibn Abī Ḥātim was concerned with 
asserting the soundness of the corpus of Prophetic  adīths while al-Ṭaḥāwī sought to 
expand the corpus of available  adīths by labeling post-Prophetic  adīths as Prophetic, 
both argued for the authority of the Successors in a way that was not continued by the 
later tradition.
378
 
 In addition to elevating the status of the Successors, al-Ṭaḥāwī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim 
are also alike in using the term qudwa (model, exemplar) exclusively in connection with 
the Companions. Ibn Abī Ḥātim writes that God “made [the Companions] signs (aʿlā ) 
and an exemplar (qudwa) for us,” a claim he does not make in his discussion of the 
Successors, despite his general elevation of their status as transmitters.
379
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, too, 
appears to restrict the status of qudwa to the Companions, although his usage is 
somewhat more ambiguous. In a chapter of Shar  mushkil al-āthār concerning Q 54/al-
Qamar:1 (“The Hour has drawn near—the moon has been split”), al-Ṭaḥāwī criticizes 
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those who claim that the moon will split on Judgment Day rather than relying on 
Companion āthār from ʿAlī, Ibn Masʿūd, Ḥudhayfa, Ibn ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās and Anas 
establishing that it had already split during the lifetime of the Prophet. He writes that “we 
know of nothing else transmitted from other scholars on this matter. They are the 
exemplars (qudwa) and the authorities ( ujja) whom only an ignoramus would oppose, 
and only a profligate would despise.”380 Here the term qudwa appears to be restricted to 
the Companions he has just listed, although in the next paragraph he condemns those who 
rely on their own raʾy over what has been transmitted from the Companions and their 
Successors without indicating why the Successors are now being mentioned along with 
the Companions. 
 A similar ambivalence concerning the relative status of the Companions and the 
Successors appears later in the same chapter, where al-Ṭaḥāwī writes that:  
We seek refuge in God from opposition to the Companions of God’s Messenger 
and deviation from their doctrines ( adhāhib). [Such deviation] is like holding 
oneself above (al-isti bār ʿan) God’s Book. Whoever holds himself above God’s 
Book and the doctrines of the Companions of God’s Messenger and their 
Successors is deserving of God denying him understanding.
381
 
 
Here, as above, al-Ṭaḥāwī first refers only to the Companions, but then apparently 
expands the scope of his claim to include the Successors. Thus, it appears that neither for 
Ibn Abī Ḥātim nor for al-Ṭaḥāwī does the claim that Successor transmission can fulfill 
the same functions as Companion transmission necessarily indicate that the two groups 
are precisely equivalent in status. 
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 The passage translated above makes a strong claim for the authority of 
Companion—and to a lesser degree, Successor—doctrines. The Companions’ status as 
qudwa in both al-Ṭaḥāwī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim might also appear to indicate that the 
Companions held a normative authority of their own. A close study of the relevant 
passages, however, indicates that the status of qudwa claimed by both scholars and the 
authority al-Ṭaḥāwī envisions for the Companions’ doctrines is not any sort of 
independent authority, but rather derives directly from their status as witnesses to 
revelation. In both passages from the chapter on the splitting of the moon citing above, 
what al-Ṭaḥāwī criticizes is later scholars’ rejection of Companion reports confirming a 
historical event—the splitting of the moon. Thus, when he speaks of their doctrines 
( adhāhib), he is not referring to their legal opinions, but rather to their recounting of 
events they witnessed, a recounting which serves as exegesis for the Qurʾān. Likewise, in 
the earlier passage the Companions are exemplars only in the sense that they preserve 
knowledge of the meaning of the Qurʾānic verse in question. Wheeler observes that Ibn 
Abī Ḥātim’s understanding of the authority of the Companions’ practice (and thus their 
role as qudwa) is also based on their status as witnesses to revelation and to the Prophet’s 
practice.
382
 Thus, the authority that both al-Ṭaḥāwī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim attribute to the 
Companions in labeling them qudwa is merely the faithful transmission of knowledge of 
Prophetic practice.  
  A hierarchy of the Companions and Successors is also indicated elsewhere in al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s thought. Below, we will see that al-Ṭaḥāwī claims Prophetic authority for far 
                                                 
382
 Brannon Wheeler, Applying the Canon in Islam: The Authorization and Maintenance of Interpretive 
Reasoning in Ḥanafī Scholarship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 86.  
115 
 
 
more Companion  adīths than Successor  adīths and that the Successors appear in only 
one of the three lists of legal sources mentioning Companion opinions. Additionally, we 
will observe that he holds the mere fact of being a Companion sufficient to allay fears of 
that person’s contravening Prophetic practice, while no such claims are made about the 
Successors. Instead, he points to the personal qualities of individual Successors to explain 
their authority. A hierarchy of Companion and Successor authority—at least in the area 
of Qurʾānic exegesis—is established in a chapter of Shar  mushkil al-āthār in which the 
Successor Mujāhid’s exegesis of a Qurʾānic verse differs from that of the Companion Ibn 
Masʿūd. Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Ibn Masʿūd’s exegesis receives precedence over 
Mujāhid’s because of Ibn Masʿūd’s position (mawḍiʿ) relative to the Prophet.383 That is, 
Ibn Masʿūd witnessed revelation and is therefore better qualified to interpret it than 
Mujāhid. 
 That al-Ṭaḥāwī gave precedence to the Companions over the Successors may be 
understood as reflecting an ongoing process of defining the boundaries and nature of 
Companionship. This process is evident as early as the beginning of the 3
rd
/9
th
 century 
with al-Wāqidī’s (d. 207/822) definition of a Companion384 and continues through the 
final crystallization of the doctrine of the collective probity of the Companions (ʿadālat 
al-ṣa āba) in the 5th/11th century.385 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s ʿ qīda is one of the earliest statements 
of the theological requirement to revere all of the Companions,
386
 and a number of 
chapters in Shar  mushkil al-āthār are concerned with working out the collective status 
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of the Companions by addressing  adīths that appear to suggest that only some 
Companions possessed important virtues
387
 or imply that Companions acted wrongly in a 
certain case.
388
 Other chapters argue for the superiority of the Companions over all later 
Muslims while recognizing the possibility that some Companions may be superior to 
others in certain areas.
389
  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī thus theorizes about the status of the Companions in a way that he 
does not do with the Successors, even though the Successors perform all the same 
functions in his legal arguments as the Companions. In this approach, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears 
to represent an intermediary stage between a time when the earliest generations of 
Muslims were vested with the authority to extend and develop Prophetic practice and the 
later concept of ʿadālat al-ṣa aba, which served primarily to guarantee the corpus of 
Prophetic  adīth by precluding criticism of any of its original transmitters. 
 
The Prophetic Authority of Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths 
Claims of Prophetic Status for Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī understood only the Prophet’s Sunna as revelation and thus in theory 
made a firm distinction between the status of Prophetic and post-Prophetic  adīths. 
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not distinguish between 
Prophetic and post-Prophetic reports in his terminology; khabar,  adīth, āthār and sunna 
are all used in reference to both Prophetic and post-Prophetic material, while many later 
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jurists would carefully distinguish between Prophetic  adīth and post-Prophetic āthār in 
their terminology.
390
 Further, in approximately fifty passages in    ā  al-Qurʾān and 
Shar  mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī blurs the boundaries between Prophetic and non-
Prophetic material by claiming Prophetic status for a post-Prophetic  adīth.391  
For example, no Prophetic  adīth indicates any limit to when it is permissible to 
perform the ʿUmra (minor pilgrimage). According to qiyās, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, it should 
be permissible on any day of the year. However, he has discovered a statement from 
ʿĀʾisha that there are four days of the year when the ʿUmra may not be performed. Al-
Ṭaḥāwī argues that:  
We know that [ʿĀʾisha] did not speak based upon her own legal reasoning (raʾy), 
but rather spoke what had been confirmed by the Prophet’s instruction (tawqīf), 
because this kind of thing cannot be based upon legal reasoning. Therefore we 
hold that her statement on this is like a continuously attested Prophetic  adīth 
( adīth  uttaṣil).392  
 
By deeming ʿĀʾisha’s statement evidence of revelation, al-Ṭaḥāwī has in effect elevated 
a post-Prophetic  adīth to the status of a revealed text. Crucially, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument 
in support of ʿĀʾisha’s position depends on the instruction/inference binary we have 
already encountered in the previous chapter, although here that binary is expressed using 
the language of raʾy (legal reasoning) and tawqīf (Prophetic instruction). While a 
Companion or Successor’s legal reasoning—most commonly termed raʾy, but also 
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occasionally istinbāṭ, isti hrāj or qiyās393—can justifiably serve as the basis for some 
kinds of statements regarding the law, other types of legislative statements can only be 
based upon instruction from the Prophet (tawqīf or, occasionally, akhdh).394 Precisely 
which types of statements require tawqīf is never explicitly and comprehensively stated, 
although I suggest some parameters later in this section, abstracted from passages in 
which al-Ṭaḥāwī employs this argument. In addition to this binary, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument 
in this passage assumes a second major premise: that a Companion or Successor would 
never make a statement concerning the law for which they did not possess the necessary 
authority.
395
 In effect, the tawqīf:raʾy binary transforms a pious optimism about the 
trustworthiness of the Companions and Successors into the basis for an inference 
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concerning the origins of their legal doctrines. By appealing to this binary, al-Ṭaḥāwī is 
able to claim revelatory status for many apparently non-Prophetic statements of the law. 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī similarly elevates post-Prophetic  adīths to Prophetic status in many 
other passages of his hermeneutical works. In a chapter containing both Prophetic and 
Companion versions of an exegesis of a Qurʾānic verse, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that, even if not 
a single transmitter had elevated (rafʿ) a certain  adīth from Ibn ʿAbbās to the Prophet, 
we would know that Ibn ʿAbbās must have received this statement from the Prophet.396 
On another occasion, when faced with an ambiguous report in which it is not clear 
whether a certain phrase is quoting the speech of Abū Hurayra or the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
concludes that, in either case, the speech is originally that of the Prophet. That is true 
even if Abū Hurayra did not receive it directly from the Prophet, but instead reported it 
indirectly from someone else who had received it from the Prophet.
397
  
 Once al-Ṭaḥāwī has claimed Prophetic status for a Companion  adīth, he holds 
that  adīth equal to other Prophetic  adīths in every way. Concerning one report from the 
wives of the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī says that he “includes it among the Prophetic  adīths” 
(ad halnā hādhihi al- adīth fī a ādīth rasūl  llāh”).398 In another place, he argues that a 
 adīth from ʿAlī falls under the ruling ( ukm) of something transmitted from the 
Prophet.
399
 After elevating Companion reports from ʿAlī and Abū Hurayra to Prophetic 
status, al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the term  u āfiʾ (equivalent) to describe their relationship to 
another relevant Prophetic  adīth, the same term he uses when two Prophetic  adīths 
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cannot be harmonized and therefore must both be discarded.
400
 Finally, in a chapter 
where al-Ṭaḥāwī has claimed Prophetic status for a report from Abū Hurayra, he 
proceeds to harmonize that report with both the Qurʾān and Prophetic  adīths on the 
grounds that they are equally authoritative sources.
401
 In a strong sense, then, the reports 
in question are no longer truly Companion  adīths at all, but have fully entered the realm 
of Prophetic revelation. 
 Only rarely does al-Ṭaḥāwī elevate a post-Companion  adīth to Prophetic status. 
One passage identified concerns the Successor Ṭāwūs, while another concerns the jurist 
al-Awzāʿī (d.158/774). In the chapter on the ʿUmra discussed above, shortly after 
claiming for ʿĀʾisha’s report the status of a  adīth  uttaṣil, al-Ṭaḥāwī cites a  adīth from 
Ṭāwūs. He writes that Ṭāwūs “must have had tawqīf from someone who came before 
him, because this is the kind of thing not taken from raʾy, isti hrāj or istinbāṭ.”402 That is, 
Ṭāwūs must have heard it from a Companion, who must have heard it from the Prophet. 
The other example concerns a Prophetic  adīth in which it is unclear whether a certain 
addition to the  adīth by al-Awzāʿī was intended to be part of the Prophet’s speech or 
was al-Awzāʿī’s own speech. Al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes that the question is unimportant, 
because someone as knowledgeable and virtuous as al-Awzāʿī would not inappropriately 
add his own interpretation to the  adīth, and what he said could not be based upon raʾy, 
isti hrāj or istinbāṭ.403 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments concerning these post-Companion reports 
thus follow the same pattern and use the same language as many of his arguments 
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concerning the Prophetic status of Companion  adīths; however, his stronger claims 
discussed above, such as that a post-Prophetic  adīth should be counted among the 
Prophetic  adīths, are limited to the Companions.    
 In many cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claims of authority for post-Prophetic  adīths are in 
agreement with principles described by other jurists and traditionists. For instance, al-
Ṭaḥāwī accepts a  adīth from Abū Mulayḥ concerning the amount of the damages (diya) 
for the killing of a viable fetus on the grounds that the  adīth mentions a specific sum for 
the damages, and such a sum can only be known through Prophetic instruction.
404
 In their 
chapters on taqlīd al-Ṣa ābī,405 al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī similarly note that even those 
jurists who deny the precedence of a Companion report over qiyās accept the legal 
authority of a single Companion report on issues related to quantity. Like al-Ṭaḥāwī, they 
take the Ḥanafī principle that enumerated quantities and defined amounts cannot be the 
outcome of analogy and make that principle the basis for an inference about the 
provenance of a Companion  adīth. That is, because quantities cannot be known through 
qiyās, a Companion  adīth establishing such a rule must have been based upon Prophetic 
instruction (tawqīf).406 Nyazee observes that the Ḥanafīs apply the same rule to time 
periods.
407
 We have already seen al-Ṭaḥāwī claiming Prophetic status for ʿĀʾisha’s 
 adīth about the time period during which Muslims may perform the ʿUmra, and al-
Ṭaḥāwī states explicitly elsewhere that the defining of time periods (tawqīt) requires 
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instruction (tawqīf) from the Prophet.408 However, while later Ḥanafī jurists may accept 
the legal authority of such Companion  adīths, they do not appear to reclassify 
Companion  adīths as Prophetic or discuss the authority of post-Companion  adīths in 
the manner of al-Ṭaḥāwī. 
 Nor does al-Ṭaḥāwī limit his use of this argument to cases involving numbers or 
time periods. In a few cases, he establishes principles concerning other kinds of 
legislative statements that require tawqīf. For instance, we learn that statements in the 
grammatical form of a threat and statements which particularize ( hāṣṣ) the general 
(ʿāmm) must have been the result of Prophetic instruction.409 In most cases, however, al-
Ṭaḥāwī merely states that a certain legislative statement in a post-Prophetic  adīth could 
not be based upon legal reasoning without explaining what it is about the statement that 
precludes that possibility.
410
 The rules that al-Ṭaḥāwī supports on the basis of this 
argument include, for example, the impermissibility of performing Congregational prayer 
on Fridays and the three days of ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā outside of a garrison town or Friday mosque 
(jā iʿ);411 the permissibility of wearing a garment embroidered in silk;412 the 
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impermissibility of slaves calling their masters ‘rabbī’ (my lord);413 the practice of 
calling out a greeting before asking permission to enter a house;
414
 the permissibility of 
interceding for someone who has committed a  add crime before the charge is brought to 
the ruler;
415
 and the impermissibility of two people conferring secretly together while 
traveling with a third person.
416
 Surveying other cases in which he employs this 
argument, we may surmise that al-Ṭaḥāwī also holds that Companion opinions 
establishing ritual practices must have originated with the Prophet, since a number of his 
examples involve prayer
417
 and pilgrimage practices.
418
  
On the whole, however, while it is possible to abstract from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
discussions some limited set of principles concerning the kind of legislative statement 
that requires tawqīf, in practice, these principles cannot account for nearly all of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s appeals to the idea of an underlying instance of tawqīf. Indeed, it appears that 
any legislative statement by a Companion that is not explicitly labeled an instance of 
qiyās may be subsumed under this argument and reclassified as Prophetic, a move which 
permits al-Ṭaḥāwī wide latitude in claiming divine origins for practices not recorded in 
the Qurʾān and Prophetic Sunna. The question arises, then, on what basis does al-Ṭaḥāwī 
identify particular Companion and Successor  adīths as representing Prophetic authority, 
and to what end? 
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In many cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts the Prophetic status of Companion  adīths in 
order to justify established rules of Ḥanafī positive law that cannot be accounted for 
under the source rubric of Qurʾān, Sunna and consensus. Such cases reveal that al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical project is at least to some extent instrumental, serving the 
ultimate purpose of tethering Ḥanafī fiqh to revelation. For example, in a discussion 
defining the area of ʿArafat within which pilgrims must halt, al-Ṭaḥāwī first cites a 
Prophetic  adīth saying that all of ʿArafat is a halting place (mawqif). He next notes that 
scholars including Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī 
exclude a certain area from the permissible halting place for the pilgrimage, but that he 
has not found a continuously attested Prophetic  adīth giving that exception. He has, 
however, identified a Companion hadith from Ibn ʿAbbās, supported by other reports 
from ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr and ʿUrwa, stating the exception. Because we know that 
they would not have spoken from raʾy, istinbāṭ,  aqāyīs, or ḍarb al-a thāl, they must 
have taken this exception from the Prophet. Al-Ṭaḥāwī goes on to state that he later found 
a version of the  adīth from Ibn ʿAbbās which was elevated to the Prophet ( arfūʿ);419 
however, even before discovering the Prophetic  adīth stating the exception, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
was willing to base his opinion on the authority of the presumed Prophetic origins of 
Companion  adīths. Significantly, the authority that al-Ṭaḥāwī grants these Companion 
 adīths outweighs the authority of the original Prophetic  adīth stating that all of ʿArafat 
is the halting place. The argument for the Prophetic status of Companion  adīth thus 
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allows al-Ṭaḥāwī to claim a basis in revelation even for rules which conflict with 
Prophetic  adīth. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s elevation of 
Companion  adīths to Prophetic status is merely a tool in the service of justifying Ḥanafī 
fiqh. While the majority of such arguments do serve to support an established rule of 
Ḥanafī positive law, at other times al-Ṭaḥāwī’s deference to Companion  adīths leads 
him to oppose established Ḥanafī positions, revealing a fundamental struggle in al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s works between instrumental and philosophical reasoning.420 For instance, in a 
chapter concerning someone who had the opportunity to make up missed fast days from a 
previous Ramadan but failed to do so before the arrival of a new Ramadan, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
spends most of the chapter arguing in support of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-
Shaybānī, who hold that nothing more is required of the person than that he or she should 
make up the missed fast days. In response to the claim of Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn ʿAbbās 
and Abū Hurayra that the individual must also feed a poor person for every day of fasting 
missed, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that nothing more than making up the missed obligation is 
required of someone who misses a prayer. By analogy, nothing more should be required 
of someone who misses a fast day. Further, the Qurʾān does not mention feeding the poor 
in its discussion of making up missed fast days. Al-Ṭaḥāwī counters several more 
arguments from an unnamed interlocutor representing the position of Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, 
Ibn ʿAbbās and Abū Hurayra.421  
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To this point in the argument, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to agree with the Ḥanafī 
position. At the very end of the discussion, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that he could not 
find support for the legislative content of the  adīths from Ibn ʿAbbās and Abū Hurayra 
in the Qurʾān, the Sunna, or qiyās. They could not have spoken from raʾy or istinbāṭ, but 
only on the basis of tawqīf from the Prophet. No other Companion is known to disagree 
with them. Therefore, he will oppose Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī and adopt 
the opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās and Abū Hurayra, even though analogy and the apparent 
meaning of the Qurʾān are in conflict with their position.422 Although he does not say so 
directly, he is also now in agreement with Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī over the members of his 
own legal school.  
We see here that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s deference to Companion reports goes considerably 
deeper than a mere need to justify Ḥanafī positive law on the basis of revealed texts. 
Instead, he elevates the Companions’ status such that any discrepancy between certain 
Companion  adīths and the Qurʾān or Sunna indicates special knowledge on the part of 
the Companions. In effect, it is the apparent baselessness of the Companion reports which 
al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts as his justification for accepting them as Prophetic, a procedure which 
relies upon the underlying premise that it is impossible that the Companions would ever 
knowingly depart from correct legal practice or speak on matters for which they do not 
have the necessary authority, such as basic ritual matters. Thus, within the 
instruction/inference divide which makes up the tawqīf:raʾy binary, all that is necessary 
to confirm the presence of tawqīf is the absence of an undisputed instance of raʾy. That is, 
the affirmation of tawqīf is the result of a lack of evidence (or permission) for raʾy, rather 
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than any positive indication that tawqīf actually occurred. Nonetheless, in the example 
above, al-Ṭaḥāwī considers his inference of an original tawqīf strong enough to outweigh 
the apparent evidence of Qurʾān and Sunna as well as established Ḥanafī law.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī also sometimes defers to Companion  adīths over Ḥanafī doctrine in 
cases where he does not argue that those Companion  adīths have Prophetic status. For 
example, in a chapter of Shar  mushkil al-āthār concerning the requirements of i rā  (a 
prolonged state of ritual purification for the Pilgrimage), al-Ṭaḥāwī proposes an 
interpretation of apparently contradictory Prophetic  adīths such that they refer to 
different situations, and are thus in harmony with each other. He asserts that his 
harmonization is supported by  adīths showing the Companions acting in accordance 
with his interpretation. He concludes the chapter by noting that his position opposes that 
of the Ḥanafīs and the Mālikīs.423  
In another chapter of Shar  mushkil al-āthār on whether Q 5/al-Māʾida:106 (“[let 
there be] witnessing between you when death comes to one of you”) was abrogated, al-
Ṭaḥāwī adduces several Companion reports indicating that the verse was not abrogated 
and then writes that he knows of no Companion who opposed them. He likewise cites a 
large number of Successors who held that the verse was not abrogated, while conceding 
that at least one Successor, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, held that it was abrogated. Although the 
later Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs held that the verse was indeed abrogated, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
argues that their argument does not provide certainty of the abrogation of what was in the 
Qurʾān and then was practiced by the Prophet and many of his Companions.424 In each of 
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the examples above, al-Ṭaḥāwī appeals to Companion  adīths to support an argument 
against the jurists of his own legal school.  
In light of these passages, we may evaluate Schacht’s characterization of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s use of Companion  adīths as merely instrumental. In a discussion of 
Companion  adīths in The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Schacht comments 
that the early Iraqi jurists “usually chose seemingly arbitrarily one out of several 
contradictory traditions,” depending on which best supported their school tradition. He 
continues, “This acceptance or rejection of traditions, according to whether they agree or 
disagree with the previously established doctrine of the school, was later developed into a 
fine art by Ṭaḥāwī whose efforts at harmonizing are overshadowed by his tendency to 
find contradictions, so that he can eliminate those traditions which do not agree with the 
doctrine of the Ḥanafī school, by assuming their repeal.”425  
It is quite true that in the majority of cases al-Ṭaḥāwī harmonizes Prophetic and 
Companion  adīths or dismisses them as weak in ways that support established Ḥanafī 
doctrine. That is, his legal arguments throughout all of his works of practical 
hermeneutics are most often based on instrumental reasoning, meant to achieve a 
specific, predetermined end. However, the existence of passages like those cited above, 
as well as others we have encountered or will encounter in which al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from 
accepted Ḥanafī positions in order to follow Prophetic or Companion practice, suggests 
that Schacht’s portrayal of al-Ṭaḥāwī is overly simplistic and perhaps overly cynical. 
Certainly, al-Ṭaḥāwī understood himself to participate in a Ḥanafī tradition—indicated by 
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 Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 30. It is unclear whether Schacht means to continue to 
discuss only Companion reports in this passage, or whether he is now including Prophetic reports as well. 
My comments above apply in either case.  
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his frequent reference to Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī as aṣ ābunā (our 
colleagues)—which subscribed to a particular body of positive law, albeit a nebulous one. 
However, to dismiss al-Ṭaḥāwī’s efforts at harmonization as the mere justification of 
Ḥanafī positive law is to ignore the way in which his works of practical hermeneutics 
embody a very real struggle to reconcile his commitment to a body of positive law with 
his apparently sincere ascription to relatively newly-developed ideas about the sources of 
the law and legal authority.
426
 While al-Ṭaḥāwī is often able to martial his theories of 
legal sources and legal hermeneutics in ways that support Ḥanafī doctrine, he is not 
invariably successful. In cases where his commitment to Prophetic and Companion 
 adīths are irreconcilable with Ḥanafī doctrine, he evinces a willingness to depart from 
that doctrine in a way not admitted by Schacht.
427
 In addition to reflecting al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
commitment to  adīth, his departures from Ḥanafī doctrine in favor of Prophetic or 
Companion  adīth may also be a consequence of a more expansive understanding of 
what it means to belong to a madhhab than Schacht envisions. While Schacht portrays al-
Ṭaḥāwī as callously dismissing revealed texts in order to protect Ḥanafī doctrine, al-
Ṭaḥāwī does not appear to feel that his not infrequent departures from Ḥanafī doctrine 
make him any less Ḥanafī.  
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commitment to  adīth as merely instrumental or strategic.  
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Abrogation Known through Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths 
In addition to claiming Prophetic status for certain post-Prophetic  adīth, al-
Ṭaḥāwī also relies on post-Prophetic  adīth as the sole evidence for instances of 
abrogation not preserved in the corpus of Prophetic  adīth. His argument is that the 
existence of a post-Prophetic opinion in conflict with a Prophetic  adīth transmitted by 
the same individual is sound evidence that that individual knew of the  adīth’s 
abrogation. As was the case with the elevation of post-Prophetic  adīths to Prophetic 
status, Companion  adīths are the basis for his argument in the great majority of the 
approximately twenty passages in question. Nonetheless, this argument appears twice in 
connection with the Successor ʿUrwa ibn al-Zubayr and once concerning the Successor 
al-Shaʿbī.428  
In one example, al-Ṭaḥāwī reports that Ibn ʿAbbās transmitted a Prophetic  adīth 
saying that a man who commits bestiality should be killed, as should the animal involved. 
However, Ibn ʿAbbās later stated that there is no  add punishment for bestiality.429 In 
response, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes that “Ibn ʿAbbās would not have said anything after the [time 
of the] Prophet that contradicted what he had received from the Prophet unless he had 
Prophetic instruction (tawqīf) that it was abrogated.” Shortly afterward he affirms that 
this argument is sufficient ( ifāya) and authoritative ( ujja) for refuting the legal 
effectiveness of the original Prophetic  adīth.430 In other passages al-Ṭaḥāwī claims the 
actions of ʿAlī431 and Ibn ʿUmar432 as evidence for the abrogation of aspects of ritual 
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prayer; the opinions of ʿĀʾisha and Ibn ʿAbbās as evidence for the abrogation of fasting 
on behalf of the deceased;
433
 another report from Ibn ʿUmar as evidence for the 
abrogation of the permissibility of seclusion in a mosque (iʿti āf) without an 
accompanying fast;
434
 and the actions of Abū Ṭalḥa and Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī as 
evidence of the abrogation of the requirement to renew ablutions after eating.
435
 From 
these examples we may observe that Companion actions and opinions provide al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s evidence for a number of major ritual practices.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī thus considers that the actions and opinions of individual Companions 
and Successors preserve a memory of instances of abrogation that are not reflected in the 
canon of Prophetic  adīth. The significance of their role in preserving knowledge of 
abrogation becomes apparent if we recall from the previous chapter al-Ṭaḥāwī’s anxieties 
related to the loss of the text of the Qurʾān.436 His primary argument against reports that 
verses are missing from the canonized text of the Qurʾān is that, if that were the case, it 
would be possible that the missing verses would abrogate verses preserved in the 
canonized text, and the requirement to perform certain duties would be lifted.
437
 Despite 
his anxiety about losing abrogating texts, al-Ṭaḥāwī is willing to relegate to the 
Companions and Successors the function of preserving knowledge of the abrogation of 
the Sunna.
438
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 Interestingly, one of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments for a Companion preserving knowledge of an abrogating 
Prophetic  adīth appears in the very same chapter as the above argument against the possibility of missing 
abrogating texts in the Qurʾān (Mushkil, 11.486, 11.491).  
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s acceptance that some instances of abrogation can be known only 
through post-Prophetic  adīths amounts to an admission that the corpus of Prophetic 
 adīths does not adequately convey Prophetic practice to later generations. It is for this 
reason that Saʿd Bashīr Asʿad Sharaf, the author of  bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī wa  anhajuhu 
fī al-fiqh al-Islā ī, condemns al-Ṭaḥāwī’s preference for a Companion action over a 
Prophetic  adīth narrated by the same Companion, despite Sharaf’s generally positive 
stance toward al-Ṭaḥāwī. He argues that for a Companion to suppress an abrogating 
Prophetic  adīth would be a form of unbelief (kufr).439 This view seems to be a distortion 
of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s position, however; presumably al-Ṭaḥāwī would argue that the abrogating 
 adīth is not suppressed, but is instead adequately preserved in post-Prophetic  adīth 
form.  
 
Explanations for Companion and Successor Authority 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument for abrogation based on post-Prophetic  adīth maps onto a 
larger debate among legal theorists about conflicts between a Companion’s action and his 
or her transmission from the Prophet.
440
 As in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of abrogation, one 
question at stake in this debate is whether the Companions can be trusted invariably to 
follow the Prophet’s practice. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, as we shall see below, holds that they can be. 
Equally importantly, the debate is one about whether Prophetic authority is adequately 
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 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī for the most part envisions the conflict between a Companion’s transmission from 
the Prophet and his action as a question of abrogation, he does very rarely apply this argument to other ends 
discussed by later jurists. For example, in a chapter on whether women are permitted to wear wool 
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and exclusively conveyed by Prophetic  adīths. Al-Shāfiʿī, who attempted fully to 
identify Prophetic authority with Prophetic  adīth, characteristically gives priority to the 
Prophetic  adīth transmitted by a Companion over that same Companion’s action.441 
Later Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs would do the same.442  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s position is largely in agreement with both earlier and later Ḥanafīs, 
however, including ʿĪsā ibn Abān and al-Jaṣṣāṣ.443 The latter adds a caveat: the Prophetic 
 adīth must not be open to interpretation (taʾwīl). If it is, then the Companion action, 
representing his taʾwīl, has no special interpretive authority.444 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does 
not address this issue in his discussions of the conflict between a Companion’s 
transmission and his action, he holds as a general principle that the person who transmits 
a  adīth is the most qualified to interpret it—that is, the transmitter of a hadith has a 
special insight into its meaning—and would therefore most likely disagree with al-
Jaṣṣāṣ.445 As we have seen, al-Ṭaḥāwī also departs from al-Jaṣṣāṣ by looking to Successor 
 adīths for evidence of abrogation, a situation not envisioned in later uṣūl al-fiqh 
discussions. 
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s initial description of the cases in which a Companion’s action takes 
precedence over a Prophetic  adīth contains no explanation of why it should do so. 
However, in a later discussion of a specific example of abrogation known by a 
Companion’s action, he explains that it is inconceivable (ghayr jāʾi ) that Ibn ʿUmar 
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would contravene the sunna he had transmitted from the Prophet in a case where that 
particular sunna left no room for interpretation.
446
 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī is consistently 
concerned with explaining why a post-Prophetic  adīth can be trusted as evidence for the 
abrogation of a Prophetic  adīth. His explanations fall into several categories, some of 
which provide important insights into his understanding of the status of the Companions 
and Successors and the nature of probity (ʿadl). Because al-Ṭaḥāwī relies upon the same 
set of explanations for both abrogation known by post-Prophetic  adīth and the elevation 
of post-Prophetic  adīth to Prophetic status, I have included examples from both types of 
argument below. Rather than justifying a single function of Companion and Successor 
 adīths, this range of arguments appears to constitute al-Ṭaḥāwī’s general justification for 
his heavy reliance on post-Prophetic  adīths in his hermeneutical works.  
In the first type of explanation, al-Ṭaḥāwī attributes his confidence in the 
trustworthiness of a post-Prophetic  adīth to his knowledge of an individual transmitter’s 
character: Ibn ʿUmar’s virtue (faḍl), piety (waraʿ) and knowledge (ʿilm) would prevent 
him from particularizing (takhṣīṣ) what the Prophet had made general (ʿāmm) without 
Prophetic authority,
447
 and individuals of ʿAlī’s stature (mithluhu) do not speak on certain 
matters based merely on their own opinion.
448
 Similarly, in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of two 
of the four Successor  adīths mentioned above and the single  adīth from a later jurist, 
we learn that it was those individuals’ great knowledge or other personal qualities that 
would not permit them to act in a certain way without certainty of the abrogation of an 
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earlier rule.
449
 This first category of explanation is thus restricted to the qualities of 
individuals and may apply to members of any group: Companions, Successors or later 
jurists.   
 Another category of explanation anticipates al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s discussion by emphasizing 
the sheer inconceivability of an individual abandoning Prophetic practice or speaking 
without Prophetic authority, using phrases such as mu āl/ista āla (it is impossible or 
inconceivable) or lā yajū  (it is inconceivable).450 Unlike the previous category, the 
argument from inconceivability is exclusively connected with Companions. In most 
examples, al-Ṭaḥāwī simply states that it is inconceivable that a particular Companion 
would undertake a certain action or make a certain statement in the absence of Prophetic 
authority, thus leaving open the possibility that the impossibility stems from the personal 
qualities of that Companion.
451
  
In two cases, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī reveals that it is the very fact of being a 
Companion that prevents individuals from abandoning Prophetic practice.
452
 Given his 
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way that a later scholar’s holding a view in conflict with Prophetic practice is not.  
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companionship (ṣu ba) with the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, it is unimaginable that 
Salama ibn Ṣakhr would pronounce a ẓihār divorce in a certain way unless he knew an 
earlier ruling on the practice had been abrogated.
453
 Likewise, concerning Companion 
 adīths on turning a Greater Pilgrimage into a Lesser Pilgrimage (faskh al- ajj bi-ʿumra), 
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that it is inconceivable that anyone who experienced companionship 
with the Prophet would make such a statement based merely on opinion.
454
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
argument from inconceivability forms an interesting parallel with the doctrine of the 
collective probity of the Companions (taʿdīl al-Ṣa āba), to which al-Ṭaḥāwī also 
subscribed.
455
 While the doctrine of taʿdīl al-Ṣa āba functioned to preserve the 
maximum amount of Prophetic material that could be used to justify the law by refraining 
from discrediting the transmission of any Companion,
456
 al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument from 
inconceivability functions effectively to expand the Prophetic corpus by granting 
Prophetic authority to any Companion material whose contradiction with Prophetic 
material cannot otherwise be explained.  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s third and final category of explanation for the authority of post-
Prophetic  adīths likewise centers on notions of probity and transmission. These 
explanations are characterized by a shifting constellation of statements and terms related 
to the ideas of amn (trustworthiness, reliability) and ʿadl (probity). Unlike the previous 
category, however, these statements do not concern only the Companions. The same 
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language is used to describe the authority of Successor reports and, as we will discuss in 
the next chapter, the collective opinion of later jurists.
457
 That being the case, the 
statements on the Companions analyzed below are best understood not as part of a 
conception of taʿdīl al-Ṣa āba, but rather as part of a wider theory of the relationship 
between probity, transmission and legal reasoning. 
 The explanations in this category are comprised of two basic building blocks 
appearing separately or in combination. The first, most frequently-appearing building 
block consists of the statement that someone is  aʾ ūn (trustworthy). Individual 
Companions are described as  aʾ ūn in their transmission from the Prophet458 and in 
what they opine (qāla) that is in conflict with Prophetic  adīth.459 Collectively, the 
Companions are described as “trusted in what they do (faʿalū), just as they are trusted in 
what they transmit,”460 a formulation also used to describe later jurists as a group.461 In 
these and other passages, al-Ṭaḥāwī describes Companions, Successors or later jurists as 
 aʾ ūn in some combination of transmission, legal opinion, action and knowledge of 
abrogation.
462
 In many passages, statements concerning amn are immediately followed by 
the assertion that a loss of probity (ʿadl) entails the loss of reliability in transmission463 
or, in one case, the loss of reliability in transmission and legal opinions.
464
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Two passages explicitly connect the threat of a loss of probity not only to a loss of 
someone’s reliability as a transmitter of  adīth, but also to a loss of trust in his legal 
opinions. In one, al-Ṭaḥāwī says that, if al-Shaʿbī had given an opinion in conflict with a 
Prophetic  adīth he transmitted without knowing it to be abrogated, then his legal 
opinions (raʾy) would become suspect (muttaham). If his legal opinions were suspect, 
then his transmission of  adīth (riwāya) would also be suspect. Because his probity 
(ʿadāla) in transmission is confirmed, his probity in avoiding contravening those 
transmissions is also confirmed. If one supposes (in wuhiba) the voiding of one of these 
matters, one must suppose the voiding of the other as well.
465
 That is to say, probity in 
transmitting  adīth and probity in acting in accordance with  adīth are inseparable; you 
cannot have one without the other. In the other passage, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that, if Abū 
Hurayra contravened what he had transmitted from the Prophet, then his probity would be 
voided such that neither his legal opinion (qawl) nor his transmission (riwāya) would be 
accepted.
466
 
Probity (ʿadl, ʿadāla) for al-Ṭaḥāwī thus consists of three inseparable factors. The 
first is reliability in the transmission of  adīth, alternatively expressed as ‘probity in 
transmission’ (al-ʿadāla fī al-riwāya)467 or more commonly simply as ‘transmission’ 
(riwāya).468 The second factor is authority in legal opinions (qawl, raʾy), and the final 
factor, termed ‘ʿadl’ or ‘ʿadāla,’ is the uprightness that precludes abandonment of a 
Prophetic  adīth without just cause. In all of the passages about the conflict between a 
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Companion’s opinion and his transmission from the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī takes for granted 
that the Companions’ transmission of  adīth—their riwāya—is beyond suspicion. It is in 
fact their riwāya which he uses as evidence that they would not have contravened a 
Prophetic  adīth unless they knew it to be abrogated. If they had done so, then their 
riwāya would be voided, and “God forbid that such should be the case.” Because we are 
confident in the Companions’ riwāya, al-Ṭaḥāwī insists that we may also have 
confidence in the ʿadl, the uprightness, which guarantees that riwāya. Likewise, we may 
have confidence in the Companion’s legal opinions, because a lack of probity there 
would void their probity in riwāya, and we know that their probity in riwāya is 
unquestioned. For al-Ṭaḥāwī, then, the trustworthiness of the Companions as transmitters 
is assumed. Far from arguing to establish the principle of taʿdīl al-Ṣa āba, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
points to scholars’ confidence in the Companions’ and other figures’ probity as 
transmitters to establish their probity in other matters. The precedence of a Companion or 
Successor action over their transmission from the Prophet is thus guaranteed by our 
knowledge of their probity as transmitters. 
 
The Relative Authority of Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths and Later Jurists’ Qiyās  
While the superior authority of Prophetic over post-Prophetic  adīth was asserted 
as part of the elevation of Prophetic authority in the 2
nd
/8
th
 and 3
rd
/9
th
 centuries, some 
questions remained concerning the relative status of Companion or Successor  adīths and 
later jurists’ legal opinions. In this section I assess the degree to which al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
understanding of their relative authority aligns with discussions among legal theorists. 
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The later uṣūl tradition would frame the issue primarily in terms of the competition 
between the qiyās (analogy) of later jurists and a Companion opinion in cases where no 
opposition from other Companions is reported and no relevant Prophetic  adīth is 
known.
469
 According to the Shāfiʿīs and to the Ḥanafī al-Karkhī, jurists need not give 
preference to a Companion report over their own qiyās. Mālik and the majority of 
Ḥanafīs, in contrast, held that later jurists must adopt the Companion report, a process 
they labeled taqlīd al-Ṣa ābī (following the precedent of a Companion).470  
 In their discussions of taqlīd al-Ṣa ābī, both al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī concur with 
the argument of Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī (d. 317/929-930), a Ḥanafī jurist active in 
Baghdad.
471
 Abū Saʿīd asserts that the unopposed opinion of a Companion is a  ujja 
(proof) because it might have been based on a revealed text that was otherwise lost. 
Something that might have been revealed (a Companion report) is superior to something 
which certainly was not revealed (the qiyās of a later jurist). Further, even if the 
Companion’s opinion were not based on revelation, the ijtihād of a Companion is 
superior to the ijtihād of a later jurist, and therefore the Companion opinion must be 
adopted. The central issues for Abū Saʿīd, al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī are thus the 
possibility that a Companion report may preserve Prophetic material and the relative 
value of the ijtihād of the Companions and later jurists.  
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 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī was a close contemporary of Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī, he does 
not replicate his fellow Ḥanafī’s arguments for the superiority of the Companions’ qiyās 
as the basis for the authority of their opinions. Instances in which he explicitly opposes 
opinions of the Companions and later jurists are rare. In one passage concerning the 
status of the marriage of a woman who converts to Islam while outside of Islamic lands, 
he demonstrates an awareness of the doctrine that Companion  adīths may be preferred 
over later jurists’ analogy by noting that Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad follow 
(qalladū) a Companion  adīth from ʿUmar over naẓar (reasoned argument) in their 
opinion that irrevocable divorce does not take effect immediately upon her conversion.
472
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own opinion is in agreement with naẓar as well as another Companion 
opinion, that of Ibn ʿAbbās.473 However, the authority he claims for his position is neither 
that of naẓar nor of the opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās, but is instead Prophetic. Here, as in other 
passages we have encountered, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Ibn ʿAbbās’s position in the 
Companion  adīth is in conflict with a Prophetic  adīth that Ibn ʿAbbās himself 
transmitted, thereby demonstrating that he knew the  adīth to be abrogated and his own 
position to be affirmed. Where al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Ḥanafī predecessors argue this question on 
the basis of the inherent authority of a Companion opinion, al-Ṭaḥāwī claims as Prophetic 
the authority of the Companion  adīth he adduces. 
 A similar tendency is apparent in other passages relevant to the uṣūl debate over 
Companion reports and later jurists’ reasoning. In a discussion of whether it is 
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permissible to take back a gift, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that he knows of no reports contradicting 
those he adduces from Companions and Successors including ʿUmar, Shurayḥ and 
Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, each of whom serves as the authority for a different aspect of his 
argument. Therefore he will abandon naẓar and follow (qallada) their āthār. He admits 
that naẓar would lead to a different result than the one found in āthār, but “following 
(ittibāʿ) āthār and following the precedent of (taqlīd) the foremost scholars (aʾi  at ahl 
al-ʿilm) is better [than naẓar].474  
 The final example we will consider is one we have already encountered above 
concerning ʿĀʾisha’s statement about when it is permissible to perform the ʿUmra (lesser 
pilgrimage). According to qiyās, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, it should be permissible on every day 
of the year. However, he has discovered an athr from ʿĀʾisha which states that there are 
four days of the year when the ʿUmra may not be performed. The  adīth of ʿĀʾisha is the 
only statement he has found from the Companions on this issue. Concerning ʿĀʾisha’s 
 adīth, he argues that: 
We know that she did not merely opine on her own (raʾy), but rather spoke what 
had been confirmed (tawqīf), because this kind of thing cannot be based upon 
raʾy. Therefore we hold that her statement on this is like  adīth with a continuous 
chain of transmitters reaching back to the Prophet ( adīth  uttaṣil).475  
 
 In both of these examples, al-Ṭaḥāwī follows Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī and later 
jurists in emphasizing that these reports were unopposed by other Companions and 
therefore authoritative. Al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from the later Ḥanafī tradition, however, in his 
willingness to grant the same precedence to Successor  adīths as he does to Companion 
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 adīths.476 Al-Ṭaḥāwī further diverges from Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī and later Ḥanafīs in his 
understanding of why post-Prophetic  adīth take precedence over later jurists’ qiyās. 
Where his fellow Ḥanafīs are concerned with the status of the Companions’ ijtihād versus 
the ijtihād of later jurists,477 al-Ṭaḥāwī does not portray the Companion or Successor 
reports as examples of their ijtihād, with the exception of a single report from Shurayḥ in 
a chapter on gifts.
478
 This difference is emphasized by the language employed by each: 
Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī frames the issue as one concerning the opinion (qawl) of a 
Companion,
479
 while al-Ṭaḥāwī mentions following āthār or  adīth, thus connecting this 
issue to the general duty of obeying transmitted reports.
480
 Further, he portrays the 
Companion  adīths as faithful reflections of Prophetic practice, rather than as examples 
of the superiority of Companion legal reasoning.
481
  
 
The Companions and Successors in al-Ṭa āwī’s Lists of Legal Sources 
 Another place we might look for evidence of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the 
authority of Companion and Successor  adīths in relation to the legal opinions of later 
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jurists is in the lists of legal sources which appear across his hermeneutical works and al-
Mukhtaṣar (The Concise Manual of Legal Doctrine).482 Notably, the Companions or 
Successors are mentioned in only three of the approximately thirty lists found in these 
four works. Lists which do mention the Companions or Successors provide somewhat 
ambiguous evidence for the nature of the Companions’ and Successors’ authority. The 
first list, which appears in the two-paragraph introduction to Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, 
describes the sources that al-Ṭaḥāwī will use to establish which of scholars’ proposed 
interpretations of apparently conflicting  adīths is correct: the Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus, 
and widely transmitted opinions of the Companions or Successors (tawātur  in aqāwīl 
al-ṣa āba aw tābiʿīhi ).483 We learn from this passage that widely-held opinions of the 
Companions and Successors may support an interpretation, but the passage provides no 
clear indication of whether these opinions preserve otherwise unknown Prophetic 
material—as is so often the function of Companion and Successor  adīths in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
works—or whether they represent those individuals’ legal reasoning. The mention of 
widespread transmission (tawātur) also raises interesting questions about the individual 
or collective nature of Companion and Successor authority as well as the boundary 
between widespread transmission and consensus. 
The Companions also appear in a list of sources in a chapter of    ā  al-Qurʾān 
on whether seclusion in a mosque (iʿti āf) must be accompanied by fasting. Here al-
Ṭaḥāwī argues against those who claim that fasting is not required by stating that 
evidence for their view is not found in the Book, the Prophet’s Sunna, the doctrines 
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(aqwāl) of the Companions, speculative legal reasoning (naẓar) or analogy (qiyās).484 In 
support of his own view, he adduces a Companion  adīth reporting the legal opinion of 
Ibn ʿUmar.485 Earlier in the chapter, he had argued that Ibn ʿUmar’s opinion can only 
have been based on knowledge from the Prophet.
486
 From this equating of the qawl of Ibn 
ʿUmar with knowledge taken from the Prophet, we may conclude that what al-Ṭaḥāwī 
intends by the aqwāl of the Companions in the list of sources in this chapter is not the 
superior legal reasoning of the Companions, but rather their special knowledge of the 
Prophet’s practice as preserved in Companion  adīths. 
In contrast, the final list of sources we will consider does portray Companion 
legal opinions as more authoritative than the legal reasoning of later jurists. In a 
significant passage in al-Mukhtaṣar, al-Ṭaḥāwī describes the methodology which judges 
should follow in determining a ruling: 
[A judge] should rule according to what is in the Book of God. If a matter should 
come before him that is not in the Book of God, then he should rule according to 
what has come down from God’s Messenger. If he does not find it, then he should 
look to what has come to him from the Companions of God’s Messenger and rule 
according to that. If they disagreed, then the best of their opinions (aqāwīl) should 
be selected. He may not oppose all of [the Companions] and contrive (yabtadiʿ) 
something from his personal reasoning (raʾy). If he does not find it in the Book of 
God, nor in what has come from God’s Messenger, nor from any of the 
Companions of God’s Messenger, then he should employ legal reasoning 
(ijtahada raʾyahu) in the matter and analogize from what has been transmitted 
from them…487 
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s insistence that jurists must look to Companion reports before engaging in 
their own legal reasoning reveals that he does indeed give precedence to Companion 
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legal opinions over those of later jurists, although it is not the way in which he generally 
frames the question of Companion authority.  
The debate over the relative authority of Companion  adīths and later jurists’ 
qiyās may be understood as one manifestation of a wider debate over the nature of 
Companion authority. Al-Shāfiʿī favored later jurists’ legal reasoning because he 
understood all revelatory authority to reside in the Qurʾān and Prophetic Sunna and 
sought fully to identify the Prophetic Sunna with the body of Prophetic  adīth. In 
contrast, both the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools understood Prophetic authority to reside not 
only in Prophetic  adīth but also in the continuing practice of the Companions, which 
both preserved Prophetic practice and served as its natural extension, a topic I will 
discuss in the next chapter. Given their understanding of Prophetic practice as embodied 
in the Companions’ applications of that practice to new situations, it is reasonable that the 
Mālikīs and many Ḥanafīs should prefer Companion reports based in Companion legal 
reasoning to later jurists’ qiyās. 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, however, understood Companion practice and, indeed, the idea of 
practice in general, differently than the other Ḥanafīs we have discussed. For him, in 
almost all cases the Companion practice which is authoritative over later jurists’ legal 
reasoning is an exact record of Prophetic practice. Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī emphasizes 
an exclusively Prophetic authority in most of his writing. However, unlike al-Shāfiʿī, he 
does not seek to identify Prophetic authority only with Prophetic  adīth. Instead, al-
Ṭaḥāwī understands Prophetic practice to be preserved faithfully in a spectrum of forms 
ranging from the directly textual (Prophetic  adīth) to the progressively more ephemeral 
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(Companion and Successor  adīth, the practice of the jurists or the Community, and 
certain forms of consensus).
488
 While Prophetic  adīths by definition represent Prophetic 
authority, the other sources on this spectrum are only held to stand in for Prophetic 
authority in certain cases. Nonetheless, in those cases where al-Ṭaḥāwī does claim 
Prophetic authority for other sources, their epistemological status is equal to that of 
Prophetic  adīths themselves—an equivalence that we have already observed in the 
ability of Companion  adīths to indicate the abrogation of Prophetic  adīths.489  
The result of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s elevation of some, but not all, Companion and 
Successor  adīths to Prophetic status is a disjunction between the surface rhetoric of his 
lists of legal sources and the actual functioning of his hermeneutical arguments. While al-
Ṭaḥāwī repeatedly appeals to the list ‘Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus’ as the prototypical 
sources required to justify interpretive moves,
490
 the passages that I analyze in this 
chapter concerning Companion and Successor  adīths reveal that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal 
reasoning often rests instead upon a deeper distinction between what post-Prophetic 
figures must have known from the Prophet and what they could have worked out for 
themselves by inference—that is, the tawqīf:raʾy binary.  
As a result, the Companion and Successor  adīths that should be a marginal 
source of law according to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own rhetoric sometimes overpower in practice the 
sources of Qurʾān, Sunna and consensus that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s explicit theorizing favors. In 
fact, it is the ‘sometimes’ nature of the Prophetic authority of Companion  adīths that 
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reveals the fundamental gulf between the surface rhetoric of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s conception of 
the structure of the law and its functioning in practice. Al-Ṭaḥāwī—and, indeed, later 
legal theorists—outwardly describe a hierarchy of sources of legal authority based on 
form: Prophetic  adīth represents a certain level of authority, while consensus represents 
another, lesser level of authority, as suggested by the fact that consensus always comes 
after Prophetic  adīth in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s list of legal sources, etc.  
However, in his actual legal arguments al-Ṭaḥāwī assigns authority to sources 
based not on their form, but rather on their function. Thus, Companion  adīths have a 
certain authority when they represent raʾy, but a much higher level of authority when 
they represent tawqīf. There is, then, no single type of authority that can be assigned to 
post-Prophetic  adīths in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works. Further, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s binary view of what is 
generally thought of as a single ‘source’ of law is not limited to post-Prophetic  adīths. 
Although the technical term ‘tawqīf’ is almost exclusively associated with post-Prophetic 
 adīth, the instruction/inference binary that tawqīf evokes is latent in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
discussion of other sources of legal authority. In the following chapter, we will see that 
al-Ṭaḥāwī holds that the authority of jurists’ consensus is dependent on whether a 
particular case of consensus represents inference or instruction.
491
 Like Companion 
 adīths based upon tawqīf, instances of instruction-based consensus have the authority to 
abrogate Prophetic  adīths. Indeed, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, the 
concept, if not the language, of the instruction/inference binary extends even to the 
authority of Prophetic  adīths themselves; al-Ṭaḥāwī grants no special authority to 
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Prophetic  adīths he deems to be based upon the Prophet’s own inference.492 Al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s vision of the structure of the law, then, is based upon a binary division between 
what may be known through inference and what must be known through instruction, a 
division that transcends traditional categories and hierarchies of legal sources.  
 
Competing Conceptions of Religious Authority 
 This chapter has argued that al-Ṭaḥāwī understands Companion and Successor 
 adīths to provide stronger evidence of Prophetic practice than Prophetic  adīths 
themselves in some cases, and that the special authority of this subset of post-Prophetic 
 adīths is grounded in the Companions and Successors’ role as mimetic preservers of the 
Prophet’s words and actions. That is, although the practices they transmit may not be 
preserved in the form of Prophetic  adīth, the Companions and Successors nonetheless 
are merely transmitting the Prophet’s practice by means of their own practice in the 
 adīths we have discussed, without adding anything to it or further developing it. 
Individual Companions and Successors do, of course, engage in legal reasoning to 
produce new rulings for novel situations, but in this area their authority is portrayed as 
being largely of the same type as that of other jurists; al-Ṭaḥāwī is in any case not greatly 
interested in the authority of the legal reasoning of individual Companions and 
Successors in relation to that of later jurists.  
In several passages, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought preserves lingering traces of an 
earlier conception of religious authority which holds that the earliest generations of 
Muslims represent a natural and evolving extension of the Prophet’s authority that is 
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sometimes even in competition with Prophetic practice. This tendency is evident in al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s occasional use of the term sunna in connection with the Companions 
individually and collectively, as well as in reference to the first four caliphs.
493
 His 
willingness to associate sunna with figures other than the Prophet is suggestive of what 
Hallaq labels the “practice-based sunna” of earlier centuries, in which post-Prophetic 
figures both preserved and extended Prophetic practice by applying Prophetic precepts to 
new situations.
494
 The degree to which the association of the term sunna with post-
Prophetic figures would become unacceptable in the later tradition may be judged by the 
lengthy footnote that the modern editor of Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, Muḥammad Zuhrī al-
Najjār, dedicates to condemning al-Ṭaḥāwī’s usage of it in connection with the first four 
caliphs.
495
  
Despite his occasional mentions of the sunna of Companions, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
nowhere suggests that a post-Prophetic sunna is in conflict with a Prophetic sunna. 
Instead, the post-Prophetic sunnas he appeals to either give evidence of the Prophet’s 
own sunna
496
 or are dismissed as less authoritative than Prophetic practice. Indeed, in one 
passage al-Ṭaḥāwī agrees with those who argue against a  adīth’s claim that a certain 
practice is a sunna by stating that it is merely the sunna of ʿUmar, not that of the Prophet, 
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and is therefore not authoritative in the face of conflicting evidence.
497
 Thus, while al-
Ṭaḥāwī, like the jurists of the 1st/7th and 2nd/8th centuries, occasionally uses the term 
sunna in association with non-Prophetic figures, he does not claim for these figures the 
kind of authority indicated by earlier jurists’ references to non-Prophetic sunna. Instead, 
his works appear to represent a transitional phase in which the term sunna could still be 
used in connection with the Companions, but did not imply that their practice had a 
normative status of its own. 
More strikingly, al-Ṭaḥāwī claims in several passages of Shar   aʿānī al-āthār 
that the consensus of the Companions has the power to abrogate Prophetic practice and to 
establish a new practice different from the Prophet’s practice.498 These passages, which I 
analyze in the following chapter, appear to portray the Companions not merely as 
mimetic preservers of the Prophet’s practice, but as possessing an authority in legal 
reasoning that allows them to alter established Prophetic practices—an authority which 
goes beyond merely establishing what the Prophet might have done in a novel situation. 
That al-Ṭaḥāwī could make such a claim must be attributed at least in part to lingering 
ideas of normative authority vested in figures others than the Prophet. The passages 
arguing for abrogation by Companion consensus thus emerge as relatively isolated 
examples of an older conception of what it means to preserve Prophetic practice and 
serve as further evidence that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought represents a transitional stage in the 
development of the idea of Prophetic authority during which the meaning of Prophetic 
practice was changing. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s ability to defend abrogation of Prophetic  adīth by 
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Companion consensus as late as the early 4
th
/10
th
 century suggests that the field of 
Islamic law is in need of a more complicated model of the evolving relationship between 
Prophetic text, Prophetic practice and Prophetic authority. 
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Chapter Three: Consensus and the Practice of the Community 
 
 The uṣūl al-fiqh doctrine of consensus (ij āʿ) holds that the unanimous 
agreement of the jurists of an era on a legal question constitutes an infallible and binding 
proof for all future Muslims.
499
 This definition portrays consensus first and foremost as a practical tool for generating 
law and confirming the permanence of legal doctrine. Indeed, consensus is often 
described in modern discussions as the “third source” of the law after the Qurʾān and 
Sunna.
500
 However, the doctrine also served a number of theological and ideological ends 
for the legal theorists who elaborated the requirements of consensus in their works of uṣūl 
al-fiqh. By asserting the infallibility of the Muslim Community as a whole and then 
deeming both existing legal doctrine and the corpus of Prophetic texts to have been 
confirmed by that infallible community, theorists both affirmed the saved character of the 
Muslim Community and projected backwards an image of a united ur-Community that 
had never existed historically.
501
  
At the same time, the doctrine of consensus guarantees the unity of the 
Community in ages to come by guarding against the possibility of dissent. The doctrine 
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of consensus thus serves the theological purpose of affirming the nature of the Muslim 
Community both historically and in the future. Ideologically, the doctrine of consensus 
also justifies the authority of the jurists, for it is they—not the caliphs, the members of the 
Prophet’s family, or the Muslim Community as a whole—who speak in unison on behalf 
of the Community. The doctrine of consensus therefore supports a particular power 
relationship among jurists, Muslim rulers and the Muslim Community.
502
 
These ideological and theological functions of consensus generated their own 
doctrinal imperatives that shaped and constrained jurists’ discussions of consensus in 
works of uṣūl al-fiqh. In particular, the centrality of the concept of unanimity to the 
theological aspirations of consensus led to a situation in which consensus became 
difficult to achieve or prove in practice. To a large extent, the elaboration of a theory of 
consensus able to support a certain theological view of the Muslim Community and the 
role of jurists within it, led to a doctrine that existed in tension with consensus as a 
practical tool for discovering the law. This tension becomes clear when comparing 
appeals to consensus in the practical hermeneutics of al-Ṭaḥāwī with the theoretical 
discussions of the doctrine found in works of uṣūl al-fiqh.503 Like the authors of uṣūl 
texts, al-Ṭaḥāwī understood consensus as an authoritative and binding source of law,504 
and yet he was largely unencumbered by many of the theological and ideological 
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 On the inextricable intertwining of law and politics and the consequent role of ideology in law, see The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Law and Ideology” by Christine Sypnowich,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/law-ideology/. 
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 The field is still in need of a systematic study comparing assertions of ij āʿ in support of individual 
rules in fiqh works with the theoretical principles asserted in uṣūl al-fiqh texts. The present study suggests 
some of the tensions that are liable to be uncovered by such an investigation.  
504
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s reification of consensus is apparent in the way that the list “Qurʾān, Sunna, Consensus” 
regularly stands in for the idea of authoritative legal sources across his hermeneutical works (see 
“Introduction,” p. 23).  
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concerns surrounding the doctrine which would cause legal theorists to restrict its 
practice. As a result, consensus becomes in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hands a powerful tool for 
advancing legal arguments and formulating new rules of law.  
This chapter first reconstructs al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of consensus and the 
circumstances under which it may be claimed, arguing that that it was the flexibility of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s approach to consensus which made it so useful in his legal arguments. In the 
second half of the chapter, I examine three of the many functions that consensus fills in 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works. In the first, which treats the resolution of juristic disagreements, I 
demonstrate how al-Ṭaḥāwī relies on a principle of inferred or implicit consensus to 
claim agreement on apparently disputed questions and thus advance his own positions. In 
the second, I explore the relationship between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understandings of consensus 
and ʿamal (practice) in the context of the abrogation of Prophetic  adīths and conclude 
that both ʿamal and ij āʿ in this context represent for al-Ṭaḥāwī an exclusively 
Prophetic, though non-textual, authority. Notably, al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts the Prophetic 
authority of juristic ʿamal and ij āʿ by invoking the instruction/inference binary that we 
have already encountered in his discussions of the Prophet’s ijtihād and of the authority 
of post-Prophetic  adīths. Finally, I suggest the ways in which conceptions of religious 
authority were in flux during the late 3
rd
/9
th
 and early 4
th
/10
th
 centuries by analyzing a 
number of passages in which al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Companion consensus may directly 
abrogate Prophetic practice. 
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Theory 
 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī frequently appeals to consensus in his legal arguments, his 
surviving works contain almost no theoretical discussion of the doctrine, and certainly 
none of the elaborate detail that serves in uṣūl works to anchor the theological and 
ideological implications of consensus. Abstract statements on consensus are considerably 
less frequent in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works than those on Sunna or ijtihād (legal reasoning), for 
example. Presumably, al-Ṭaḥāwī considered his use of consensus unproblematic and 
therefore not in need of discussion.
505
 Nonetheless, we can infer much of his theory of 
consensus from references to particular instances of it as well as from the few theoretical 
statements on the doctrine preserved in Shar   aʿānī al-āthār,    ā  al-Qurʾān, and 
Shar  mushkil al-āthār. 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī knows the verb ‘aj aʿa’ and the noun ‘ij āʿ’ as technical terms for 
consensus and employs them regularly; they appear about two hundred times in Shar  
 aʿānī al-āthār alone.506 His rare statements on the theoretical basis of consensus 
consistently use the term ij āʿ. However, like the jurists of earlier centuries, he also 
employs non-technical phrases to indicate consensus, including ittafaqū (they agreed)507 
and lā ya htalifūn (they do not disagree).508 Nowhere does al-Ṭaḥāwī suggest that these 
non-technical phrases indicate a different grade of consensus than that of ij āʿ. Indeed, 
                                                 
505
 The major exceptions to this generalization are the brief passages justifying his argument that jurists’ 
consensus can indicate prior abrogation of a Prophetic  adīth in cases where no abrogating text is 
preserved, and other, lengthier passages in support of his claim that Companion consensus can abrogate 
Prophetic practice (both are discussed below). The attention he gives to justifying these claims suggests 
that he perceives them as the most controversial aspects of his theory of consensus.   
506
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 1.11, 1.12, 1.18, 1.31, 1.33, 1.44, 1.45. 
507
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 2.371; Maʿānī, 1.34.  
508
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.152; Maʿānī, 1.33; Mushkil, 2.188. For earlier jurists’ terminology for 
consensus, see Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology,” 28-33.  
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he sometimes uses both aj aʿū and either ittafaqū or bilā i hilāf to refer to the same 
instance of consensus.
509
 It seems probable that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s retention of some of the 
terminological diversity of an earlier period reflects his practical, almost casual approach 
to consensus, which is not particularly concerned with defining what does and does not 
constitute ij āʿ in a technical sense.510   
 
The Authority of Consensus 
 For al-Ṭaḥāwī, consensus is an independent source of law which can provide legal 
rulings for cases in which nothing relevant is found in the Qurʾān or Sunna. In this claim 
he agrees with most of the later uṣūl al-fiqh tradition, but differs from al-Shāfiʿī, who 
held that consensus is a tool for interpreting the Qurʾān and Sunna, but not an 
independent source of law.
511
 Concerning the types of property on which alms must be 
paid, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that a certain rule “is one of those for which we find no mention 
in the Book or the Sunna, but rather we found an indication of it in consensus alone.”512 
His statement implies that there exists a whole class of rules known only through 
consensus. The basis for such rules is scholars’ raʾy (legal opinion), upon which they 
eventually reach consensus. This process is suggested in a chapter in which al-Ṭaḥāwī 
                                                 
509
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 2.24;    ā , 1.152.   
510
 After analyzing a passage in which al-Ṭaḥāwī states that “there is no disagreement” regarding a doctrine 
for which Ibn al-Mundhir actively asserts agreement, Carolyn Baugh cautiously hypothesizes that “it could 
well be that [al-Ṭaḥāwī’s] approach to consensus is considerably more pessimistic than that of his 
contemporary Ibn al-Mundhir” (“Compulsion in Minor Marriages” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 
2011), 174). While it may be true that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claims to consensus were stated less forcefully than 
those of Ibn al-Mundhir in this particular case, a global reading of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works suggests that he is in 
fact highly optimistic about the possibility of consensus and makes regular claims of its occurrence. 
511
 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 319; Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 91. El 
Shamsy emphasizes al-Shāfiʿī’s conception of consensus as a tool for expressing “the normative memory 
of the community” (Canonization of Islamic Law, 61).  
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details jurists’ initial disagreement concerning what should be done with Muḥammad’s 
rightful share of the spoils of war after his death. He describes jurists’ later agreement by 
stating that “then they reached consensus on their opinion” (thu  a aj aʿū raʾyahu ), 
indicating that their consensus was based upon raʾy.513  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s assertions of the authority of consensus anticipate the language that 
would later be used by the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition. In several passages he labels 
consensus a “ ujja,” or authoritative proof, a characterization which appears in the very 
first sentence of al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s definition of consensus in al-Fuṣūl.514 In one discussion al-
Ṭaḥāwī labels a particular instance of consensus a  ujja qāṭiʿa, or certain proof.515 Later 
theorists would understand the term qāṭʿ to indicate epistemologically certain knowledge. 
For instance, al-Jaṣṣāṣ would hold that the achievement of consensus after disagreement 
produced epistemologically certain (qāṭiʿ) knowledge, and al-Sarakhsī defines consensus 
in general as producing qaṭʿ.516 However, as we have already seen in our discussion of 
varieties of  adīth,517 al-Ṭaḥāwī is not interested in defining degrees of certainty in the 
same way that later jurists would be, and I therefore have chosen here to translate “ ujja 
qāṭiʿa” conservatively  as ‘certain proof.’ In either case, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s language regarding 
consensus is closely related to that of the later tradition.    
Al-Ṭaḥāwī further holds that consensus has the power to elevate a ruling to the 
status of a revealed text. He states that the scholars’ consensus upon considering a certain 
                                                 
513
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.235; the same passage is repeated verbatim at Maʿānī, 3.277. On al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
understanding of raʾy, see Chapter Four, “Hermeneutics,” pp. 257-260.  
514
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 2.227, 3.309; al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 2.107.  
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.332. On the epistemological certainty of consensus as discussed by later jurists, 
see Wael Hallaq, “On the Authoritativeness of Sunni Consensus,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 18, no. 4 (1986): 427. 
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 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 2.161; al-Sarakhsī, al-Mu arrar, 1.221.  
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 See Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna,” pp. 85-89. 
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case an exception to a rule constitutes an authoritative proof ( ujja), just as the Prophet’s 
own exception to the rule would.
518
 The equivalence of consensus to a text of revelation 
is confirmed in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s observation that “opinion (raʾy) is employed in cases for 
which the rulings are not found to be textually stipulated (manṣūṣ) in the Book, the Sunna 
or in the consensus of the Community.”519 Al-Ṭaḥāwī here includes consensus within the 
definition of textual stipulation (naṣṣ), effectively making it a third source of law. Lists 
containing the same sequence—Book, Sunna, consensus—appear approximately twenty 
times across Shar   aʿānī al-āthār,    ā  al-Qurʾān and Shar  mushkil al-āthār.520 
The stability of these lists suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī does indeed view consensus as a third 
source of law equivalent in status to the Qurʾān and Sunna.521  
Although most later jurists would, like al-Ṭaḥāwī, acknowledge consensus as an 
independent source of law, they would not find it easy to establish its authority on the 
basis of other revealed texts, as no Qurʾānic verse or widely transmitted ( utawātir) 
Prophetic  adīth makes a clear statement on the issue. The earliest known attempt to 
justify consensus is that of al-Shaybānī, who claimed support from the unitary Prophetic 
 adīth, “Whatever the Muslims see as good is good ( asan) in the eyes of God, and 
whatever they see as bad is bad in the eyes of God.”522 Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not follow his 
Ḥanafī predecessor in his justification of consensus, however. The only justification he 
offers is a variation on a principle earlier stated by al-Shāfiʿī: that the Muslim 
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519
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Community as a whole could not be in error. Significantly, neither al-Shāfiʿī nor al-
Ṭaḥāwī provides this justification in the form of a Prophetic  adīth in Muḥammad’s 
voice, although al-Shāfiʿī adduces other  adīths in support of consensus, and al-Ṭaḥāwī 
consistently provides chains of authority for  adīths.523 Thus, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s failure to 
provide an isnād for the statement that the Muslim community cannot agree upon an 
error, suggests that he did not understand the principle to have been spoken by the 
Prophet.  
It is unlikely that al-Ṭaḥāwī took his justification of consensus from al-Shāfiʿī, 
however. In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī asserts that “the entirety of them (ʿāmmatuhum) will 
not agree (tajta iʿ) upon an error (khaṭaʾ).”524 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, consistently states 
some variation on the idea that God would not unite Muslims upon an error ( llāh la  
yakun la-yaj aʿuhu  ʿalā ḍalāl).525 Al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī thus differ concerning the 
subject of the sentence (the Community or God) and the term for ‘error’ (khaṭaʾ or 
ḍalāl(a)). While this principle may not have been canonized as a Prophetic  adīth by the 
time of al-Shāfiʿī,526 during al-Ṭaḥāwī’s lifetime it was recorded as a Prophetic  adīth 
with slight linguistic variations in the Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), the 
Sunan of al-Dārimī (d. 255/869), the Sunan of Ibn Mājah (d. 273/887), and the Sunan of 
al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892); it was also cited by Ibn Qutayba in Prophetic  adīth form as a 
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 On the debate concerning whether this  adīth was an “invention” to justify consensus, see Ahmad 
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justification for consensus.
527
 Notably, Ibn Qutayba’s  adīth is linguistically similar to 
that of al-Shāfiʿī, making the Muslims the subject of the sentence and employing the term 
‘khaṭaʾ’ for ‘error.’ Al-Tirmidhī, al-Dārimī and Ibn Ḥanbal, in contrast, use the same 
linguistic markers as al-Ṭaḥāwī. That al-Ṭaḥāwī would cite as a principle a text which 
had already been canonized as a  adīth suggests that the process of canonization was 
gradual, and that both the abstract principle and the Prophetic  adīth were in general 
circulation at the time.  
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ represents the culmination of the process in which the principle of 
communal infallibility was canonized in  adīth form and made a standard justification for 
consensus. In a chapter of al-Fuṣūl arguing for the Qurʾānic and Sunnaic roots of 
consensus, he provides the Prophetic  adīth in question with the wording it was to retain 
in most later uṣūl al-fiqh discussions and classical  adīth compilations: “My Community 
(u  atī) will not agree (tajta iʿ) upon an error (ḍalāl).”528 We see here that the typical 
form of the classical  adīth combines the linguistic markers in the al-Shāfiʿī/Ibn Qutayba 
tradition and the al-Tirmidhī/al-Ṭaḥāwī tradition. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works thus represent a 
transitional stage in the justification of the authority of consensus on the basis of 
revelation. Within fifty years of his death, the primary  adīth that jurists cite to support 
consensus would have taken its characteristic linguistic form and be fully understood as 
Prophetic. In the early 4
th
/10
th
 century, however, it was still possible to cite this  adīth as 
                                                 
527
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a non-Prophetic principle and to assert the authority of consensus without rooting that 
authority in a text of revelation.
529
  
 
The Participants in Forming Consensus 
In many cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not specify whose agreement is considered in 
establishing consensus: he frequently employs the anonymous “aj aʿū” (they reached 
consensus)
530
 or the passive “uj iʿa” (consensus was reached).531 In other cases, he refers 
to the consensus of the Companions,
532
 the scholars (ahl al-ʿilm, ʿula āʾ, fuqahāʾ),533 the 
 adīth scholars (ahl al- adīth),534 the Muslims (al-Musli ūn),535 the Community (al-
umma),
536
 everyone (kull)
537
 or the people (al-nās).538 Even when al-Ṭaḥāwī refers to ‘the 
people,’ ‘the Community,’ or ‘the Muslims,’ however, it appears that in the 
overwhelming majority of cases he intends only jurists, a phenomenon that is also 
characteristic of al-Shāfiʿī’s discussions of consensus.539 
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88-94; Norman Calder, “I htilāf and Ij āʿ in Shāfiʿī’s Risāla,” Studia Islamica 58 (1983): 72-81).   
163 
 
 
That al-Ṭaḥāwī intends jurists when he mentions the groups listed above is 
suggested by the fact that in similar statements about consensus, he sometimes refers to 
jurists and sometimes to other groups. For example, in a chapter concerning the 
permissibility of riding seated upon the hide of a predatory animal, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that 
no one may exclude anything from the scope of what God has made general (ʿāmm) 
except on the basis of evidence from the Qurʾān, Sunna, or the consensus of the scholars 
(ahl al-ʿilm).540 In another chapter in the same book concerning hunting during the 
pilgrimage, al-Ṭaḥāwī states the same principle, but specifies the consensus of the 
Community (umma), rather than that of scholars.
541
 Likewise, in some chapters al-Ṭaḥāwī 
writes that the “consensus of the Muslims” has established a technical legal rule of the 
sort that he usually attributes to the consensus of the scholars.
542
 In these and many 
similar cases we may safely conclude that al-Ṭaḥāwī envisions the consensus of the 
jurists only. 
In a few, ambiguous cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī may in fact have in mind a consensus which 
includes all Muslims, in keeping with the Ḥanafī principle that all Muslims participate in 
the consensus on foundational matters like the obligation to perform the Ramadan fast 
and the pilgrimage.
543
 Specifically, in several passages asserting that ijtihād is used in 
cases where nothing is found in the Qurʾān, Sunna or consensus, the consensus he 
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mentions is that of the Community (umma).
544
 It may be that he has in mind the basic 
obligations which have been established on the authority of the Muslim community as a 
whole. Similarly, when al-Ṭaḥāwī states that “the people” (al-nās) have reached 
consensus that the occasion of revelation for a certain Qurʾānic verse was a specific 
battle, he may be referring to a collective memory of the Community.
545
 
In almost every case, al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays his claims of consensus as 
geographically universal, rather than restricted to the scholars of a particular locale.
546
 
When he mentions the fuqahāʾ al-amṣār (jurists of the garrison towns), he often takes 
care to specify that he includes the Ḥaramayn (Mecca and Medina), as well as the 
garrison towns in all other countries (sāʾir al-buldān).547 Intriguingly, the single example 
that I was able to identify in which al-Ṭaḥāwī could be interpreted as favoring the 
consensus of the scholars of a certain region concerns the ahl al- adīna (people of 
Medina), a group for whom some jurists claimed special authority on the grounds that 
they preserved the continuous and authentic practice of Muslim Community from the 
time of the Prophet.
548
 In a chapter concerning whether a matter that has already been 
decided by a judge or arbitrator ( akam) may then be referred to the ruler for a de novo 
ruling, al-Ṭaḥāwī describes the opposition between Abū Ḥanīfa and his disciples on the 
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one hand and Ibn Abī Laylā and the jurists (fuqahāʾ) of Medina on the other. He holds 
that the best opinion is that of Ibn Abī Laylā and the ahl al- adīna “because of their 
consensus.” He concludes the chapter with an analogical argument refuting the opinion of 
the Ḥanafīs.549  
While this passage might seem to suggest that al-Ṭaḥāwī privileges the consensus 
of the ahl al- adīna over the opinion of the Ḥanafīs, in the context of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
thought as a whole, it seems considerably more likely that he is using the term 
‘consensus’ to refer to the agreement between the ahl al- adīna and Ibn Abī Laylā, a 
Kūfan, rather than to the simple consensus of the Medinese. Given that no other passage 
in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works favors the consensus or legal opinions of the Medinese, this 
discussion is best understood in the context of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s willingness to apply the term 
‘consensus’ to an agreement that is not entirely unanimous, a topic I will discuss in more 
detail below. 
 
The Boundaries of Consensus 
Many of the questions that preoccupied legal theorists about the circumstances 
under which consensus may be said to have been reached are entirely absent from al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ devotes individual chapters to issues including the 
moral qualities required to participate in forming a consensus;
550
 whether a consensus 
becomes effective immediately or only upon the death of the generation of scholars that 
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formed it;
551
 whether a Successor who became a jurist during the time of the Companions 
must be counted as part of Companion consensus;
552
 and whether it is possible for a later 
generation to reach consensus on a question on which the Companions held several 
known opinions.
553
 None of these questions are raised in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works.  
A crucial question debated during al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time asks whether scholars must 
actively state their consent to a position, or whether a tacit consensus may be claimed 
based on an absence of explicit disagreement. The Ḥanafīs ʿĪsā ibn Abān and al-Karkhī 
rejected tacit consensus, as did al-Shāfiʿī.554 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ and the later Ḥanafī tradition 
would largely accept it as necessary, given the difficulty of determining the active assent 
to a doctrine of every scholar alive during a certain time.
555
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī claims a tacit 
consensus on several occasions by noting that a Companion indicated a ruling by speech 
or action in the presence of other Companions, and they did not object.
556
  
In fact, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to discuss tacit consensus exclusively in connection 
with the Companions, a type of tacit consensus which some later jurists would consider a 
special case because the Companions represented a fairly small community with better 
knowledge of each other’s opinions than would be possible as the Muslim community 
grew in size and geographical extent.
557
 Considerations such as the relative degrees of 
certainty inspired by active and tacit consensus are not addressed in his extant works. 
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Although it seems probable that al-Ṭaḥāwī would accept the tacit consensus of post-
Companion generations given his consistently optimistic approach to consensus, the 
absence of any explicit discussion of the matter relieves al-Ṭaḥāwī of having to justify 
specific claims of consensus in later generations on the basis of active or tacit assent.
558
  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s expansive definition of consensus is also apparent in passages which 
indicate that he agreed with the view that consensus need not be unanimous in order to be 
valid.
559
 In a discussion of the Pilgrimage rites, he claims that “the Muslims have reached 
consensus” and that “they all participate in the consensus” (innāhu  ja īʿan  uj iʿīn) 
while acknowledging in the very same paragraph the disagreement of Ibn ʿAbbās.560 
Shortly afterward, he acknowledges that some other scholars followed the opinion of Ibn 
ʿAbbās.561 He thus applies the term ij āʿ to a non-unanimous consensus, a phenomenon 
we also saw above when al-Ṭaḥāwī claimed the consensus of the Medinese and Ibn Abī 
Laylā against the Ḥanafī opinion. Similarly, he states elsewhere that “a group” (ja āʿa) 
of Companions reached consensus on a question.
562
 He uses this restricted consensus as 
evidence in favor of his position.  
On the other hand, al-Ṭaḥāwī does know the principle of unanimous consensus 
and employs it himself on at least one occasion. In a chapter in Mukhtaṣar I htilāf al-
ʿula āʾ on whether a Muslim may be killed in recompense for the killing of an infidel, 
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al-Shāfiʿī says that there is “no disagreement” (lā  hilāf) on a certain principle. Al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s response as reported by al-Jaṣṣāṣ is that what al-Shāfiʿī transmits is not 
consensus (ij āʿ), because Abū Yūsuf disagreed.563 While this polemical passage 
demonstrates al-Ṭaḥāwī’s awareness of the argument that consensus must be unanimous, 
the claim is not typical of al-Ṭaḥāwī and appears nowhere else in his extant works that I 
was able to locate. In general, his acceptance of non-unanimous ij āʿ permits him to 
claim consensus in the maximum number of cases. 
The principle of majority consensus is most famously associated with al-
Ṭabarī,564 although al-Shāfiʿī’s understanding of consensus also did not require 
unanimity.
565
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ accepted majority consensus, but the opinion died out among 
most later Ḥanafīs.566 Given that the understanding of consensus among jurists of the first 
two centuries of Islamic history likewise did not rely upon unanimity,
567
 it seems 
plausible that al-Ṭabarī and al-Ṭaḥāwī were not expressing an unusual view in accepting 
the consensus of the majority. Rather, al-Ṭabarī is remembered for a doctrine which was 
for a long time the most widespread, until the increasing emphasis on the communal 
unity implied by the doctrine of consensus made the concept of a non-unanimous 
consensus untenable.  
 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī sharply diverges from the later uṣūl al-fiqh tradition in his 
willingness to accept that consensus may be abrogated. In general, the term naskh 
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(abrogation) is reserved for the temporal and legislative supersession of a Qurʾānic verse 
or  adīth; ordinarily, later jurists would speak of a change in ij āʿ, or a new ij āʿ, rather 
than its abrogation. Indeed, among later jurists it was widely held that consensus could 
neither abrogate nor be abrogated, because abrogation was only possible during the 
lifetime of Muḥammad, and consensus was only effective after it.568 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, 
however, twice entertains the possibility of the abrogation of a consensus, although he 
denies that abrogation actually occurred in either case. In the first example, the Ḥanafīs, 
Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs569 claim that Q 5/al-Māʾida:106 (“O you who believe, [let there be] 
witnessing between you when death comes to one of you”) was abrogated by Q 65/al-
Ṭalāq:2 (“Call as witnesses two just men”). Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s response is that “it is not 
permissible (lā yajū ) to abrogate something upon whose certainty (thubūt) consensus has 
been reached unless there exists an authoritative proof ( ujja) requiring that.”570 In other 
words, jurists have reached consensus on the effectiveness of the rule stated in Q 5/al-
Māʾida:106. It is possible for such a consensus to be abrogated, but only in cases where 
there is a new, authoritative proof ( ujja). In this case, he finds no such authoritative 
proof, and so he follows the consensus of the Companions and Successors over the 
opinion of most later jurists. Neither here nor elsewhere does al-Ṭaḥāwī specify what sort 
of authoritative proof could abrogate consensus, but the fact that he understands such 
abrogation to be possible places him at odds with the later tradition.  
 The second example is similar. It concerns a claim that Q 5/al-Māʾida:6 (“your 
feet up to the ankles”) abrogated the earlier permission to wipe the feet that had been 
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established by a Prophetic  adīth. Jurists who hold that the Qurʾān abrogated the earlier 
 adīth argue that this verse replaces washing the feet with wiping the feet. Al-Ṭaḥāwī 
responds that “the necessary course of action is that we adhere to that upon whose 
obligation consensus has been reached until its abrogation is known (yuʿla ).”571 Once 
again, his argument is that there is consensus upon the effectiveness of the wiping rule as 
established in the Prophetic  adīth. Although that consensus may be abrogated, such 
abrogation has to be known through some other (unspecified) proof.  Since no such proof 
is known, the permission to wipe the feet stands.  
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī denies that abrogation has actually occurred in either case, he 
leaves open the possibility that consensus could be abrogated if an authoritative proof is 
found, or if it is “known.” At the same time, he confirms the authority of consensus by 
requiring proof in order to set it aside. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claim that consensus may be 
abrogated reflects a general approach which seeks to establish the occurrence of 
consensus in the maximum number of cases by refraining from setting up any 
unnecessary barriers to attaining it. Al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to feel confident in claiming the 
authority of consensus for cases in which later jurists would hesitate for fear of falling 
into inconsistencies or of undermining the theological claims that the doctrine of a 
unanimous and unalterable consensus supported. 
 Another passage demonstrates how al-Ṭaḥāwī gains flexibility in the application 
of consensus by avoiding a definitive statement concerning when it becomes binding. In a 
discussion of whether the relatives of the Prophet receive a share of the khums tax, al-
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Ṭaḥāwī states that Abū Bakr and ʿUmar did not distribute the khums to the Prophet’s 
relatives after his death. He first writes:  
This confirms that this is the rule in our opinion. Since none of the other 
Companions of God’s Messenger opposed them, it confirms that it was [the other 
Companions’] opinion as well. Since consensus has been confirmed (thabata) in 
this from Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and all the Companions of God’s Messenger, the 
doctrine (al-qawl bihi) has been confirmed. It is obligatory to practice it and to 
abandon what opposes it.
572
 
 
 To this point in the passage al-Ṭaḥāwī has strongly affirmed the obligation to act 
upon the Companions’ tacit consensus on this matter. He continues: “Then, when ʿAlī 
came to power, he similarly confirmed this ruling.” He is now discussing a period after 
the consensus had already been established. After adducing a Companion report from 
ʿAlī, al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that “had his opinion been different, he would have restored [the 
matter] (raddahu ilā) to what he opined, given his knowledge, his piety and his virtue.”573 
What is notable about this passage is that al-Ṭaḥāwī contemplates with equanimity the 
possibility that ʿAlī could oppose a consensus that had already been formed (thabata). 
What is more, had ʿAlī opposed the confirmed consensus of the Companions, his action 
would have been the praiseworthy result of his knowledge, his piety and his virtue. From 
this discussion, it appears that the prior consensus was not binding on ʿAlī, perhaps 
because of his role as an early caliph or the rough equivalence of his stature with that of 
Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. Nonetheless, in this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī both states that a consensus 
had already been formed (thabata) and that it might permissibly later have been 
challenged. 
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 Similar situations in which a Companion is reported to have opposed a consensus 
led other jurists to develop the doctrine of inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr, which held that a consensus 
does not become effective until all of the jurists involved in forming it have passed away. 
Under this theory ʿAlī would be permitted to give a share of khums to the Prophet’s 
relatives because the earlier consensus had not yet become binding. This doctrine, which 
was in effect a way of excusing an otherwise impermissible breach of consensus, was 
held by Ḥanbalīs, Shāfiʿīs, Muʿtazilīs and Ashʿarīs, and was already known in al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s time and attributed to Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.574 This principle cannot be what al-
Ṭaḥāwī was envisioning, however, because he states clearly that the consensus was 
confirmed by the actions of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and the other Companions, and that it was 
obligatory to act upon it. Further, he is not excusing a breach of consensus by ʿAlī, but is 
instead portraying his potential opposition in a positive light. Nor is there any indication 
in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion that he considered the original consensus to be provisional, 
such that the objection of ʿAlī would have revealed that there was in fact no consensus. 
Notions of provisional instances of consensus, or discussions of the point where instances 
of consensus become irrevocable, are simply absent from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s work.  
Other jurists, including most Ḥanafīs, would deny the doctrine of inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr 
and would hold that a consensus becomes binding in the moment that it occurs. They 
recognized that, by trying to solve the problem of the existence of reports of Companions 
acting in opposition to established consensus, the proponents of inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr had 
created other problems. When new individuals were constantly joining the ranks of the 
jurists, what would it mean for a generation to pass away? The opponents of inqirāḍ al-
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ʿaṣr would reject the idea that ʿAlī’s piety could cause him to oppose a confirmed 
consensus. Confronted with a similar situation in which ʿUmar is said to have opposed a 
consensus established under Abū Bakr, al-Jaṣṣāṣ denies that there was any valid 
consensus in the first place, such that ʿUmar could have opposed it.575  
The Ḥanafī denial of the doctrine of inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr, however, also does not 
adequately account for the passage under discussion. Al-Ṭaḥāwī clearly states that a 
consensus had occurred under Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. By declining to recognize a conflict 
between his initial assertion that the consensus of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and the other 
Companions is binding and his later assertion that ʿAlī could have acted upon his own 
raʾy, al-Ṭaḥāwī claims the authority of consensus while still permitting a kind of 
dynamism that the uṣūl tradition excluded by its insistence upon the binding nature of 
consensus and the impossibility of its abrogation. It may well be that al-Ṭaḥāwī often has 
in mind something less than a permanently binding, unanimous agreement when he 
claims consensus. Nonetheless, by using the term ij āʿ both when making possibly 
casual claims of consensus and while asserting the status of consensus as a certain proof 
( ujja qāṭiʿa), al-Ṭaḥāwī elevates the status of all of his other claims of consensus.  
One result of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s comparative disinterest in many of the questions that 
later theorists considered integral to a discussion of consensus is that he is not burdened 
by a detailed set of requirements when making his own claims of consensus. While al-
Ṭaḥāwī does address various theoretical issues related to consensus, he also makes claims 
of consensus without rigorous justification, sometimes in ways that later theorists would 
find unacceptable. Consensus is a powerful tool for al-Ṭaḥāwī because he is able to use 
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the language of uṣūl al-fiqh to claim ij āʿ as a certain and authoritative proof, and yet he 
does not feel constrained to take positions on the entire “checklist” of questions that 
would characterize discussions of the doctrine in later uṣūl al-fiqh works.  
In part, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s approach must be understood as reflecting the historical 
development of the doctrine of consensus. As we have seen above, al-Ṭaḥāwī wrote 
before many aspects of the classical doctrine on consensus had crystallized. He also 
shares in a general Ḥanafī optimism concerning consensus, expressed in a tendency to 
“consistently [adopt] those positions that were felt to facilitate the application of the 
doctrine.”576 His approach to consensus also reflects the genre in which he worked, 
however. His goal as the author of works of practical hermeneutics was to establish and 
justify the law on discrete issues. In contrast, we may understand the complexity of later 
theorists’ discussions of consensus as the product of their attempts to extrapolate a 
rigorous and coherent theory from the Qurʾānic verses and Prophetic  adīths that had 
come to be understood as underpinning the authority of consensus as a source of law. As 
we have seen above, this theory of consensus was also employed to uphold ideological 
and theological claims. The overtly theoretical aspirations of the uṣūl genre thus 
generated their own imperatives of systematicity that are entirely absent from al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s practical approach to consensus.   
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While jurists in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time and before did also develop doctrines like 
inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr, it was only the uṣūl al-fiqh genre which sought to bring all aspects of 
consensus together into a single, coherent whole. The result of legal theorists’ efforts to 
produce a coherent account of the doctrine was a definition of consensus of such 
specificity and rigor that theorists came to question whether consensus had ever actually 
occurred in practice.
577
 Indeed, Bernard Weiss writes that, “on the whole, I think it is fair 
to say that the actual impact of consensus on the formulation of the law was seen by the 
classical jurists as rather minimal.”578 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī understands consensus to be 
a routine occurrence and integral to the process of formulating the law, as we shall see 
below.  
The disparate goals of practical hermeneutics and legal theory may then be 
identified as the reason for the gap which Kamali and others have noted between the 
theory and practice of consensus.
579
 Ahmad Hasan has suggested that the existence of 
claims of non-unanimous consensus demonstrates that “either the classical definition of 
Ij āʿ is defective, or Ij āʿ is only a theoretical concept.”580 In response, we may suggest 
from our reading of al-Ṭaḥāwī and later works of theory that the classical definition of 
consensus in uṣūl al-fiqh works reflects one set of theological and ideological goals, 
while the operation of consensus in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics reflects 
the imperatives of law creation in practice. The question of the relationship between the 
genres of legal theory and practical hermeneutics requires further study, however. In 
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particular, it would be instructive to examine whether and how the use of consensus in 
works of practical hermeneutics changed in response to the maturation of the doctrine in 
uṣūl al-fiqh works. While the maturity of al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s Fuṣūl certainly suggests that there 
were earlier works in the genre which have been lost, it is nonetheless fair to say that al-
Ṭaḥāwī lived before the genre became canonized to the extent it would later. It seems 
possible that authors of works of practical hermeneutics a few centuries after al-Ṭaḥāwī 
would need to engage with uṣūl al-fiqh approaches to consensus to a degree that al-
Ṭaḥāwī did not. A chronological survey of approaches to consensus in works of practical 
hermeneutics could thus provide us with important insights on the relationship between 
that genre and uṣūl al-fiqh. 
 
Function 
Consensus as a Tool for Resolving Disagreement 
 As stated above, consensus is not merely discussed as a theoretical possibility in 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, but instead plays a major, practical role in his legal arguments. Far 
from doubting the possibility of obtaining consensus in real-life situations, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
claims consensus as the basis for establishing the occasion of revelation for a Qurʾānic 
verse;
581
 restricting an apparently general (ʿāmm) meaning to a specific ( hāṣṣ) 
meaning;
582
 affirming the authenticity of an apparently weak  adīth;583 providing the 
explanation (taʾwīl) of the intent of a Qurʾānic verse or  adīth;584 setting out a rule of 
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positive law;
585
 and many other kinds of claims. Often, consensus on one question 
becomes the basis for an analogy by which another rule is derived.
586
  
 The flexible quality of consensus in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought is perhaps most apparent 
in his use of it as a technique for resolving reported disagreements (i htilāf) among 
jurists. The impression gained from uṣūl al-fiqh discussions of consensus, which are 
largely concerned with determining when and how consensus may be said to have been 
reached, is that jurists either have reached consensus on a certain question or they have 
not.
587
 The existence of disagreement (i htilāf) on an issue would therefore seem to 
preclude any claim of consensus.
588
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, however, frequently appeals to an 
inferred consensus when identifying points of agreement within a larger debate.  
 For example, in a chapter concerning how many extra ta bīrs (that declaration 
that ‘God is great’) should be said during prayers for the two major festival days, al-
Ṭaḥāwī first sets out conflicting opinions from various Companions and Successors. One 
major faction holds that there should be nine ta bīrs, while the other argues that it should 
be twelve; both claim support from  adīths.589 After listing the proponents of each 
opinion, al-Ṭaḥāwī signals the transition to the discussion portion of his chapter in his 
usual way. He writes, “Because they disagreed on takbīr for the two festival prayers, we 
wanted to examine it (nanẓur fīhi) in order to derive (nastakhrij) the correct opinion 
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(qawl ṣa ī ) from their various opinions.”590 After resolving a side issue, he returns to the 
question of the number of ta bīrs in the two festival prayers. Although he has previously 
acknowledged that scholars disagree on the issue, he now claims that within their 
disagreement they have reached consensus that there are indeed additional ta bīrs for the 
festival prayers in comparison with non-festival prayers. He further argues that the two 
groups have reached consensus on nine additional ta bīrs, since that is a number on 
which all groups agree, i.e., nine ta bīrs are included within the twelve ta bīrs of the 
second group. He affirms that he will adopt the additional ta bīrs that everyone agrees on 
and deny those on which there is disagreement.
591
 Thus, although the stated opinions of 
the Companions and Successors express disagreement on this question, al-Ṭaḥāwī infers 
a consensus which serves as an authoritative proof and resolves the dispute.
592
 
 Likewise, in a chapter on shortening prayers while traveling al-Ṭaḥāwī first 
describes scholars’ various opinions on how long someone must travel in order to qualify 
for the reduced obligation. He next infers that the proponents of all of these positions 
have reached consensus that the relevant Qurʾānic verse intends only a specific ( hāṣṣ) 
kind of traveler, despite the apparently general (ʿāmm) meaning of the verse, since no 
jurist holds that all travelers may shorten their prayers. Within this consensus, some say 
that three days is the minimum length of travel which merits shortened prayers, while 
others name shorter travel times. Since they would all agree that someone traveling for 
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three days may shorten his or her prayer, that is what they have reached consensus 
upon.
593
  
As in the previous example, al-Ṭaḥāwī first infers the existence of consensus on a 
larger scale—here, that the meaning of the Qurʾānic verse is  hāṣṣ—and then identifies a 
point of commonality among the competing opinions. Al-Ṭaḥāwī similarly resolves 
disagreements by identifying an implicit consensus on questions such as the disagreement 
over the minimum amount a thief must steal before he is subject to the punishment of 
amputation, how many people may share in the sacrifice of a single animal during the 
Pilgrimage and the maximum time that may pass between the minor and major 
Pilgrimage such that one may still be considered to be doing ta attuʿ (a way of 
combining the minor and major Pilgrimages).
594
 In all of these cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī validates 
one opinion over another by arguing that it represents a sort of ‘lowest common 
denominator’ of consensus.  
In other chapters, al-Ṭaḥāwī resolves juristic disagreement not by claiming that a 
consensus already exists among apparently contradictory opinions, but by appealing to 
another issue on which scholars have already reached consensus for a solution to the 
current problem.
595
 In a chapter on the legal effectiveness of sales concluded during the 
Friday prayer, a time when commerce is ostensibly prohibited, al-Ṭaḥāwī first describes 
the opposition between Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, al-Shaybānī and al-Shāfiʿī, who validate 
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such a sale, and Mālik ibn Anas, who rejects it.596 Al-Ṭaḥāwī then observes that “because 
they disagreed, we looked to what they had reached consensus upon that was of the same 
type as what they disagreed upon, in order that the disagreement be brought into 
alignment (li-tuʿṭaf ʿalayhi) with it.”597 He finds that scholars have reached consensus 
that sales made during other prayer periods when commerce is prohibited are still legally 
effective, and so therefore should the sale in question be. Here al-Ṭaḥāwī is relying on 
analogical reasoning to resolve the disagreement; however, his language is that of 
consensus, not analogy. 
The principle at work here is stated most clearly in a chapter on prayer under 
circumstances in which worshippers fear for their safety (ṣalāt al-khawf). There, al-
Ṭaḥāwī refutes the opinion (raʾy) of Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd on how this prayer should be 
performed on the grounds that there is no parallel for his opinion in any other kind of 
prayer. His opinion is therefore without basis, because “knowledge (ʿilm) of [the 
resolution of] disagreements is sought from [questions] on which consensus has been 
reached.”598 Similarly, we learn in another chapter that “[the resolutions to] disputed 
issues are confirmed if they resemble issues on which consensus has been reached. If 
they do not resemble them, they are not confirmed except by means of the establishment 
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of a limit in another revealed text (tawqīt) that serves an authoritative proof ( ujja).”599 
Like the example above, both of these passages are discussing the use of a kind of qiyās 
to resolve juristic disagreements, but they do so using the language of consensus.  
 Above we have considered two ways in which al-Ṭaḥāwī employs consensus to 
resolve disagreements among jurists. What these passages highlight is the way in which 
al-Ṭaḥāwī appeals to consensus to advance his legal arguments, even in cases in which it 
might have seemed that no consensus could exist. Reading manuals of uṣūl al-fiqh, one 
gains the impression that theorists primarily envisioned consensus as an end point, the 
conclusion of a process. This impression is supported by the fact that the chapters on 
consensus in legal theory manuals are dedicated to defining the circumstances under 
which consensus may said to have been attained and to emphasizing the permanence of 
consensus once achieved. In contrast, for al-Ṭaḥāwī as a writer engaged in the work of 
practical hermeneutics, the establishment of consensus is rarely an ending or an end in 
itself, but instead only a stage in a larger argument. As we have seen, consensus in al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s works does not have the same universal, immutable qualities that are 
envisioned in the uṣūl al-fiqh tradition. As a result, it is a much more useful tool for 
demonstrating the relationship between text and law.  
 
Consensus Indicating Abrogation 
 To this point, we have been discussing a kind of consensus that allows jurists to 
discover the law in cases where nothing relevant is found in the Qurʾān or Sunna—that is, 
consensus that ‘fills in the gaps’ of revelation. Some jurists also discussed another kind of 
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consensus, however, a consensus that had the potential to compete for authority with 
accepted Prophetic  adīths. Discussions of this type of consensus are framed in legal 
theory works in terms of whether consensus may abrogate (al-naskh bi-l-ij āʿ).600 In al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s works, the issue of abrogation by the consensus of the jurists arises in seven 
chapters in Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and Shar  mushkil al-āthār.601 We may assume that 
this topic is absent from    ā  al-Qurʾān because al-Ṭaḥāwī, like other jurists, never 
contemplates the possibility that consensus could abrogate the Qurʾān.602  
 Six of the seven passages in question concern cases in which al-Ṭaḥāwī is faced 
with conflicting Prophetic  adīths containing no reference to the order in which they 
were revealed.
603
 In each case, he argues that the consensus against following the practice 
detailed in one of the  adīths indicates that that  adīth is abrogated. In the final passage, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that scholars’ consensus against practicing the rule contained in a 
 adīth indicates its abrogation, even though no other Prophetic  adīth on the topic is 
known.
604
 In the first group of passages, consensus confirms one Prophetic  adīth even 
while overriding another; in this last passage, consensus functions to negate the authority 
of a Prophetic  adīth without appealing to any other Prophetic or Qurʾānic text.  
 Perhaps surprisingly, discussions of abrogation by consensus in later uṣūl works 
do not appear to be concerned with the distinction between cases in which consensus 
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affirms one Prophetic  adīth over another as opposed to times when the consensus 
reached has no obvious basis in a revealed text. Instead, these discussions are focused 
almost entirely on whether consensus has the power to abrogate revealed texts at all. The 
nearly universal answer is that it does not. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Zarkashī report that the 
Ḥanafī ʿĪsā ibn Abān held that consensus may abrogate (“al-ij āʿ nāsi h”),605 and al-
Sarakhsī refers to unnamed Ḥanafīs who held the same view. However, al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-
Sarakhsī themselves are categorical in their assertion that consensus may not abrogate, as 
is al-Zarkashī and the many other scholars he cites in al-Ba r al-mu īṭ.606 
 The major argument against abrogation by consensus adduced by al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-
Sarakhsī, al-Zarkashī and many of the scholars he discusses is that abrogation only 
occurred during the Prophet’s lifetime and consensus only became operative after it, so 
therefore consensus may neither abrogate nor be abrogated; the two processes have no 
interaction with each other.
607
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ also argues that abrogation requires revelatory 
instruction (tawqīf),608 which cannot be obtained after the death of the Prophet. Al-
Sarakhsī, on the other hand, emphasizes that consensus is not based in revelation; he 
writes that “consensus consists of (ʿibāra ʿan) the confluence of opinions (arāʾ) on a 
topic, and we have shown that there is no place for mere opinion in knowing the time 
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after which doing a thing becomes good or bad according to God,” that is, there is no 
place for mere opinion in knowing when a text is abrogating or abrogated.
609
 
While it was widely held that consensus could not itself abrogate a text of 
revelation, many jurists did accept that consensus may indicate (yadull ʿalā/dalīl) that 
abrogation had already occurred. In this case, consensus effectively preserves revelation 
that has not come down in the form of a Prophetic  adīth.610 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ accepts this form 
of consensus. He writes that “we do not say that consensus causes (awjaba) abrogation.” 
However, he affirms that “consensus indicates to us that [a  adīth] is abrogated by 
revelatory confirmation (tawqīf), even if the abrogating text (lafẓ nāsi h) has not been 
transmitted to us.”611 This function of consensus is accepted by a variety of non-Ḥanafī 
jurists as well, including Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs listed in al-Ba r al-mu īṭ, the Mālikī 
jurist al-Tilimsānī (d. 771/1369) and the Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064).612 Al-Sarakhsī 
rejects even this limited definition of abrogation by consensus.
613
 
It is this consensus that merely indicates a previous abrogation that al-Ṭaḥāwī has 
in mind in the passages mentioned above. In none of them does he refer to consensus as 
itself abrogating (nāsi h). Instead, he writes that scholars reached consensus that a  adīth 
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was abrogated ( ansū h)614 or that “we reason” (ʿaqalnā) from their consensus that the 
 adīth was abrogated, implying that the abrogation had occurred before their consensus 
upon it was reached.
615
 In other cases, he uses derivations from the root d-l-l also used by 
later jurists to claim that consensus indicates (yadull ʿalā, dalīl) a  adīth’s abrogation.616 
That al-Ṭaḥāwī rejected the possibility that scholars’ consensus could itself abrogate 
revealed texts is emphasized by the justifications he gives for his claims of consensus in 
four of the seven passages under discussion. In one he writes that: 
They would not reach consensus against what the Prophet did without 
confirmation (thubūt) of its abrogation. That is because they are trustworthy 
( aʾ ūnūn) in what they do (faʿalū) just as they are trustworthy in what they 
transmit.
617
  
 
In another passage, al-Ṭaḥāwī makes a very similar argument and then adds that:  
The opinions (qawl) and transmission (riwāya) of anyone who abandons what the 
Prophet said or ruled can no longer be accepted, and God forbid that such should 
be the case for [the jurists of the garrison towns].
618
  
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument is that it is inconceivable that scholars would reach 
consensus inappropriately, and therefore their consensus against a  adīth must be based 
upon other revelatory authority. They cannot all abandon what the Prophet commanded, 
because their trustworthiness in following the Prophet is inextricably linked to their 
trustworthiness in transmitting the texts of revelation. Because it is unthinkable that 
scholars could be collectively untrustworthy as transmitters, it is impossible to suppose 
that they would collectively and knowingly contravene a Prophetic  adīth that was still in 
                                                 
614
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.78.  
615
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 12.288, 15.167, 15.465. 
616
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 15.170; Maʿānī, 1.291, 1.449. 
617
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 15.167.  
618
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 12.288.  
186 
 
 
effect. The categorical impossibility of scholars reaching consensus inappropriately is 
further emphasized in three other passages where al-Ṭaḥāwī justifies his claim of 
abrogation by saying that God would not cause His Community to agree upon an error, a 
statement of principle which we have already discussed above, and one which suggests a 
form of communal infallibility.
619
 Indeed, three of the four assertions of this principle in 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works occur in the context of justifying an abrogation known only through 
consensus, suggesting that al-Ṭaḥāwī feels that this is an area of his theory of consensus 
strongly in need of justification.  
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not directly argue in these passages that consensus 
cannot itself abrogate, that is the unspoken premise underlying his argument that scholars 
must have had confirmation from revelation before reaching consensus. Comparing al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of abrogation by consensus with those of later legal theorists, we 
can see that he does not share in their widespread assertion that abrogation only occurred 
during the life of the Prophet and consensus only became operative after it. Indeed, we 
have already seen in a previous section that al-Ṭaḥāwī accepts that consensus may be 
abrogated by an (unspecified) authoritative proof, thus negating the firm boundary that 
other jurists erect between abrogation and consensus. Nor does he state his objections in 
terms of al-Sarakhsī’s concern that consensus is based on a confluence of opinion, and 
therefore has no place abrogating a text of revelation. Instead, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s primary 
concern with abrogation by consensus alone is that it means abandoning the Prophet’s 
practice, a consideration not directly addressed by other theorists we have mentioned. 
Because he links scholars’ trustworthiness as transmitters to their trustworthiness in 
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following the Prophet’s practice, the entire edifice of revelation and the law is dependent 
upon the upright conduct of those who transmit religious texts.  
In claiming that some instances of consensus have a special authority to indicate 
the abrogation of Prophetic  adīths, al-Ṭaḥāwī is applying the same instruction/inference 
distinction that we have encountered in previous chapters: in cases where consensus must 
represent a memory about revelatory instruction that has not otherwise been preserved, it 
has the special authority to indicate the abrogation of Prophetic  adīths. On the other 
hand, where consensus might permissibly be based upon scholars’ collective legal 
reasoning, it cannot impinge upon the application of revealed texts. In contrast to his 
discussions of post-Prophetic  adīth, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not use the term ‘tawqīf’ to describe 
the revelatory instruction that must underlie such instances of consensus, although he 
does employ the related term ‘wuqūf’ in one passage.620 Nevertheless, consensus 
represents a third legal source for which al-Ṭaḥāwī posits a two-tiered system of authority 
on the basis of what may be discovered by reasoning and what may only be known 
through revelation.  
 
The Practice (ʿAmal/Istiʿmāl) of the Scholars and the Muslims 
 In the passages analyzed above, it is the consensus (ij āʿ) of the scholars that 
indicates that a Prophetic  adīth has been abrogated. In a strikingly similar set of 
passages, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī claims that abrogation is indicated not by scholars’ ij āʿ, 
but by the fact that the rule scholars or Muslims actually put into practice 
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(ʿa ila/istaʿ ala) is in conflict with the rule indicated by a Prophetic  adīth.621 In such 
cases, that  adīth is known to have been abrogated by another Prophetic  adīth, even 
when the abrogating  adīth has not been preserved. For example, in a chapter on whether 
women may wear kohl during their ʿidda (waiting period after a divorce or bereavement) 
in cases of medical necessity, al-Ṭaḥāwī cites a Prophetic  adīth prohibiting the custom. 
He then observes that: 
This  adīth has been transmitted from God’s Messenger through multiple 
pathways ( utawātir) of the kind which scholars accept as sound (wujūh ṣi ā ). 
Their abandonment (tark) of it after it had reached them and their putting into 
practice (istiʿ āl) something else is an indication of its abrogation. This is 
because they are trustworthy ( aʾ ūn) in regard to its abrogation just as they are 
trustworthy in regard to what they transmit. That being the case, they could only 
have abandoned something whose manner of transmission they approved because 
something caused them to abandon it in favor of what they held was better than 
it—that is, something that had abrogated it. If that were not the case, then their 
probity (ʿadl) would be voided. In the voiding of their probity would be the 
voiding of their status as transmitters, and God forbid that such should be the true 
state of their affairs.
622
 
 
If we compare this passage with al-Ṭaḥāwī’s justification for consensus indicating 
abrogation in the passages above, we see that they contain the same argument: scholars 
must have known that the abandoned  adīth had been abrogated, because they are 
trustworthy. If they did abandon the rule expressed in a Prophetic practice without cause, 
they would no longer be trustworthy transmitters of revelation, an unthinkable 
occurrence.   
                                                 
621
 The terms ʿamal and istiʿ āl may be translated as ‘practice’ and ‘putting into practice,’ respectively. 
The term ʿamal in particular is generally assumed in discussions of legal theory to refer to the continuous, 
living practice of the Muslim community, which is based upon but not limited to Prophetic practice. 
However, as we shall see below, al-Ṭaḥāwī has a very different concept in mind when he invokes ʿamal, 
and he in fact uses the terms ʿamal and istiʿ āl interchangeably in his arguments. I therefore discuss them 
together in this section. 
622
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 3.178.  
189 
 
 
The major difference between this passage and passages discussed in the previous 
section is that earlier al-Ṭaḥāwī was speaking of consensus (ij āʿ), whereas here he is 
interested in whether scholars put a rule expressed in a Prophetic  adīth into practice 
(ʿa al/istiʿ āl) or refrain from putting that rule into practice (tark). That is, for al-
Ṭaḥāwī, ‘practice’ concerns the application or non-application of a certain rule. In most 
cases, what al-Ṭaḥāwī seems to be envisioning when he speaks of ‘putting [the rule 
contained in] a Prophetic  adīth into practice’ is, in fact, whether that rule is reflected in 
the positive law applied by jurists as legal practitioners. In a smaller number of cases, 
discussed below, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs the term ʿamal to refer to what Muslims actually do 
in their daily lives—that is, to lived practice rather than doctrine.  
In other examples of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the link between ʿamal and 
abrogation, we learn that scholars are trustworthy ( aʾ ūn) in what they practice 
(ʿa ilū), thus indicating a  adīth’s abrogation, or that they are trustworthy in their 
abandonment of one rule instituted by a  adīth and their practice (ʿamal) of another, 
again indicating abrogation.
623
 Elsewhere, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that, in cases where 
Prophetic  adīths conflict, we should look to the practice (ʿamal) of the Muslims. The 
 adīth they follow is confirmed and abrogates the  adīth they abandoned.624  That ʿamal 
is the application of Prophetic practice is emphasized in other chapters which invoke the 
ʿamal of the scholars or Muslims, usually in order to support a Prophetic  adīth. In one 
chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes that Abū Bakr and ʿUmar practiced (ʿamila) this  adīth after 
the Prophet, and its practice (ʿamal) has continued uninterruptedly (tawātara) to this 
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day.
625
 In another chapter, he criticizes those who would abandon Qurʾānic verses and 
widely attested Prophetic  adīths which the Community has accepted and practiced 
(ʿamilat) to this day in favor of another  adīth which might be abrogated.626 Similarly, in 
a chapter concerning how the imam should stand in relationship to those he leads in 
prayer for different numbers of worshippers, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the Prophet acted in a 
certain way, and that practice (ʿamal) proceeded in the same way after him.627 ʿAmal thus 
represents for al-Ṭaḥāwī the application of a Prophetic practice as preserved either in a 
Prophetic  adīth or in communal memory. 
 With this definition in mind, we may compare al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of ʿamal to 
those of the Medinese and early Iraqi jurists. The use of ʿamal as an indicator of the law 
is, of course, most famously associated with Mālik’s reliance on the practice of the ahl 
al- adīna, or people of Medina.628 Early Mālikī jurists claim authority for Medinese 
ʿamal on the basis that the local practice of the Medinese represents a continuous practice 
going back to the time of the Prophet and his Companions in Medina, the seat of 
government of the early caliphate. While some Companions settled in each garrison 
town, only in Medina was there a large number of Companions able authentically to 
preserve Prophetic practice. A major difference between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of ʿamal 
and that of the Medinese is thus that Medinese ʿamal is geographically limited to the 
inhabitants of a certain city, and it is their tie to this city itself which gives their ʿamal its 
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authority. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays his claims to ʿamal as universal. None of his 
references to ʿamal concern a local tradition; rather, it is the very fact that the practice is 
common to all scholars or to all Muslims that gives it its authority. 
 While Medinese ʿamal claims continuity of practice from the time of Muḥammad, 
Prophetic practice is not its only component. As El Shamsy observes, ʿamal is “always 
bigger and always more” than Prophetic reports, and even than the reports and practices 
of the Companions and Successors.
629
 In addition to these sources, Medinese ʿamal 
incorporates the legal opinions (raʾy) of later Medinese jurists.630 Medinese ʿamal is thus 
continuous, but not static. In contrast, the ʿamal to which al-Ṭaḥāwī appeals in order to 
claim support for some  adīths and the abrogation of others is a simple preservation of 
Prophetic practice, unaltered by the raʾy of later jurists and unconnected to the reports or 
opinions of the generations after Muḥammad.  
  Also, where Medinese ʿamal understands practice to be embodied by the people 
of Medina (ahl al-madīna) as interpreted by scholars,631 al-Ṭaḥāwī distinguishes between 
the ʿamal of the scholars and the ʿamal of the Muslim Community as a whole. In some of 
the passages discussed earlier, al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly refers to the practice of the scholars. 
It is they who are “trustworthy in their practice.”632 Here, the preservation of Prophetic 
practice forms part of the specialized knowledge of the scholars. A few passages, 
however, indicate a more generalized collective memory of Prophetic practice that is 
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common to all Muslims. In one such passage, al-Ṭaḥāwī is confronted with conflicting 
Prophetic  adīths concerning whether Muslims should pray at the burial of a child. In 
response, he argues that when  adīths conflict, we should look to the practice of the 
Muslims. We find that Muslims do pray at the burial of their children. The  adīths 
permitting prayer thus abrogate those prohibiting it.
633
 In this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī is 
discussing a widespread practice within the Muslim Community. Similarly, in arguing 
that a  adīth concerning a certain prayer ritual has been abrogated, al-Ṭaḥāwī separately 
appeals to what the scholars do (ʿalā) and to the practice (ʿamal) in the mosques.634 
Again, the practice intended here goes beyond that of the scholars. 
 Finally, Medinese jurists understood the practice of the ahl al- adīna to be in 
some senses separate from and in competition with Prophetic  adīths. Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 
191/806) wrote that when  adīths are not supported by Medinese practice, they remain 
“neither discredited nor adopted in practice (ghayr mukadhdhab bihi wa-lā  aʿ ūl 
bihi).
635
 In contrast, for al-Ṭaḥāwī  adīths that are neither discredited nor abrogated 
cannot simply be set aside as Ibn al-Qāsim envisions; the function of ʿamal is to indicate 
that one  adīth has abrogated another or that the Muslim community or scholars retain a 
memory of a lost  adīth that abrogates another. That is, ʿamal always bears upon  adīth 
for al-Ṭaḥāwī and always preserves a memory of a lost Prophetic text. That is, within the 
instruction/inference binary underlying al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the structure of the 
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law, ʿamal and istiʿ āl exclusively represent Prophetic instruction; al-Ṭaḥāwī never 
appeals to an ʿamal that reflects scholars’ own inferences.  
 Although early Ḥanafīs including Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī criticized Medinese 
ʿamal as unreliable when not verified by authentic texts,636 they, too, had a concept of 
communal practice, albeit one not based on the special claim to authority of a specific 
locale. Hallaq finds that the early Kūfan jurists almost never expressed the concept of 
practice using the term ʿamal,637 but the language of ʿamal is well attested in extant 
fragments from al-Shaybānī’s pupil, ʿĪsā ibn Abān.638 As we have seen above, al-Ṭaḥāwī, 
too, uses the term ʿamal as well as the related terms istiʿ āl and tark when discussing 
practice. Like the Medinese, the early Ḥanafīs weighed Prophetic  adīths against local 
Community or scholarly practice and rejected some  adīths that were not supported by 
continual practice.
639
 El Shamsy explains this reliance on practice as a means to defend 
established Ḥanafī legal practice against the growing authority of Prophetic  adīth in the 
late 2
nd
/8
th
 century.
640
 When newly circulating  adīths conflicted with established Ḥanafī 
doctrine, jurists could point to their absence from communal practice as evidence that 
they were shādhdh, or irregular.641 The early Ḥanafī concept of communal practice, like 
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Medinese ʿamal, also incorporated some Companion practice, an aspect which appears to 
be absent from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of ʿamal.642 
 El Shamsy and Hallaq frame their discussions of the concept of communal 
practice among early Ḥanafī jurists as being a characteristic of the late 2nd/8th century,643 
a time when religious authority was not yet understood to be as exclusively textual in 
nature as it would be by later jurists. By looking to communal practice as an indicator of 
whether a  adīth should be acted upon, jurists essentially implied that the texts of 
revelation were not adequate in and of themselves to provide all necessary information 
concerning the law. Some information had failed to be captured in textual form, and 
existed only as a communal memory, preserved in communal practice. Further, the status 
of some revealed texts could only be known by looking outside the text, to practice. 
Dutton, too, understands the reliance on ʿamal as an early stage of jurisprudence that was 
later replaced by a “ adīth-based, i.e. text-based, religion.”644 He identifies the early 
stages of the process of textualization with the early Ḥanafīs, progressing to al-Shāfiʿī’s 
assertion of the exclusive authority of the Qurʾān and Sunna. The process was completed, 
he writes, in the works of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (d. 
270/883). 
 What we learn from the works of al-Ṭaḥāwī is that the process of the 
‘textualization’ of Islamic law was not as neat or as linear as the presentation above 
would suggest. Almost half a century after the death of Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
struggled with the question of whether authority resided in revealed texts themselves or 
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in the community’s memory of their status and meaning. We have seen a number of 
examples in which al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that ʿamal indicates that a certain  adīth must have 
been abrogated, even though neither the abrogating  adīth nor any textual evidence of the 
order in which they were revealed has been preserved.
645
 At the same time, we saw in a 
previous chapter al-Ṭaḥāwī’s insistence on the duty of following Prophetic  adīths.646 
Further, in at least one passage, al-Ṭaḥāwī criticizes scholars for abandoning the practice 
of a sound Prophetic  adīth.647 Nor was al-Ṭaḥāwī the last Ḥanafī to look to ʿamal as an 
indicator of the law; al-Jaṣṣāṣ, citing ʿĪsā ibn Abān, likewise holds that ʿamal can reveal 
which of two conflicting  adīths is abrogated.648 
 From the passages in which al-Ṭaḥāwī supplants Prophetic authority by reference 
to communal practice, we may conclude that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of religious 
authority is not exclusively textual. However, we must also note that the number of cases 
in which he appeals to the authority of communal practice across all his extant works is 
extremely small in comparison with his explicit assertions of textual authority and his 
appeals to such authority in his legal arguments. Further, where the Medinese and even 
the early Ḥanafīs sometimes let a contradiction between their doctrine and a Prophetic 
 adīth stand without attempting to justify the disparity, for al-Ṭaḥāwī any departure from 
Prophetic  adīths requires justification. All of his discussions of communal practice are 
concerned with explaining why certain Prophetic  adīths should or should not be put into 
action and with rooting that practice in Prophetic authority. We might therefore say that 
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al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of legal authority is not exclusively textual—though it is 
largely so—but that it is exclusively Prophetic and Qurʾānic. ʿAmal for al-Ṭaḥāwī 
preserves Prophetic material in an unadulterated but non-textual form. 
 With this observation in mind, we may return to the striking similarity mentioned 
above between the passages in which al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the abrogation of a  adīth is 
indicated by ʿamal and those in which he says that it is indicated by ij āʿ. The 
relationship between the two processes is further complicated by the fact that, in two 
passages arguing that consensus indicates that a  adīth was abrogated, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
explains that that consensus is known from practice.
649
 That is, practice indicates 
consensus, which in turn indicates abrogation. In other passages we have discussed, 
however, consensus is left out of this equation, and it is simply practice which indicates 
abrogation.  
In the context of determining the abrogation of a  adīth, then, ʿamal and 
consensus are not clearly distinguished in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought and appear 
interchangeable. Further, both consensus and ʿamal preserve Prophetic practice in non-
textual form, where Prophetic  adīth preserves that practice in textual form. Lowry has 
observed that, “among Shāfiʿī’s predecessors and colleagues, it would be fair to say that 
the dividing lines between the normative concepts of sunna (the general concept of 
tradition, sometimes stretching back to the Prophet), ij āʿ (what people think), and even 
ʿamal (what people do), remained hazy.”650 It is equally fair to say that, in the context of 
knowing whether  adīths have been abrogated, the dividing lines between ij āʿ and 
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ʿamal are still hazy for al-Ṭaḥāwī a century later. What has changed is that all three—
sunna, ij āʿ and ʿamal—are entirely Prophetic in origin.  
The equation of ij āʿ and ʿamal is restricted in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought to the single 
function of determining the status of  adīths. Consensus, however, is a much wider 
concept than ʿamal in his works, and, unlike ʿamal, is not always based on a memory of 
Prophetic practice. Instead, as we have seen above, consensus can be based upon raʾy, 
and therefore represent a variety of qiyās. That is, while ʿamal always takes its authority 
from an assumed instance of Prophetic instruction, ij āʿ can represent either side of the 
instruction/inference binary. What is always true of the consensus of the jurists, however, 
is that it cannot challenge Prophetic practice, but only ‘fill in the gaps’ where that 
practice is unknown or provide further information about the status of a particular  adīth. 
Such restrictions, however, do not appear to apply to the consensus of the Companions. 
 
Abrogation of Prophetic Ḥadīth by Companion Consensus 
  On the consensus of the Companions al-Ṭaḥāwī makes a number of highly 
idiosyncratic statements by the standards of the uṣūl tradition. In several passages in 
Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, he ascribes to the Companions the authority to abrogate by 
consensus what they know to have been the practice of the Prophet during his lifetime. 
The first passage in which al-Ṭaḥāwī makes this claim concerns a debate over how many 
times one should say ta bīr (‘God is great’) during a funeral prayer. Al-Ṭaḥāwī reports 
that, after the Prophet’s death, Muslims spoke four, five or seven ta bīrs, and each group 
claimed Prophetic authority for their practice. In response, the caliph ʿUmar consulted 
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with other Companions, and they reached consensus that the funeral prayer should be 
brought into alignment with the prayers for the major feasts, each of which contained 
four ta bīrs. Al-Ṭaḥāwī writes: 
ʿUmar thus restored the matter to four ta bīrs upon consultation ( ushāwara) 
with the Companions of God’s Messenger. They were present when His 
Messenger did what was reported by Ḥudhayfa [i.e., five ta bīrs] and Zayd ibn 
Arqam [i.e., four ta bīrs], but they held that what they did (faʿalū) was better than 
what they had previously known the law to be (ʿali ū). 
 
[Their action] is an abrogation of what they knew, because they are trustworthy 
( aʾ ūnūn) in what they do (faʿalū) just as they are trustworthy in what they 
transmit. This is like their consensus after [the death of] God’s Messenger on the 
scope (tawqīt) of the  add punishment for drinking wine, and on ending 
[permission for] the sale of slave women who bear children to their masters 
(u  ahāt al-awlād). Their consensus is a conclusive proof ( ujja), even if they 
did something different ( hilāfuhu) during the era of the Prophet. 
 
Their consensus on the number of ta bīrs at a funeral prayer after [the death of] 
God’s Messenger likewise is a conclusive proof ( ujja), even if they knew 
something different from him. What they did and reached consensus upon after 
God’s Messenger abrogates (nāsi h) what God’s Messenger did.651  
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī also adduces versions of this argument as evidence for the legal 
effectiveness of a triple statement of divorce and setting the  add punishment for 
drinking wine at eighty lashes.
652
 In each of these chapters, al-Ṭaḥāwī cites other 
instances of abrogation by Companion consensus, usually those listed above. In addition, 
he also mentions as examples two instances of abrogation by Companion consensus that 
are never discussed at length in Shar   aʿānī al-āthār: the withdrawal of permission to 
sell slave women who have borne children to their master
653
 and ʿUmar’s creation of the 
dīwān, the register establishing how income would be distributed to Muslims who 
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participated in the conquests.
654
 The fact that al-Ṭaḥāwī consistently cites additional 
examples of abrogation by Companion consensus suggests that he considered its actual 
occurrence to be self-evident as well as one of the best arguments for its permissibility.
655
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, a similar phenomenon occurs in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
discussions of the permissibility of the Qurʾān abrogating the Sunna and vice versa, 
where his argument consists largely of listing examples of its known occurrence.  
The authority granted to Companion consensus in these passages is much more 
powerful than the mere preservation of the knowledge of an earlier instance of 
abrogation.
656
 Where al-Jaṣṣāṣ demurs with his statement that “we do not say that 
consensus causes abrogation,”657 al-Ṭaḥāwī affirms clearly that “what [the Companions] 
did and reached consensus upon after God’s Messenger abrogates (nāsi h) what God’s 
Messenger did.”658 Their consensus is not a confirmation of an underlying Prophetic 
action, but rather privileges what the Companions do (faʿala) over what they know 
(ʿalima) from the Prophet. A comparison of the chapter on the funeral prayer cited above 
with the chapter on triple divorce can help us determine what al-Ṭaḥāwī means by his 
reference in the earlier chapter to what the Companions ‘do’ (faʿalū). He writes: 
ʿUmar addressed all the people, among them Companions of God’s Messenger 
who knew what had preceded during the time of God’s Messenger, and none of 
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them denied or refuted him. That is the greatest proof ( ujja) of the abrogation of 
what had preceded. 
 
Just as the collective transmissions
659
 of the Companions of God’s Messenger 
constitute legal proof, so their consensus upon an opinion (qawl) constitutes legal 
proof. And just as their consensus upon transmission (naql) is exempt from errors 
and lapses (barīʾ  in al-wahm wa-l-zalal), likewise their consensus upon a legal 
opinion (raʾy) is exempt from errors and lapses.  
 
We have seen matters that were a certain way (ʿalā  aʿānī) during the era of 
God’s Messenger, which his Companions made a different way (jaʿalū ʿalā  hilāf 
tilk al- aʿānī) after him. This is because they saw (raʾaw) in it that which was 
hidden from those who came after them, and it was an abrogating proof ( ujja 
nāsi ha) over what preceded it.660 
 
From this passage we learn that what al-Ṭaḥāwī means in the earlier passage by what the 
Companions ‘do’ is not related to any concept of the continuous practice of the 
Community (ʿamal). Indeed, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s choice to employ ‘faʿalū’ rather than ‘ʿa ilū’ 
appears deliberate, especially given how rhetorically elegant the contrast between 
‘ʿa ilū’ (what the Companions practice) and ‘ʿali ū’ (what the Companions know) 
would have been.  
Instead, the ‘doing’ referenced in the earlier passage on funeral prayers is here 
glossed as the activity of propounding legal opinions (qawl, raʾy) and reaching consensus 
upon them. Upon reaching that consensus, the legal thinking of the Companions is as 
exempt from error as is their transmission of Prophetic  adīth. The concept of the 
Companions’ legal reasoning also appears in the earlier passage, when the Companions 
reach consensus that the rule for the number of ta bīrs should be brought into alignment 
with the number of ta bīrs for the festival prayers. Analogy is the basis for the new rule. 
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In his discussions of abrogation by Companion consensus, then, al-Ṭaḥāwī subverts the 
instruction/inference binary that underlies his general conception of the structure of the 
law. Here, Companion inference is granted a higher authority than direct Prophetic 
instruction preserved in  adīth form.  
The chapter on triple divorce further explains why this type of abrogation is 
associated with the Companions: they saw what was hidden from those who came after 
them. The term used for ‘seeing’ (ra’aw) connotes both observation and the act of 
propounding a legal opinion, and it appears that both of those meanings are intended 
here. The Companions observed the Prophet as later Muslims would not, and as a result 
their legal opinions (raʾy) are superior to those of later Muslims. In this sense, al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the ability of Companion consensus to abrogate Prophetic 
practice is still connected, if tenuously, to the idea of Prophetic instruction. Here, 
preserving Prophetic practice can mean extrapolating from or even altering earlier 
rulings. The concept in this passage of what it means to preserve Prophetic practice is 
thus quite different from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s usual argument that the Companions preserve 
Prophetic practice by transmitting it mimetically, even if not in the form of Prophetic 
 adīth. This form of consensus is not merely the preservation of Prophetic practice, but 
has the authority to exceed and replace that practice. These passages thus preserve an 
older concept of religious and Prophetic authority, one that al-Ṭaḥāwī has largely moved 
away from in most of his arguments.  
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Abrogation by consensus was widely rejected by jurists of all major schools, 
although ʿĪsā ibn Abān and other unspecified Ḥanafīs are reported to have accepted it.661 
In al-Mu arrar al-Sarakhsī rejects abrogation by consensus but describes the arguments 
some Ḥanafīs make in favor of it. They consider that consensus leads to 
epistemologically certain knowledge (ʿil  yaqīn) like that contained in a text of 
revelation (naṣṣ), and therefore consensus may abrogate. They further argue that 
consensus is a stronger legal proof ( ujja) than al-khabar al- ashhūr.662 Since al-khabar 
al- ashhūr may abrogate, even more so can consensus abrogate.663 In al-Sarakhsī’s 
understanding, the Ḥanafī argument is based upon relative degrees of epistemological 
certainty. In contrast, none of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments for abrogation by consensus 
identify epistemological certainty as the basis for this doctrine. Nor have I been able to 
identify other references by earlier or later jurists to the special ability of the 
Companions’ consensus to abrogate Prophetic practice. 
Significantly, while al-Ṭaḥāwī describes all of the passages under discussion as 
examples of abrogation by the consensus of the Companions, he also intimates that they 
were all undertaken at the initiative of ʿUmar ibn Abī Khaṭṭāb, the second caliph. In the 
chapter on the funeral prayer, we learn in a  adīth that the disagreement over the number 
of ta bīrs weighed upon ʿUmar, and so he wrote to the Companions asking them to reach 
consensus upon the matter. Their initial response was to ask ʿUmar to decide for them. 
He responded that he is only a man (anā bashar  ithlu u ) and therefore wished to 
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consult together on the matter.
664
 The chapter on triple divorce similarly reports a speech 
given by ʿUmar during his caliphate (lit. the time of ʿUmar,  a ān ʿU ar) as the basis 
for the Companion consensus on the permissibility of a pronouncement of triple divorce, 
on the grounds that other Companions were present and did not refute him.
665
 In the 
chapter on the punishment for drinking wine, al-Ṭaḥāwī reports that when ʿUmar came to 
power (la  ā  āna ʿU ar), he consulted with the people in order to establish the 
punishment at eighty lashes.
666
 Despite the fact that al-Ṭaḥāwī only mentions in passing 
the end of the selling of u  ahāt al-awlād and the establishment of the dīwān, these 
events, too, are associated with ʿUmar.667 
A survey of premodern and modern sources suggests that many of these events 
are generally understood to have been undertaken on ʿUmar’s initiative and authority as a 
caliph. In the 740s, the Khārijite Abū Ḥamza listed the establishment of the dīwān and 
the punishment for drinking wine among ʿUmar’s major accomplishments.668 Modern 
scholars similarly credit to ʿUmar the establishment of the dīwān, the prohibition on 
selling u  ahāt al-awlād and the permission for a triple pronouncement of divorce.669 
We might therefore posit that abrogation by Companion consensus functions in Shar  
 aʿānī al-āthār, at least de facto, to legitimize the legislative role of ʿUmar, although al-
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Ṭaḥāwī never explicitly theorizes about ʿUmar’s special authority.670 By al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
time, caliphs were no longer seen to possess sufficient legislative authority to promulgate 
law independently, much less law in conflict with the Prophet’s practice. By portraying 
ʿUmar’s initiatives as functioning within the framework of Companion consensus, al-
Ṭaḥāwī transforms the problem from a historical memory of the independent legislative 
authority of an early caliph to the authority of the Companions in general.
671
  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of abrogation by Companion consensus as detailed in Shar  
 aʿānī al-athār effectively grants a higher authority to collective Companion legal 
reasoning than to Prophetic  adīths for the few questions on which he invokes this 
authority, even if the Companions’ authority is rooted in their observation of the Prophet. 
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 Ahmad Hasan has also recognized that “the personal opinions of the Companions, especially of ʿUmar, 
in many legal problems, were accepted later as Ij āʿ of the Companions” (‘Ij āʿ in the Early Schools,” 
122). The conclusion he draws from this, however, is that consensus “begins with the personal judgment of 
individuals and culminates in the universal acceptance of a certain opinion by the Community in the long 
run. Ij āʿ emerges by itself and is not imposed upon the Ummah” (“Ij āʿ in the Early Schools,” 122). 
Thus, rather than seeing reports of ʿUmar’s legislation as threatening Prophetic authority , he portrays them 
as evidence of the natural process of reaching consensus and refrains from mentioning any conflict between 
it and Prophetic practice.  
671
 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī accounts for the prohibition on  utʿa (temporary marriage), another piece of 
legislation sometimes attributed to ʿUmar, by claiming that the consensus of the Companions is an 
indicator (dalīl) of its abrogation, the same argument we saw above in connection with the consensus of the 
jurists and Community. While some sources identify a sermon from ʿUmar during his caliphate as the 
origin of the prohibition (Shahla Haeri, “Power of Ambiguity: Cultural Improvisations on the Theme of 
Temporary Marriage,” Iranian Studies 19, no. 2 (1986): 124; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al- abīr, aw, 
Mafātī  al-ghayb, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn and Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya), 
10.40-41), al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces Prophetic  adīths both permitting and prohibiting  utʿa, and then argues that 
the Prophetic  adīths themselves contain evidence that permission for  utʿa was abrogated (Maʿānī, 3.24-
27). Only after establishing the abrogation does al-Ṭaḥāwī cite reports stating that ʿUmar was the source of 
the prohibition. He says that the tacit assent of the Companions shows their consensus, and that their 
consensus is an indication of its abrogation (Maʿānī, 3.27). Nowhere does he address the tension between 
his argument that the abrogation was indicated in the Prophetic  adīths and the other reports stating that it 
was ʿUmar who prohibited  utʿa. We may assume that al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays Companion consensus as the 
indicator rather than the cause of abrogation in this case because he is relying on their consensus only as 
additional source of support for his basic argument, which is about Prophetic  adīths. For Schacht’s doubts 
concerning the authenticity of the tradition concerning ʿUmar’s prohibition of  utʿa, see Schacht, Origins 
of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 267.  
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In his later work of    ā  al-Qurʾān,672 however, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to have reversed 
his earlier position by affirming that it is “impossible that [the Muslims] would reach 
consensus in contradiction with what God’s Messenger did on a matter that was not later 
particularized (takhṣīṣ) or abrogated.”673 While it is possible that he intended to exclude 
Companion consensus from that declaration, in his final work, Shar  mushkil al-āthār, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī states that the Companions “would not reach consensus in contradiction with 
what God’s Messenger did unless they had confirmation that it had been abrogated and 
the matter had become as they asserted, because they are trustworthy in what they do, just 
as they are trustworthy in what they transmit.”674  
In this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī restricts the power of Companion consensus to merely 
affirming an earlier abrogation, in agreement with many other jurists. He has also 
effectively redefined what it means for the Companions to be “trustworthy in what they 
do” ( aʾ ūnūn ʿalā  ā faʿalū). Where in Shar   aʿānī al-āthār the same phrase was 
used to argue for the authority of collective Companion legal reasoning over Prophetic 
practice, here al-Ṭaḥāwī employs it to assert that the Companions could never knowingly 
depart from Prophetic practice. That is, he once again confirms the superior authority of 
Prophetic instruction to inference. Although, given our imperfect knowledge of the 
history of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works as texts, it is impossible to state with certainty that he did in 
fact intend to retract his earlier arguments about abrogation by Companion consensus, it 
is certainly plausible that he might find such a position uncomfortable in an atmosphere 
                                                 
672
 The order of composition of Shar   aʿānī al-āthār,    ā  al-Qurʾān and Shar  mushkil al-āthār is 
reported in the biographical tradition (e.g., Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ, al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya, 166) and confirmed by 
internal textual evidence. 
673
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 2.86. 
674
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 15.167.  
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which increasingly privileged Prophetic authority over all other forms of religious 
authority.  
Within the context of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought as a whole, the abrogation of Prophetic 
 adīths by Companion consensus is best understood as the extreme end of a spectrum for 
preserving Prophetic practice that ranges from the purely textual to the more ephemeral. 
At the other end of that spectrum lies Prophetic  adīth, in which an obviously Prophetic 
practice is preserved in a purportedly stable textual form. Next on that spectrum appear 
Companion and Successor  adīths, which al-Ṭaḥāwī understands in many cases to 
provide a textual record of Prophetic practice, albeit not in the Prophet’s voice. With the 
next group of sources, juristic consensus and the practice (ʿamal) of the jurists and the 
Community, we move away from textual sources, although al-Ṭaḥāwī still understands 
these sources to derive their authority from the fact that they mimetically preserve 
Prophetic practice without adding anything to it.  
Finally, abrogation by Companion consensus represents a non-textual source that 
only obliquely preserves Prophetic practice—while the authority of Companion 
consensus derives from the Companions’ observation of the Prophet, this form of 
consensus grants them the power to override Prophetic practice known through Prophetic 
 adīth. The uncomfortable fit of abrogation by Companion consensus within a scale that 
otherwise envisions a purely Prophetic, if not always textual, authority, suggests the 
reason for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s rejection of this form of consensus in his later two works. 
Although the passages in Shar   aʿānī al-āthār on abrogation by Companion consensus 
preserve an older concept of religious authority after the Prophet’s death, on the whole, 
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al-Ṭaḥāwī is firmly committed to an exclusively Prophetic authority, in what whatever 
form that authority might be preserved. 
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Chapter Four: Hermeneutics 
  
 Within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works, the seven-page introduction to    ā  al-
Qurʾān represents the only sustained, theory-driven discussion of how jurists may 
discover the meaning of the revealed texts of Qurʾān and Sunna in their work of 
determining the law. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī comments briefly on questions of hermeneutics 
whenever they arise in the course of analyzing discrete texts and legal issues, the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān is unique in suggesting how al-Ṭaḥāwī understands his 
most important hermeneutical principles to relate to each other. In the course of the 
introduction, al-Ṭaḥāwī establishes three key pairs of terms: mu  a : utashābih 
(unequivocal:equivocal), ẓāhir:bāṭin (apparent:non-apparent) and ʿā  : hāṣṣ 
(unrestricted:restricted). Without explicitly describing a hierarchy among these terms, the 
structure of the introduction suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of the latter two pairs of 
terms serves as a set of tools for reading  utashābih (equivocal) texts. By locating the 
Qurʾānic dichotomy of mu kam and  utashābih at the center of his theory of legal 
interpretation, al-Ṭaḥāwī implies that his hermeneutics is itself Qurʾānic and, therefore, 
authoritative.   
 In this chapter I take as my framework these three pairs of terms and analyze the 
role each plays within the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān. In addition, I look to the 
body chapters of    ā  al-Qurʾān as well as to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other hermeneutical works 
to determine more fully both how al-Ṭaḥāwī understands these concepts and the work 
they do within his legal arguments. In the remainder of the chapter, I turn to two 
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additional issues raised by these terms: first, hints of a formalist approach to language 
and law in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works and, second, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the role of 
ijtihād (legal reasoning) in determining the law.675  
Previous analyses of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutics have offered descriptions of his 
hermeneutical approach to specific legal questions or his intellectual relationship with 
other jurists.
676
 While these provide valuable insights into al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought, this 
chapter represents the first study to bring together al-Ṭaḥāwī’s most important 
hermeneutical principles into a coherent structure. As such, I do not attempt to catalog 
every hermeneutical procedure employed in the course of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works. Nor 
am I concerned here with how al-Ṭaḥāwī combines different hermeneutical techniques 
within his arguments. Instead, this chapter demonstrates how al-Ṭaḥāwī draws a direct 
                                                 
675
 The first topic, legal formalism, is raised in response to hints of a formalist understanding of ʿāmm and 
 hāṣṣ in some passages of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works; the second, ijtihād, is important as one of the means al-
Ṭaḥāwī suggests for approaching  utashābih texts. 
676
 Both Vishanoff and El Shamsy are concerned with the relationship between al-Ṭaḥāwī and al-Shāfiʿī. In 
his Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, Vishanoff observes briefly that al-Ṭaḥāwī “inclined toward the 
Shāfiʿī hermeneutic of ambiguity” and “employed al-Shāfiʿī’s distinction between general and particular 
texts” (214). El Shamsy, too, emphasizes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s “strikingly close intellectual relationship with 
Shāfiʿism” and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of many of al-Shāfiʿī’s hermeneutical terms and concepts (Canonization of 
Islamic Law, 205-207). I will have occasion to comment on both scholars’ analyses below. Najam Haider 
analyzes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of the qunūt prayer and the prohibition of intoxicants in al-Mukhtaṣar and 
Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, comparing al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical approach with that of earlier and later 
Ḥanafīs (The Origins of the Shīʿa: Identity, Ritual and Sacred Space in Eighth- entury Kūfa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 96-100, 142-145). Calder favorably compares al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion 
of the cancellation of wuḍūʾ in Shar  mushkil al-āthār to that of Ibn Qutayba in Taʾwīl  u htalif al- adīth 
and affirms that al-Ṭaḥāwī employs the hermeneutical concepts of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ in his arguments 
(Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, 228-233). He also accuses al-Ṭaḥāwī of “arbitrary and 
irresponsible manipulation of Prophetic and Companion dicta,” however, an accusation which Calder 
illustrates by analyzing al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of isnād criticism in his discussion of touching the penis (mass al-
dhakar) in Shar   aʿānī al-āthār (Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, 235-241). Schacht, too, portrays 
al-Ṭaḥāwī as unscrupulous in his acceptance or rejection of Prophetic  adīths in the course of his legal 
arguments, depending on whether they support established Ḥanafī law (Origins of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence, 30-31, 47-48). Sadeghi describes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical approach to a variety of 
questions related to women’s prayer in order to demonstrate how al-Ṭaḥāwī balanced his commitment to 
Prophetic  adīth with his commitment to established Ḥanafī law; he emphasizes the role the concepts of 
ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ played in reconciling these commitments (Logic of Law-Making, 108-112, 130-137). 
Wheeler is interested not in how al-Ṭaḥāwī interprets revelation, but in how his arguments construct Ḥanafī 
authority (Applying the Canon, 100-109). 
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connection between how God communicates with humans and the approach jurists must 
take to correctly interpret His message.  
 
Muḥkam and Mutashābih (Unequivocal and Equivocal Texts) 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī begins the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān by establishing the 
division of the Qurʾān into mu kam and  utashābih verses.677 In Shar  mushkil al-āthār, 
he expands the scope of application of these terms to encompass Prophetic  adīths as 
well.
678
 Although the mu kam: utashābih dichotomy appears far less frequently in his 
arguments than ʿāmm: hāṣṣ and ẓāhir:bāṭin, the other pairs of terms treated in the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān, its centrality to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the nature 
of God’s communication through revelation is suggested by its prominent placement here 
as well as further substantial discussion of the pair in two chapters of Shar  mushkil al-
āthār.679 
After a brief pious invocation, al-Ṭaḥāwī opens the introduction to    ā  al-
Qurʾān by adducing Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7:  
It is He who has sent down to you the Scripture, in which are the mu  a āt 
which are the matrix of the Scripture, whilst there are others that are 
 utashābihāt. As for those in whose hearts is deviation, they follow the 
 utashābihāt. Only God knows their interpretation, and those who are well-
grounded in knowledge.
680
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.59.  
678
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.221-2.  
679
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.219-221, 6.334-337. 
680
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.59. Al-Ṭaḥāwī initially only adduces the opening of the verse, but he references it 
in its entirety both later in the passage and in the chapters of Shar  mushkil al-āthār, and so I quote it here 
in full. (Translation adapted from Jones, trans., The Qurʾān (Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2007)).   
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Exegetes disputed the intent of mu  a āt and  utashābihāt in this verse.681 In his Jā iʿ 
al-bayān al-Ṭabarī identified five meanings exegetes assigned to the pair, including that 
the terms indicate the abrogating and abrogated verses; the legal verses and the verses 
which merely resemble one another; verses permitting only one interpretation and those 
permitting multiple interpretations; stories about earlier prophets and communities given 
in clear detail and those repeated across chapters without detail; and verses which can be 
understood by scholars and those which cannot.
682
 
 In the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition, the terms mu kam and  utashābih were 
severed from their Qurʾānic roots and made technical terms designating the clarity or 
obscurity of individual words within revealed texts. In particular, the Ḥanafīs employed 
them as the extreme ends of an eight-part scale in which mu kam represents absolutely 
clear discourse permitting neither interpretation nor abrogation, and  utashābih 
represents unintelligible discourse from which God’s intention cannot be determined.683 
                                                 
681
 On the range of exegetical discussions of Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7, see Sahiron Syamsuddin, “Mu kam and 
Mutashābih: An Analytical Study of al-Ṭabarī’s and al-Zamakhsharī’s Interpretations of Q3:7,” Qurʾānic 
Studies 1, no. 1 (1999): 63-79; Leah Kinberg, “Mu  a āt and Mutashābihāt (Koran 3/7): Implication of a 
Koranic Pair of Terms in Medieval Exegesis,” Arabica 35, no. 2 (1988): 143-172; Vishanoff, Formation of 
Islamic Hermeneutics, 17; Michel Lagarde, “De L’Ambiguïté ( uta ābih) dans le Coran,” Quaderni di 
Studi Arabi 3 (1985): 45-62. 
682
 Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī: Jā iʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl al-Qurʾān, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir 
(Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1969), 6.169-182. Al-Ṭabarī holds the last of these positions, that mu kam verses 
can be understood by scholars, while  utashābih verses may not. In addition to the positions catalogued by 
al-Ṭabarī, al-Māturīdī (d. 333/934) preserves the following views: 1) that the mu  a āt are Q 6/al-
Anʿām:151-153 and Q 17/al-Isrāʾ:23 onwards, while the rest of the Qurʾān is  utashābih; 2) that the 
mu  a āt are understood by everyone, while the  utashābihāt require study and inquiry; 3) that the 
mu  a āt are verses whose intention may be understood while the  utashābihāt are a test of faith; 4) that 
the mu  a āt are verses [whose meaning] is apparent to all Muslims, such that they do not disagree 
concerning them, while the  utashābihāt  cause doubt and disagreement because of differences in language 
or because of a conflict between the apparent and inner meaning; and 5) that the mu  a āt are verses that 
may be understood by the intellect while the  utashābihāt require revelation to be understood (al-Māturīdī, 
Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓī , al- usa  ā Taʾwīlāt ahl al-Sunna, ed. Fāṭima Yūsuf al-Khaymī (Beirut: 
Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2004), 1.246-248).  
683
 The eight-part scale designates language as mu kam (unequivocal), mufassar (explained), naṣṣ 
(explicit), ẓāhir (apparent),  hafī (hidden), mushkil (problematic), mujmal (concise) and  utashābih 
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This recontextualization of mu kam: utashābih appears already in al-Sarakhsī’s 
Mu arrar, in which the full eight-part scale is described in a chapter on “Terms for the 
Forms of Divine Address” (as āʾ ṣīghat al-khiṭāb). Although al-Sarakhsī refers briefly to 
phrases from Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 within his discussion, his arguments are primarily 
etymological and hermeneutical rather than exegetical.
684
  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not know mu kam and  utashābih as part of a formal scale for 
describing the clarity of terms, but neither does he conform to any of the exegetical 
explanations of Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 offered by al-Ṭabarī or al-Māturīdī. In both the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān and the two chapters of Shar  mushkil al-āthār, al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s approach is initially exegetical, adducing Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 or a related Prophetic 
 adīth before glossing the obscure terms mu kam and  utashābih.685 However, in all 
three cases he then makes his exegesis the foundation for a theory of hermeneutics that 
draws a direct connection between the role of jurists, their methodology, and God’s use 
of language in revelation.
686
  
After citing Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 in the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
continues: 
God informed us by means of [this verse] that in His Scripture there are 
unequivocal (mu kam) verses, which He has made secure in terms of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
(unintelligible). The Shāfiʿīs employed a similar scale consisting of only four divisions: ẓāhir, naṣṣ, mujmal 
and  utashābih.  See Sukrija Husejn Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law (Cambridge: 
Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 65-138; Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 53-56; Nyazee, Islamic 
Jurisprudence, 299-300; Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 122-140. 
684
 Al-Sarakhsī, al-Mu arrar, 1.123-4, 126-7.  
685
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.59; Mushkil, 2.219-221, 6.334-337. Although most chapters of Shar  mushkil al-
āthār resolve apparent conflicts between Prophetic  adīths or between the Qurʾān and  adīths, some 
chapters, including the two under discussion here, offer an exegesis of obscure or potentially problematic 
(mushkil) revealed texts.  
686
 I have not identified any jurists preceding al-Ṭaḥāwī who incorporated mu kam and  utashābih into a 
theory of hermeneutics, rather than treating it as an exegetical matter.  
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interpretation (taʾwīl) and the reason ( ikma) for their revelation. These are the 
foundation of the Scripture. [He also informed us] that there are equivocal 
( utashābih) verses, and he criticized those who seek them out, saying “As for 
those in whose hearts is deviation, they follow the equivocal verses.”  
 
[The reason for His criticism] is that the valuation ( ukm) of the equivocal verses 
must be sought from the unequivocal verses which God made the foundation of 
His Scripture, and then from the rules which he promulgated through the speech 
of His Messenger in order to illustrate what He revealed in an equivocal manner 
in His Scripture.
687
 
 
The crucial features of the mu kam: utashābih dichotomy as presented in    ā  al-
Qurʾān are thus that the interpretation of mu kam verses is certain and the reason for 
their revelation—that is, God’s intent in revealing them—is known. In contrast, the 
valuation of  utashābih verses must be sought first in mu kam verses of the Qurʾān and 
then from Prophetic  adīth. Interpretations of  utashābih verses that do not rest on these 
two foundations are baseless and therefore blameworthy. The role of jurists is thus to 
determine the valuation of  utashābih verses using the methodology outlined in this 
passage.
688
 
 Two chapters of Shar  mushkil al-āthār add further details concerning al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of mu kam and  utashābih. As noted above, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues in one 
that the dichotomy can be applied not only to Qurʾānic verses, but also to Prophetic 
 adīths. After listing examples of both unequivocal and equivocal verses of the Qurʾān, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī writes: 
Among [the prescriptions of religious law that God has imposed] are those that 
were promulgated through the speech of the Prophet for this purpose. He made 
                                                 
687
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.59.  
688
 See also Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna,” pp. 67-71, where I argue against El Shamsy’s claim that al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion in this passage aligns with al-Shāfiʿī’s notion of the bayān. 
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some of what was conveyed through his speech mu kam and laid bare in meaning 
( a shūf al- aʿnā).689 
 
He lists examples of rules established through unequivocal Prophetic  adīths, including 
the five prayers of the day and night and the manner in which travelers shorten them. In 
contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces quotations from  adīths, rather than the rules derived from 
those  adīths, when giving examples of equivocal Prophetic speech, presumably because 
the rules are disputed. He concludes the discussion by noting that scholars must seek the 
true meaning ( aqāʾiq) of equivocal Prophetic  adīths, and that all equivocal texts, 
whether found in Qurʾān or Sunna, belong to a single category (jins), while all 
unequivocal texts belong to a separate category.
690
  
Apart from the discussion in this chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī never classifies a Prophetic 
 adīth as equivocal or unequivocal in any of his extant works. Nonetheless, this passage 
is significant for two reasons. First, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s application of the mu kam: utashābih 
dichotomy to Prophetic  adīths appears to be highly unusual among exegetical 
discussions of Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7. While later theorists would employ the pair as abstract 
technical terms designating the clarity of revealed language in both the Qurʾān and 
Sunna, I have not been able to identify other exegetical discussions of Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 
that explicitly expand the scope of mu kam and  utashābih to encompass non-Qurʾānic 
revelation. We might tentatively suggest that al-Ṭaḥāwī represents a transitional stage 
between exegetical discussions focused on identifying the meaning of obscure words 
                                                 
689
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.221.  
690
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.221-222.  
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within the Qurʾān and a later effort to apply consistent analytical categories to language 
in all revealed texts.
691
 
 The second reason for the significance of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s application of mu kam and 
 utashābih to Prophetic  adīths is related to his overall hermeneutical project. While al-
Ṭaḥāwī does not have a system of technical terms for assessing the clarity of revealed 
texts, his discussion of mu kam and  utashābih, and in particular his extension of the 
terms mu kam and  utashābih to Prophetic  adīth, reveals that his goals in the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān and the chapters of Shar  mushkil al-āthār extend 
beyond the exegetical. Instead, he argues in these passages that revelation is 
fundamentally divided into two categories—the unequivocal and the equivocal—and that 
the mission and methodology of jurists rests upon this division. That is, Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 
serves as the point of departure for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of the structure of revelation. 
 Shar  mushkil al-āthār clarifies how al-Ṭaḥāwī understands the relationship 
between the role of jurists and the division of revelation into the equivocal and the 
unequivocal. In one chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī begins by citing Prophetic  adīths concerning the 
occasion of revelation for Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7. He then writes: 
God informed us that in His Scripture there are verses that are unequivocal in 
their interpretation (taʾwīl). They are the verses whose interpretation is agreed 
upon and whose intention is intelligible ( aʿqūl). [He also informed us that] there 
are equivocal ( utashābih) verses whose interpretation is sought from the 
                                                 
691
 Further evidence suggesting this transitional stage is found in the Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā al-bidʿa of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s contemporary Abū Muṭīʿ al-Nasafī (d. 318/930). In the course of criticizing a group of extreme 
traditionists whom he calls the  ashwīya, al-Nasafī asserts that the Muslim community holds that  adīths 
may be either mu kam or  utashābih (Marie Bernand, “Le Kitāb al-radd ʿalā l-bidʿa d’Abū Muṭīʿ Makḥūl 
al-Nasafī,” Annales Islamologiques 16 (1980): 121). Although the context is not exegetical, al-Nasafī, like 
al-Ṭaḥāwī, applies the terms mu kam and  utashābih to  adīths themselves rather than to revealed 
language.  
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unequivocal verses, which are the matrix of the Scripture. [The equivocal verses] 
are those whose interpretation is disputed.
692
 
 
This passage is significant because it draws a direct line between the occurrence of 
scholarly agreement or disagreement and the degree to which God has made His intent 
manifest in a particular revealed text: unequivocal verses are those “whose interpretation 
is agreed upon and whose intention is intelligible,” while equivocal verses are those 
“whose intention is disputed.” In other words, scholarly disagreement is the result of 
God’s rhetorical choices. This point is confirmed in another chapter of Shar  mushkil al-
āthār, in which al-Ṭaḥāwī writes that “the unequivocal verses are those in which God 
revealed His meaning ( aʿnā) to them… and the equivocal verses are those in which he 
did not reveal His intent ( urād) to them.”693 
 For al-Ṭaḥāwī, then, mu kam and  utashābih designate the degree to which God 
as a speaker fully expresses His intent in a discrete text such that that intent can be 
understood without reference to other revealed texts. This claim bears some similarity to 
one of the exegetical explanations of mu kam and  utashābih cited from al-Ṭabarī 
above: namely, that mu kam verses permit only one interpretation while  utashābih 
verses permit multiple interpretations.
694
 Proponents of this explanation include Abū 
Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935), al-Karkhī (d. 340/952) and al-Jaṣṣāṣ 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 6.337.  
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.221.  
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of mu kam and  utashābih also bears some similarity to al-Ṭabarī’s own 
position: that mu kam verses can be understood by scholars while  utashābih verses cannot. However, al-
Ṭabarī classifies as mu kam both verses whose intent is immediately understood and those which can be 
understood through recourse to other texts. The category of  utashābih is limited to texts which cannot be 
understood at all.   
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(d. 370/982).
695
 Both al-Ṭaḥāwī and the proponents of this explanation understand 
mu kam and  utashābih to be related to clarity and ambiguity; however, while al-
Ṭaḥāwī views ambiguity as a result of the speaker’s rhetorical choices in expressing his 
intent, the scholars cited above view ambiguity as a purely lexical matter. In    ā  al-
Qurʾān, al-Jaṣṣāṣ defines mu kam as “an expression containing no homonymy,” while a 
 utashābih verse may be interpreted in multiple ways.696 In al-Fuṣūl, al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s 
examples of  utashābih verses are limited to cases in which ambiguity concerning the 
voweling of a verse leads to uncertainty over its meaning.
697
  
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s examples of  utashābih texts do not concern homonymy. 
Instead, they address cases in which God did not provide sufficient detail in a statement 
for scholars to adequately understand His intent without reference to other sources. His 
examples of equivocal verses include Q 5/al-Māʾida:38 (“The thief, male and female: cut 
off their hands”), Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:23 (“[It is also forbidden] that you should have two sisters 
together, except for cases that have happened in the past”) and Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:24 (“[Also 
forbidden] are married women, except what your right hand possesses”).698 Although he 
does not explicitly state here or in other examples what makes these verses equivocal, 
these verses he cites all lack specific, detailed information that would permit the hearer to 
understand or act upon the verse without further instruction.
699
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 Vishanoff, Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 17; al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 1.205-208; al-Jaṣṣāṣ,    ā  al-
Qurʾān, 2.280.  
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 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ,    ā  al-Qurʾān, 2.280.  
697
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 1.205-207.  
698
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.221.  
699
 Notably, the equivocality of Q 5/al-Māʾida:38 (“The thief, male and female: cut off their hands”) is 
apparent only in hindsight, with knowledge of later  adīths that constrained the meaning of ‘thief’ and 
‘hand’ in this verse. That al-Ṭaḥāwī gives this verse as an example of a mutashābih text affirms that, for 
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While al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from other exegetes in his emphasis on God’s intent in 
his definition of mu kam and  utashābih, his assertion that the meaning of equivocal 
verses must be sought from unequivocal verses was shared by a number of later jurists, 
including al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Zamakhsharī, al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Kathīr and others.700 Kinberg portrays 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ as a very early advocate of this procedure and notes that its other known 
proponents lived considerably later.
701
 Although there is no evidence to suggest either 
that al-Jaṣṣāṣ took this concept from al-Ṭaḥāwī or that al-Ṭaḥāwī was the first to make 
this claim, we may at least conclude that the argument was known a half century before 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ. 
 The conflict between some scholars’ definition of  utashābih as “unintelligible” 
and others’ claim that the meaning of  utashābih verses may be understood from 
mu kam verses rests on a disagreement about the best reading of an ambiguous section of 
Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7. Depending on whether one reads a particular “wa” (and) as introducing 
a second subject to the previous sentence or beginning a new sentence, the verse can be 
understood either to mean that only God knows the interpretation of the  utashābih 
verses, or that only God and the scholars know their interpretation.
702
 The second reading 
makes a powerful claim for the authority of scholars to interpret the texts of revelation, 
                                                                                                                                                 
him, equivocality is a question of whether the speaker fully conveyed his intent and not whether a hearer 
could construe the statement as meaningful. 
700
 Syamsuddin, “Mu kam and Mutashābih,” 69-70; Lagarde, “De l'Ambiguïté (muta ābih) dans le Coran,” 
52.  
701
 Kinberg, “Mu  a āt and Mutashābihāt,” 161-162.  
702
 The Arabic reads, “ ā yaʿla u taʾwīlahu illā  llāh wa-l-rāsi hūn fī al-ʿil  yaqūluna a annā bihi.” It 
may be translated in two ways: 1) “No one knows its interpretation but God. Those who are firm in 
knowledge say, “We believe in it”; or 2) “No one knows its interpretation but God and those firm in 
knowledge. They say, “We believe in it.”  
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although neither al-Ṭaḥāwī nor al-Jaṣṣāṣ claimed that scholars would be able to interpret 
every equivocal verse.  
Where al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s discussion is in his explicit linking of 
the discovery of the meaning of equivocal texts from unequivocal texts to the process of 
ijtihād (legal interpretation). In one of the chapters of Shar  mushkil al-āthār discussed 
above, al-Ṭaḥāwī is asked by an interlocutor if the existence of equivocal texts means that 
we cannot make judgments concerning those matters. Al-Ṭaḥāwī replies that we can, and 
that the proper way to do so is through ijtihād al-raʾy (legal reasoning), a process which 
may or may not lead to an objectively correct answer, but which is always praiseworthy 
when undertaken in the right way.
703
 The division of revelation into mu kam and 
 utashābih thus divides God’s speech into the interpretable and that which is not in need 
of interpretation, and links this division to the juristic process of ijtihād.  
 
Mu  a  and Mutashābih in al-Ṭa āwī’s Her eneutical  rgu ents 
Given the importance of the mu kam: utashābih dichotomy in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
understanding of the nature of God’s revelation and the role of jurists in interpreting it, it 
is notable how rarely he appeals to these concepts in his hermeneutical arguments. Their 
application is most noteworthy in the opening paragraph of a number of chapters of 
   ā  al-Qurʾān. In one, he adduces a section of Q 5/al-Māʾida:6 (“wipe your faces and 
your hands with it (minhu)”). He then states that “wipe your faces” is unequivocal and 
self-explanatory (qāʾi  bi-nafsihi); however, the phrase “and your hands with it” is 
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equivocal and its intent is debated.
704
 Here and in similar passages,
705
 al-Ṭaḥāwī 
identifies different sections in a given verse as equivocal or unequivocal. More 
importantly, he explicitly connects the phenomenon of juristic disagreement to equivocal 
verses, confirming the relationship between mu kam and  utashābih and the role of 
jurists outlined above.  
Perhaps the paucity of appeals to the mu kam: utashābih dichotomy in al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical arguments is best explained by the observation that, in general, 
mu kam and  utashābih do not constitute an interpretive technique for al-Ṭaḥāwī, but 
instead provide the conceptual framework for the fundamental division that underlies 
multiple layers of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought, that is, the division between that which 
jurists may interpret and that for which God has already adequately conveyed His intent. 
In previous chapters, we have seen this dichotomy in the form of tawqīf and raʾy, ideas 
very closely aligned to mu kam and  utashābih. I will return to the relationship between 
mu  a : utashābih and tawqīf:raʾy in the final section of this chapter. 
 
Ẓāhir and Bāṭin (Apparent and Non-Apparent Meaning) 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes his discussion of mu kam and  utashābih in the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān with a lengthy, four-page justification for his argument 
that the Sunna has the authority to explain the  utashābih verses of the Qurʾān. He points 
to the observed occurrence of abrogation between the Qurʾān and Sunna as evidence that 
the Qurʾān and Sunna are of the same type (shakl)—that is, they are ontologically 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.103.  
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 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.102, 1.118.  
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equivalent.
706
 This argument, in turn, provides the justification for his claim that jurists 
may seek the meaning of equivocal Qurʾānic verses in the Sunna.707 Although the 
authority of the Sunna and the occurrence of abrogation between the Qurʾān and Sunna 
are crucial concepts within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutics, he does not introduce them as 
independent topics here, but only as evidence for his other claims. In analyzing the 
structure of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān, we should therefore consider 
this lengthy passage on abrogation and the authority of the Sunna to form part of his 
discussion of mu kam and  utashābih.708  
 After concluding his comments on abrogation, al-Ṭaḥāwī returns to the major 
work of the introduction of    ā  al-Qurʾān, which is to introduce a set of 
hermeneutical principles for jurists based on his theory of divine-human communication. 
The next pair of technical terms he addresses is ẓāhir:bāṭin, in most cases best translated 
in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works as apparent and non-apparent meaning.709 Although he does not say 
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 I analyze this passage as well as other evidence for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the Qurʾān and Sunna 
as ontologically equivalent  in Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna,” pp. 73-85. 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.59-64. 
708
 It is evident that al-Ṭaḥāwī did not intend to introduce abrogation as an independent hermeneutical 
technique equivalent to his discussions of mu kam: utashābih, ẓāhir:bāṭin or ʿāmm: hāṣṣ from the fact 
that he provides no prescription for jurists concerning its use. While al-Ṭaḥāwī frames the other 
hermeneutical topics in the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān as guidelines for jurists, the passage on 
abrogation is focused exclusively on demonstrating that Islamic law as it stands cannot be explained 
without accepting that abrogation between Qurʾān and Sunna has actually occurred on many occasions, 
something which can only happen if the Qurʾān and Sunna are ontologically equivalent. That al-Ṭaḥāwī 
does not treat abrogation on par with mu kam: utashābih, ẓāhir:bāṭin and ʿāmm: hāṣṣ within the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān can be explained by the fact that his goal in discussing these three pairs of 
terms is to introduce the model of divine-human communication that is the subject of this chapter, and the 
technique of abrogation does not form part of that model. 
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 For an overview of how scholars studying Islamic law have translated ẓāhir, see Robert Gleave, Islam 
and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2012), 55-60. I have selected ‘apparent’ and ‘non-apparent’ to capture al-Ṭaḥāwī’s usage 
of ẓāhir and bāṭin for two reasons. First, the terms capture al-Ṭaḥāwī’s orientation toward the perspective 
of the addressee in his discussions of ẓāhir and bāṭin; meanings are ẓāhir from the perspective of an 
individual, as we shall see below. Second, although there are cases in which al-Ṭaḥāwī considers the bāṭin 
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so explicitly, al-Ṭaḥāwī must understand the diversion from ẓāhir to bāṭin meaning as a 
feature of  utashābih texts, because mu kam texts reveal their intent immediately and 
unequivocally. The final section of the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān likewise treats a 
topic that must fall under the category of  utashābih texts: unrestricted and restricted 
meanings of texts (al-ʿāmm wa-l- hāṣṣ). We can therefore describe the overall structure 
of the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān as establishing first the dichotomy between 
revelation in which God has clearly revealed His intent and that in which He has not and, 
second, stating two principles for jurists to observe when determining the meaning of 
texts in which God has not revealed His intent. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s overall purpose in the 
introduction, therefore, is not primarily to describe the structure of revelation, but instead 
to provide a set of instructions for jurists based on what we know about the nature of 
God’s communication with us. 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī opens his discussion of ẓāhir and bāṭin by affirming that the true 
meaning of texts may not be in alignment with their apparent meaning, while establishing 
jurists’ duty nonetheless to act upon the apparent meaning of revelation: 
Within the Qurʾān is that which may be expressed such that its apparent meaning 
differs from its true meaning ( ā qad ya hruj ʿalā al- aʿnā allādhī ya ūn 
ẓāhiran li- aʿnā, wa-ya ūn bāṭinuhu  aʿnā ā har). Our duty is to employ its 
apparent meaning, even if the true meaning could be something else, because we 
were addressed in order to receive clarification ( hūṭibnā li-yubayyan lanā), and 
we were not addressed for any other purpose.
710
  
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s first argument for the primacy of the apparent meaning rests on his 
understanding of the nature of God’s revelation: God addresses us in order to provide 
                                                                                                                                                 
meaning the true or objectively correct meaning, more often he is critical of those who seek a bāṭin 
meaning for texts.  
710
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.64. In this particular passage ‘true meaning’ seems more apposite than ‘non-
apparent meaning.’ 
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clarity (bayān).711 While acknowledging that the true meaning of a text is not always the 
apparent meaning, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that it is in God’s nature to clarify His intent through 
revelation, and therefore jurists should act upon the assumption that apparent meaning is 
the true meaning. The hermeneutical principle of the primacy of the apparent meaning 
thus amounts to an optimism about God’s likeliness to express His intent 
straightforwardly.
712
  
 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s second and lengthier argument concerns not the nature of 
revelation, but the evidence of the precedent of the Companions. He writes: 
[The apparent meaning takes precedence] even if some scholars have opposed us 
in this and held that the apparent meaning does not take precedence over the non-
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 El Shamsy views this passage as evidence that “the way in which al-Ṭaḥāwī conceptualizes revelation as 
a whole closely parallels al-Shāfiʿī’s understanding of revelation as a communicative act taking place 
through the medium of human language” (Canonization of Islamic Law, 206).  My reading of the 
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language the Qurʾān was revealed” (I have taken this translation from Lowry, trans., The Epistle on Legal 
Theory, 15). Al-Shāfiʿī is not describing God’s purpose in revelation, but rather establishing the addressees 
of God’s legislative statements. Although El Shamsy is undoubtedly correct in emphasizing the close 
relationship between the thought of al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī, his eagerness to demonstrate direct borrowing 
has led him to disregard important differences in how and why the two jurists employ language and 
concepts that may initially seem quite similar. Because of the differences in how the two jurists employ 
similar concepts, as well as the absence of evidence for any direct textual borrowing, I am by no means 
convinced, as El Shamsy appears to be, that al-Ṭaḥāwī knew the text of the Risāla, although he clearly had 
great familiarity with al-Shāfiʿī’s thought.  
712
 Despite al-Ṭaḥāwī’s insistence that the nature of revelation is to clarify, al-Ṭaḥāwī never explains why 
all Qurʾānic verses should not be mu kam; that is, why God did not choose to reveal His intent 
immediately, relieving the need for jurists’ interpretations.  
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apparent meaning. We have reached our opinion on this matter because of 
evidence we observed indicating that and obligating its use.
713
 
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī cites the example of the revelation of Q 2/al-Baqara:187 (“Eat and drink until 
the white thread is distinct to you from the black thread at dawn”). Upon receiving this 
revelation, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, a number of Companions began to examine white and black 
threads to determine when to resume the Ramadan fast each morning. When the Prophet 
heard of their actions, he clarified that the white and black threads refer to the darkness of 
night and the lightness of day. However, al-Ṭaḥāwī emphasizes, Muḥammad did not 
scold them for acting upon the apparent meaning. 
[The Companions’] acting upon [the apparent meaning] before receiving 
instruction (tawqīf) from God’s Messenger about [the verse’s] intent is an 
indication that [Muslims] are to act upon the Qurʾān according to its apparent 
meaning. [This is so] even if they have not been apprised of its true interpretation 
in the way that they have been apprised of the mere text. The affirmation [of their 
actions] entails the affirmation of acting upon the apparent meaning, and that it 
takes precedence over interpreting verses for their non-apparent meaning.
714
  
 
Here al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays the Companions as the models upon whose actions jurists should 
base their hermeneutical principles. He further establishes that jurists may act upon the 
apparent meaning of a revealed text in the absence of instruction from the Prophet 
(tawqīf).715 Although he does not say so in the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān, it is also 
tawqīf that is required in most cases in order to divert from the apparent meaning to the 
true meaning of a text. It is notable that in this example al-Ṭaḥāwī holds up the 
Companions as a model for emulation in a case in which their privileging of the ẓāhir 
meaning led them to an objectively incorrect understanding, albeit one promptly 
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 For another example of the role of tawqīf in signaling that the apparent meaning is not the intended 
meaning, see    ā , 1.106.  
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corrected by the Prophet. What al-Ṭaḥāwī offers in the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān 
is not a complete set of instructions to jurists on how to derive a correct understanding of 
the law from its sources, but rather an argument for how jurists should approach revealed 
texts given certain facts about God’s habits in communicating with humans. 
 That al-Ṭaḥāwī is more interested in the assumptions jurists should make about 
God’s speech than in guaranteeing correct answers is confirmed by his final argument for 
the primacy of the apparent meaning. Here again, al-Ṭaḥāwī looks to the example of the 
Companions, this time examining their responses to the revelation of the prohibition on 
wine (khamr). In contrast to the earlier example in which the ẓāhir meaning of the text 
was self-evident, here the Companions disagree on what the apparent meaning of the 
prohibition on wine might be. Al-Ṭaḥāwī identifies five different understandings of the 
prohibition among the Companions and reports that each faction acted upon their 
understanding by destroying the kinds of wine that they held to be included within the 
scope of the prohibition. Al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that: 
This indicates that they acted upon the verse according to their immediate 
understanding of its intent (ʿalā  ā waqaʿa fī qulūbihi  annahu  urāduhu), 
based on what was apparent to them concerning its ruling (ʿalā  ā ẓahara lahum 
min  u  ihā). [It indicates] that they were not obligated to do anything more. 
Later, the Prophet did not scold them or say to them, “you should not have rushed 
to destroy your property until you knew what God had prohibited with no 
possibility of incorrect knowledge.”716  
  
In this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī claims support for the primacy of the ẓāhir both from the fact 
of the Companions’ having acted upon what they held to be the apparent meaning and 
                                                 
716
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.64-65.  
226 
 
 
from the Prophet’s tacit acceptance of their actions.717 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī’s optimism 
concerning God’s likeliness to express His intent would seem to conflict with the panoply 
of apparent meanings that Companions identified for the prohibition on wine, this tension 
remains unacknowledged.  
 
Ẓāhir and Bāṭin in al-Ṭa āwī’s Her eneutical  rgu ents 
 We saw above that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of ẓāhir and bāṭin in the introduction 
to    ā  al-Qurʾān focuses exclusively on jurists’ duty to privilege the apparent 
meaning of revealed texts while avoiding any consideration of the circumstances 
warranting a departure to a non-apparent meaning. Within the body of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
hermeneutical works, the claim that jurists may not depart from the ẓāhir to the bāṭin 
without evidence ( ujja, dalīl, tawqīf) allows al-Ṭaḥāwī to portray his interlocutors’ 
interpretation of revealed texts as straying from a foundational hermeneutical principle.
718
 
For example, in a chapter on whether neighbors receive the right of preemption (shufʿa) 
when a house is being sold, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s interlocutors suggest that the word “neighbor” 
(jār) actually means “partner” in Prophetic  adīths apparently permitting shufʿa for 
neighbors. Al-Ṭaḥāwī retorts: 
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You claim that reports should be interpreted according to their apparent meaning, 
so how have you abandoned the apparent meaning, which is supported by 
evidence, and clung to something else with no evidence to support it?
719
  
 
In other cases, the mere claim that a certain rule is supported by the apparent meaning of 
a Qurʾānic verse or Prophetic  adīth serves as sufficient evidence for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
position.
720
  
 Frequently al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that evidence does exist to depart from the apparent 
meaning in cases where the ẓāhir of a revealed text is in conflict with another revealed 
text or a position to which al-Ṭaḥāwī is committed. For example, although some versions 
of a Prophetic  adīth apparently indicate that it is permissible to free a slave on 
someone’s behalf as expiation ( affāra), al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Qurʾānic verses clarify 
that individuals must undertake their own  affāra.721 Although other revealed texts often 
serve as al-Ṭaḥāwī’s evidence for a non-apparent reading, he also claims support for non-
ẓāhir readings on the basis of consensus, the opinion of a Companion or the flexibility of 
the Arabic language.
722
 
 In his argument that jurists should rely on the apparent meaning of texts in the 
absence of evidence indicating otherwise, al-Ṭaḥāwī is in agreement both with earlier 
jurists of the formative period and with the mature uṣūl tradition, including the Ḥanafī 
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school.
723
 Although several passages in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, including the introduction to 
   ā  al-Qurʾān, suggest the existence of jurists who did not privilege the ẓāhir, theirs 
was never a widely-held position.
724
 Within the mature Ḥanafī tradition, the term ẓāhir 
would also take on an additional meaning as part of the eight-part scale designating the 
clarity and ambiguity of terms, already discussed above.
725
 Of the four terms indicating 
degrees of clarity, ẓāhir represents the weakest claim: a ẓāhir term has a meaning that is 
immediately grasped by the hearer, but is nonetheless subject to diversion from that 
meaning if other evidence so indicates.
726
  
While this definition bears an obvious similarity to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claim that jurists 
must not depart from the ẓāhir without evidence, later legal theorists understand ẓāhir as 
a quality of clarity present in some, but not all, words. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī frames ẓāhir 
as part of an interpretive practice—jurists should choose to privilege the ẓāhir meaning of 
a text because of what we know about the nature of God’s communication with humans 
and because of the example of the Companions. For al-Ṭaḥāwī, all revealed texts can be 
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read according to their ẓāhir, although not every text has a bāṭin. In his understanding of 
ẓāhir and bāṭin, al-Ṭaḥāwī shows no hints of moving toward later uṣūl theories, unlike 
some other areas of his hermeneutics addressed in this chapter.  
 
ʿĀmm and Khāṣṣ (Unrestricted and Restricted Meaning) 
 In the final and shortest section of the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān, al-
Ṭaḥāwī argues for the obligation to interpret Qurʾānic verses according to their broadest 
meaning ( a luhā ʿalā ʿu ū ihā) and establishes the opposition between unrestricted 
(ʿāmm) and restricted ( hāṣṣ) readings of texts. In mature legal theory, ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ 
would be understood as properties inhering in words by virtue of their linguistic form. 
For instance, nouns prefaced by the definite article were held to be ʿāmm, that is, to 
designate all members of their class in the absence of other evidence restricting their 
application.
727
 This linguistic understanding of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ is found already in al-
Jaṣṣāṣ’s Fuṣūl, which dedicates nearly one hundred pages to detailing the linguistic forms 
of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ, establishing the types of contextual evidence that may cause an 
apparently ʿāmm term to have a  hāṣṣ meaning, and exploring various epistemological 
and theological questions related to reliance on ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ in formulating the law.728  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not share later theorists’ understanding of the terms ʿāmm and 
 hāṣṣ as linguistic features of words, however. Nor does his usage of the terms ʿāmm and 
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 hāṣṣ resemble that of Abū Ḥanīfa and other early Ḥanafīs, who employed the term to 
designate the closeness of the match between a word and its intended referent.
729
 Instead, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ most closely resembles that of al-Shāfiʿī and his 
student al-Muzanī. For them, all legal texts are originally unrestricted, and some are then 
shown to be restricted by virtue of another text indicating that the original, unrestricted 
meaning is not the intended one.
730
 Vishanoff has noted the similarity between al-
Shāfiʿī’s and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ, arguing that al-Ṭaḥāwī “employed al-
Shāfiʿī’s distinction between general and particular texts.”731 
 While al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī both understand ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ as terms 
designating how legal sources act upon each other, however, the concepts do subtly 
different work in al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla and in the introduction to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s    ā  al-
Qurʾān. In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī writes that it is “in the nature of God’s language that it 
can be used to address people in a way that seems unrestricted with a readily apparent 
meaning that is in fact intended as unrestricted and in its apparent sense.”732 He goes on 
to list three more varieties of divine speech: language that seems unrestricted but 
combines restricted and unrestricted elements; language that seems unrestricted but is 
actually intended as restricted; and language whose actual meaning is shown by context 
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to be completely different from its apparent meaning. Al-Shāfiʿī’s argument that all legal 
texts initially appear unrestricted is thus a linguistic claim based on the observable 
features of “the nature of God’s language.” That al-Shāfiʿī considers unrestrictedness a 
natural and obvious feature of divine language is confirmed in the following chapters, 
where he illustrates each type of divine speech listed above by citing relevant Qurʾānic 
verses. Although he explains the way in which restrictedness enters into some categories, 
he accepts as obvious that the apparent meaning of each verse is unrestricted.  
 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī dedicates the two paragraphs on ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ in the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān to arguing for the priority of unrestricted readings, not 
as a natural feature of the language, but instead as a hermeneutical claim about the role of 
the jurist in interpreting divine communication. He writes: 
The obligation to construe these verses according to their apparent meaning 
(ẓāhir) entails the obligation to construe them according to their broadest meaning 
(ʿalā ʿu ū ihā). This is so even if some scholars have held that the unrestricted 
(al-ʿāmm) does not hold priority over the restricted (al- hāṣṣ) except by means of 
an indication from the Book, the Sunna or consensus. We do not say that, but 
instead hold that the unrestricted does have priority over the restricted.  
 
That is because some verses are intended as unrestricted and some as restricted, 
but they [i.e., the Companions] used to act upon the intention that was apparent to 
them concerning the unrestricted and the restricted before they had received 
instruction (tawqīf). Restricted meaning (khuṣūṣ) is not known (yūqaf ʿalayhi) by 
the apparent meaning of revelation (ẓāhir al-tan īl), but is rather known by a 
secondary act of instruction (tawqīf thānī) from the Prophet or from another 
revealed verse indicating that. 
 
What we have said proves that the duty in this is to employ verses according to 
their unrestricted meaning. That is better than employing them according to their 
restricted meaning, until it is known that God intended something else.
733
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For al-Ṭaḥāwī, it is not immediately obvious that all legal texts are unrestricted in the 
absence of other evidence. He recognizes that texts may be read in a restricted or 
unrestricted manner independent of other texts, and he alludes to other jurists who give 
priority to a restricted reading. To support his argument that jurists should favor the 
unrestricted meaning, he makes three interconnected claims. First, the priority of the 
ʿāmm is entailed by the priority of the ẓāhir. Second, the Companions used to act upon 
the ʿāmm meaning before receiving instruction from the Prophet (tawqīf), implying that 
acting upon the ʿāmm does not require tawqīf. Third, restricted meaning can only be 
known through an act of tawqīf.  
 In claiming that  hāṣṣ readings require tawqīf while ʿāmm readings do not, al-
Ṭaḥāwī is not arguing that divine language naturally appears unrestricted. Instead, he is 
looking to the example of the Companions to determine the best hermeneutical approach 
to language that might be read as either ʿāmm or  hāṣṣ. By using the example of the 
Companions’ actions previous to receiving tawqīf, al-Ṭaḥāwī again emphasizes his 
concept of divine-human communication as an unfolding process in which God does not 
always choose to reveal His intent immediately. As we saw in the earlier discussions of 
mu kam: utashābih and ẓāhir:bāṭin, al-Ṭaḥāwī is primarily concerned in the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān with portraying jurists as the successors to the 
Companions, tasked with knowing how to act upon texts that do not always reveal their 
own intent.  
 Read in context, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claim that the priority of the ẓāhir entails the priority 
of the ʿāmm is also an argument about following the example of the Companions rather 
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than a claim about the nature of divine speech.
734
 Immediately prior to his discussion of 
ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ, al-Ṭaḥāwī gives the example of how a number of Companions reacted 
to the prohibition on grape wine (khamr) by destroying all varieties of wine before they 
had received instruction from the Prophet (tawqīf) concerning what was meant by khamr. 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the Prophet’s failure to chastise them for acting upon what they 
perceived as the apparent meaning of the verse indicates that it is correct to act upon an 
apparent meaning, even though the true meaning (bāṭin) might be different.735 He then 
immediately observes that the priority of the ẓāhir indicates the priority of the ʿāmm, 
apparently referring to the fact that many Companions perceived the prohibition on 
khamr as a broad prohibition on all wine; that is, they understood the ẓāhir meaning of 
khamr to be ʿāmm.736 In both his discussion of ẓāhir:bāṭin and his discussion of 
ʿāmm: hāṣṣ, then, al-Ṭaḥāwī is concerned not with describing the natural features of 
language, but with establishing hermeneutical approaches based on following the 
example of the Companions.  
 
ʿĀ   and Khāṣṣ in al-Ṭa āwī’s Her eneutical  rgu ents  
 We have seen above that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ in the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān is first and foremost an argument for the duty to 
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construe revealed texts broadly in cases in which they do not unambiguously convey 
God’s intent. The concept of restricted and unrestricted meaning likewise plays a major 
role within the body of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works, where terms from the roots ʿ-
m-m and kh-ṣ-ṣ—including ʿamma, ʿāmm, ʿu ū , khaṣṣa,  hāṣṣ and khuṣūṣ—appear 
hundreds of times. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī clearly uses ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ as technical terms in 
the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān, his usage of them elsewhere is somewhat 
inconsistent. When discussing whether a rule applies to an entire class, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
sometimes replaces the terms ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ with the pair kull (all) and baʿḍ (some). In 
other cases, he pairs the terms ʿā  :baʿḍ and  ull: hāṣṣ or shifts between terms within a 
single passage.
737
 Despite this linguistic variability, al-Ṭaḥāwī consistently employs 
derivatives of the roots ʿ-m-m and kh-ṣ-ṣ within the body of his hermeneutical works 
when making abstract theoretical statements about restricted and unrestricted meanings, 
confirming that ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ do represent technical terms for him.738  
 Appeals to ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ take two major forms within the body of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
hermeneutical works. In the first, al-Ṭaḥāwī reasserts the rule established in the 
introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān: jurists should construe texts broadly in the absence of 
evidence indicating that their true meaning is restricted ( hāṣṣ). This assertion appears in 
polemical contexts where al-Ṭaḥāwī disagrees with another jurist’s restricted reading of a 
text, such as Mālik and al-Shaybānī’s claim that a rule about leading congregational 
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prayer while sitting applies only to Muḥammad, or the claim that the hides of predatory 
animals represent an exception to the rule that all tanned hides are ritually pure.
739
  
In these and other passages, al-Ṭaḥāwī goes beyond merely asserting that a text is 
ʿāmm where others have interpreted it as  hāṣṣ; instead, he portrays his opponents as 
dangerously violating a foundational hermeneutical principle, and thus mistaking God’s 
law. Concerning Mālik and al-Shaybānī’s stance on seated prayer leaders, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
writes, “no one may restrict (yakhuṣṣ) anything from the Prophet except when it is 
required by an act of instruction (tawqīf) from the Prophet to the people.”740 Similarly, he 
writes concerning the hide of predatory animals that “no one may exclude anything from 
what God’s Messenger has generalized (ʿamma) except in response to that which requires 
its exclusion: a Qurʾānic verse, a transmitted Sunna or the consensus of the scholars.”741 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī thus portrays his opponents as departing from the hermeneutical model 
established in the introduction to    ā  al-Qurʾān and as setting themselves up as 
lawmakers in opposition to the intentions of God and His Prophet.  
In the second and far more prevalent type of appeal to ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
claims that evidence does exist to support a restricted ( hāṣṣ) reading of an apparently 
unrestricted (ʿāmm) text. Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī regularly argues that an apparently 
unrestricted legal rule established in the Qurʾān is in fact shown to be restricted by a 
Prophetic Sunna.
742
 For example, al-Ṭaḥāwī notes that Q 62/Al-Jumʿa:9 (“O you who 
believe, when proclamation is made for prayer on the day of assembly, hasten to 
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remembrance of God and leave [your] trading”) is apparently unrestricted in its wording 
(ẓāhir [al-khiṭāb] ʿalā al-ʿu ū ), such that all believers are included within the scope of 
the verse. However, a Prophetic Sunna clarified that women, slaves, travelers and certain 
other groups are not required to attend congregational prayer. Therefore, they are not 
among those addressed in the verse.
743
  
For both al-Ṭaḥāwī and al-Shāfiʿī, the ʿā  : hāṣṣ rubric serves as a crucial tool 
for harmonizing apparently contradictory revealed texts. In claiming that the true scope 
of reference of one text is revealed by means of another text, they affirm that both texts 
remain fully legally effective—God has merely chosen to make His intent clear through 
the interaction of two texts, rather than through a single act of revelation. It is in this 
sense that Vishanoff is correct in arguing that al-Ṭaḥāwī “employed al-Shāfiʿī’s 
distinction between general and particular texts.”744 Vishanoff rightly places al-Ṭaḥāwī in 
a scholarly genealogy with al-Shāfiʿī in his treatment of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ, a genealogy to 
which we must add al-Ṭaḥāwī’s teacher al-Muzanī.  
In contrast, the classical Ḥanafī understanding of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ developed as 
part of a competing scholarly genealogy originating in the opposition of the proto-Ḥanafī 
ʿĪsā ibn Abān (d. 221/836) to al-Shāfiʿī’s approach to ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ. Where al-Shāfiʿī 
used the ʿā  : hāṣṣ rubric to preserve the legal effectiveness of both texts in cases of 
apparent contradiction, Ibn Abān set stringent limits on particularization and instead often 
resorted to discarding Prophetic  adīths in apparent conflict with other revealed texts. He 
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was later followed by al-Karkhī (d. 340/952) and al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), although al-
Jaṣṣāṣ modified the earlier Ḥanafīs’ restrictions on particularization to such an extent that 
it functioned almost as flexibly as al-Shāfiʿī’s model.745 That al-Ṭaḥāwī followed al-
Shāfiʿī in his liberal use of particularization as a harmonization tool, rather than the more 
restrictive approach of his Ḥanafī predecessor ʿĪsā Ibn Abān, is fully consistent with his 
role as the first major Ḥanafī  adīth harmonizer.  
While Vishanoff is thus correct in identifying the crucial link between 
harmonization and the ʿā  : hāṣṣ rubric for both al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī, the two 
jurists differ substantially in other aspects of their approach to ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ. As 
discussed above, al-Shāfiʿī understands the presumptive unrestricted nature of revealed 
texts as a natural feature of Arabic, while al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays it as a hermeneutical 
principle known from the actions of the Companions. Further, al-Shāfiʿī’s law-related 
examples of the ʿā  : hāṣṣ rubric all concern the interaction of multiple texts, almost 
always a Prophetic Sunna that indicates a restricted meaning for an apparently 
unrestricted Qurʾānic verse.746 For al-Shāfiʿī, particularization is one manifestation of the 
Sunna’s role in explaining the Qurʾān.  
In contrast, while al-Ṭaḥāwī often invokes the ʿāmm: hāṣṣ rubric to address 
Qurʾān-Sunna interactions, he equally envisions particularization between two Qurʾānic 
texts or two Prophetic  adīths.747 Here, as in all other areas of his hermeneutics, al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of how revealed texts act upon each other is source-neutral: none of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s harmonization techniques distinguish between the functions of Qurʾān and 
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Sunna, in keeping with his understanding of the Qurʾān and Sunna as nearly equal and 
not always entirely ontologically distinct sources.
748
 Further, the range of hermeneutical 
procedures that al-Ṭaḥāwī invokes using the language of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ is much 
broader than that envisioned by al-Shāfiʿī, for whom law-related examples of ʿāmm and 
 hāṣṣ exclusively relate to the interaction between two revealed texts. At different times, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that an apparently unrestricted text may be known to be restricted 
through consensus, analogy or the practice of a Companion.
749
  
 
Hints of a Formalist Understanding of ʿĀ   and Khāṣṣ  
 Among the most crucial developments marking the transition from the formative 
period of Islamic legal theory to the mature uṣūl tradition was a movement toward legal 
formalism, the claim that language fully encodes meaning.
750
 Although the uṣūl tradition 
never committed itself to an exclusively formalist hermeneutic, even the earliest 
preserved uṣūl works from the second half of the 4th/10th century display a concern with 
establishing the meaning and legal force of certain particles and grammatical forms.
751
 
The identification of linguistic forms associated with general and particular meaning 
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(ṣiyagh al-ʿu ū  wa-l-khuṣūṣ) represents one of the major areas in which legal theorists 
sought to correlate meaning to grammatical form. 
 We have seen above that al-Ṭaḥāwī overwhelmingly portrays the presumption of 
unrestricted meaning as a hermeneutical principle based on Companion precedent, rather 
than as a linguistic feature of particular words. Three passages of Shar  mushkil al-āthār, 
however, discuss the scope of terms in ways that prefigure the mature uṣūl tradition’s 
understanding of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ. In the first example, al-Ṭaḥāwī analyzes a Qurʾānic 
verse implying that apes and pigs are the descendants of Jews whom God transfigured 
into animals as a punishment for their disobedience. The verse is in apparent 
contradiction with a Prophetic  adīth stating that transfigured animals do not reproduce. 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s unnamed interlocutor argues that the use of the definite ( aʿrifa) in 
connection Q 5/al-Māʾida:60 (“He made of them apes (al-qirada) and pigs (al-
 hanā īr)”) indicates that the verse is talking about the apes and pigs known in his day—
that is, the entire class of apes and pigs. If the verse were discussing a limited set of apes 
and pigs, it would have used the indefinite (nakira).
752
  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s response does not directly engage with his interlocutor’s linguistic 
argument. Instead, he argues that the apparently conflicting texts can be harmonized by 
positing that God first created apes and pigs (al-qirada wa-l- hanā īr) when He created 
other creatures, then later transfigured a disobedient Jewish community into apes and 
pigs (al-qirada wa-l- hanā īr). As indicated by the Prophetic  adīth, the transfigured 
animals did not reproduce; the apes and pigs known in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s day are the 
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descendants of non-transfigured animals.
753
 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not comment on 
his opponent’s assertion that the presence of the definite article indicates all apes and 
pigs, his own use of the definite article in referring both to the apes and pigs present in 
his own day and to the subset of transfigured animals suggests that he does not accept his 
interlocutor’s identification of definite plural nouns with general reference. 
 The second example explains the obscure Prophetic  adīth, “The infidel eats into 
seven guts, while the believer eats into a single gut.” Al-Ṭaḥāwī understands this  adīth 
as an observation about the behavior of a single individual, rather than a commentary on 
believers and infidels in general. He offers three arguments in support of his position. 
First, we know that some believers eat a great deal, while some infidels eat very little, 
and so this  adīth is not an accurate description of reality if construed to refer to all 
infidels and all believers.
754
 Second, more extended versions of the  adīth clarify that the 
Prophet was speaking about a certain gluttonous infidel who began to eat more 
moderately after converting to Islam.
755
  
As his final argument, al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that the expression used to refer to the 
believer and infidel is grammatically definite (al-makhraj makhraj al- aʿrifa), indicating 
that only a single individual was intended. In support he adduces Q 94/Al-Sharḥ:5 (“With 
the hardship there is ease”) as an example of another verse in which a singular definite 
noun refers to a single instance of the noun.
756
 He continues 
What we said above holds true for everything whose expression is definite, unless 
it contains some indication (dalāla) that the intended meaning is more than one 
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individual. In that case it is diverted to that [intent], and its value ( ukm) is that of 
the indefinite (nakira). An example of this is Q 103/al-ʿAṣr:1-3 (“By the 
afternoon, man (al-insān) is indeed in a state of loss – Though that will not be the 
case with those who believe and do good works”). It is known by this that the 
class (al-jins), not the individual (al-insān al-wā id), was intended.757 
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues here that, as a general rule, a singular definite noun should be 
understood as referring to a single individual. However, the presence of the relative 
pronoun “those” (alladhīna) within the same verse referring back to al-insān makes it 
clear that the intent here is the entire class of humans. At the same time, he intimates in 
his passing reference to the “value of the indefinite” ( ukm al-nakira) that plural 
indefinite nouns refer generally to all members of their class.   
 This chapter thus contains two prescriptive interpretive rules based on the 
grammatical properties of nouns, while the previous example implied al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
rejection of another grammar-based interpretive rule suggested by his interlocutor. 
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not employ any terms derived from the roots ʿ-m-m or kh-ṣ-ṣ 
when stating these interpretive rules, his discussions of the relationship between the use 
of the definite article and the scope of reference of a noun clearly map onto mature uṣūl 
debates identifying the linguistic forms that indicate general and restricted meanings 
(ṣiyagh al-ʿu ū  wa-l-khuṣūṣ).  
In contrast, in the third and final example al-Ṭaḥāwī does employ a derivative of 
the root ʿ-m-m when discussing the relationship between the definite article and the scope 
of reference of a noun. In this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī rejects Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab’s claim 
that hiba, a form of marriage in which a woman offers herself to a man, was permissible 
only for the Prophet. As evidence, he examines the language of a Companion  adīth in 
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which ʿĀʾisha exclaims, “doesn’t a woman feel ashamed to present herself to a man 
without a dowry?”  Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that 
[ʿĀʾisha] did not intend that man to be the Prophet, but rather included (ʿammat 
bihi) all men (al-rijāl). That is because her expression was grammatically 
indefinite (kharaja min-hā  a hraj al-nakira), and the indefinite includes 
everyone in its scope (al-na ira taʿa  u al-nās ja īʿan).758 
 
Here al-Ṭaḥāwī reaffirms the prescriptive interpretive rule established in the previous 
example: indefinite nouns include all members of their class. He states this rule using the 
verb ʿamma (to include, comprise). This usage appears non-technical, in contrast to al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s fairly consistent use of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ as technical terms referring to the 
meaning, rather than the grammatical form, of a revealed text, as discussed in the 
previous section of this chapter.  
Nonetheless, the appearance of these linguistic discussions in Shar  mushkil al-
āthār represents a significant departure from al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s teacher al-
Muzanī, who did not employ technical terminology from the field of Arabic grammar in 
their discussions of hermeneutics. Further, these chapters may reveal an important stage 
in the transition between the formative understanding of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ as a 
hermeneutical procedure in which texts act upon each other, and the mature uṣūl 
conception of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ as linguistic properties of words. Given that al-Ṭaḥāwī 
introduces these grammar-based interpretive principles without using the technical terms 
ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ, and further that his own conception of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ is not based on 
linguistic form, it seems plausible that the linguistic forms theorists label ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ 
were in fact originally debated independently of the ʿāmm: hāṣṣ umbrella, and only later 
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subsumed under it. That is, al-Ṭaḥāwī may represent a period in which jurists were 
debating implications of linguistic form for determining meaning, but the rules they 
proposed were not yet firmly associated with the grammatical language of ʿāmm and 
 hāṣṣ.   
 Further, in affirming the unrestrictedness of indefinite nouns, al-Ṭaḥāwī is in 
agreement with the later uṣūl tradition. However, he opposes later jurists both in his 
rejection of the claim that definite plural nouns refer to all members of their class and in 
his own assertion that definite singular nouns refer to a single individual.
759
 The 
explanation for these discrepancies may lie in the diverging goals of al-Ṭaḥāwī and later 
theorists. For legal theorists, the assertion that many linguistic forms indicate generality 
in the absence of other evidence functions to maximize the legal effects of revealed texts. 
Further, uṣūl texts are more interested in showing that language has a systematic structure 
than in individual problems of legal interpretation. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s task in Shar  
mushkil al-āthār is the harmonization of specific texts, which he often achieves by 
restricting the meaning of a problematic term to a single individual. For his purposes, it is 
not useful a priori to assign unrestricted meaning to the maximum number of classes of 
nouns, because his harmonization efforts require considerable interpretive flexibility.  
 
Other Evidence for Legal Formalism: Amr and Nahy (Command and Prohibition) 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument for the priority of unrestricted meaning concludes his 
presentation of a hermeneutical framework for jurists in the introduction to    ā  al-
Qurʾān. In what remains of this chapter, I will further address two issues raised by my 
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discussion above: 1) evidence for legal formalism in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought beyond the 
examples considered already concerning the scope of nouns; and 2) the relationship 
between equivocal ( utashābih) texts, Prophetic tawqīf (instruction) and ijtihād (legal 
interpretation).  
I observed above that a movement toward legal formalism was one of the most 
crucial developments marking the transition between formative and post-formative legal 
theory. Authors of mature uṣūl works dedicate considerable space to determining the 
relationship between different types of linguistic forms (ṣiyagh, sing. ṣīgha) and meaning. 
Above, we considered evidence for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s early movement toward a linguistic 
understanding of ʿāmm and  hāṣṣ, a major topic of formalist debate in later theory works. 
In addition, legal theorists devoted particular attention to the imperative as the sole or 
most characteristic grammatical form encoding the divine commands and prohibitions 
that constitute Islamic law. Because of the importance of command and prohibition in 
later uṣūl works, I examine al-Ṭaḥāwī’s approach to this topic to determine the extent to 
which he is moving toward the formalist conception characteristic of later theorists.  
Already in al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s Fuṣūl we find an extended theoretical consideration of the 
imperative. There is a useful ambiguity for jurists in the Arabic terms related to command 
and prohibition; amr can mean both command and imperative, while nahy means both 
prohibition and negative imperative. Like later theorists, al-Jaṣṣāṣ addresses a variety of 
issues arising from the identification of God’s commands with the imperative form, 
including the range of observed meanings of the imperative; its literal meaning; whether 
the term amr can properly be applied to an inferior speaking to a superior; whether a 
245 
 
 
command must be performed immediately or may be delayed; whether the commanded 
action must be performed repeatedly; what is required when a command suggests a 
choice of actions; whether a repeated command must be performed repeatedly; whether 
non-believers are legally responsible for performing commanded actions; and whether 
prohibited actions may still be legally effective.
760
  
 In contrast, while jurists of the formative period understood scriptural commands 
and prohibitions to be the foundation of the law, they were concerned with the meaning 
rather than the grammatical form of God’s commands. In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī sets out a 
two-part theory of nahy that distinguishes between broad prohibitions which may have 
narrow exceptions indicated elsewhere in revelation, and more limited prohibitions 
establishing restrictions on otherwise permitted activities.
761
 The discussion of nahy is 
framed as a problem specific to interpreting  adīth; Lowry argues that al-Shāfiʿī’s major 
concern is harmonizing apparently conflicting divine commands.
762
 His student al-
Muzanī offers a considerably more complex categorization of both amr and nahy in his 
Kitāb al-Amr wa-l-nahy. In addition to arguing that commands and prohibitions may be 
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restricted or unrestricted in both Qurʾān and Sunna, he also notes that commands may 
indicate mere permission, while prohibitions may signify discouragement.
763
 
 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī was the student of al-Muzanī before he affiliated himself 
with the Ḥanafīs, he neither addresses amr and nahy in the theoretical introductions to his 
extant works nor offers anything approaching the complex interaction of sources and 
hermeneutical rubrics envisioned by al-Muzanī. Where al-Ṭaḥāwī does offer brief 
theoretical statements about amr and nahy in the course of discussing discrete legal 
questions, his ideas anticipate the treatment of amr and nahy in mature legal theory much 
more than they resemble those of his predecessors al-Muzanī or al-Shāfiʿī. While I will 
argue that al-Ṭaḥāwī is not committed to a formalist understanding of amr and nahy in 
which meaning is determined by grammar, his discussion suggests that formalist ideas 
were in circulation in his time. 
 Perhaps the most important difference between al-Muzanī and al-Ṭaḥāwī is that 
al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly identifies commands and prohibitions with the grammatical 
imperative. In two chapters of Shar  mushkil al-āthār and one chapter of    ā  al-
Qurʾān, he argues that a dispute over the meaning of a Qurʾānic verse or a  adīth hinges 
on whether a certain verb is understood as a divine command or a simple declaration, a 
distinction which is known through the use of the jussive (maj ū ) to indicate an 
imperative or the indicative ( arfūʿ) to show predication.764 The apparent meaning 
(ẓāhir) of a jussive verb, we learn, is a command, an argument al-Ṭaḥāwī supports by 
citing two Qurʾānic verses employing the imperative: Q 96/al-ʿAlaq:19 (“Do not obey 
                                                 
763
 Lowry, “Reception of al-Shāfiʿī’s Concept of Amr and Nahy in the Thought of His Student al-Muzanī,” 
140-146.  
764
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 4.97-98, 4.161;    ā , 1.118. 
247 
 
 
him (lā tuṭiʿhu), but prostrate yourself and draw near”) and Q 76/al-Insāna:24 (“Do not 
obey (lā tuṭiʿ) any ungrateful one or any sinner among them”). 765  
Interestingly, both verses in fact concern negative imperatives, or prohibitions, 
and yet al-Ṭaḥāwī labels them amr, a term generally translated as command. Likewise, 
the disputed  adīths and Qurʾānic verse in the chapters under discussion also concern 
negative imperatives, which al-Ṭaḥāwī again labels amr. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s consistent use of 
the term amr to indicate imperatives and negative imperatives as well as commands and 
prohibitions in these passages suggests that he is using the term to designate the 
grammatical category of jussive verbs, rather than simply referring to the functions of 
commanding and prohibiting. That is, for al-Ṭaḥāwī, meaning has become linked to 
grammatical form.   
 However, while al-Ṭaḥāwī may conceive of divine commands and prohibitions in 
terms of their grammatical form, grammar does not provide sufficient information to 
determine meaning. Like al-Muzanī, al-Ṭaḥāwī recognizes that amr does not always 
indicate absolute obligation. In    ā  al-Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī presents a tripartite typology 
of amr, observing that God’s commands may indicate obligation (ījāb), the 
recommendation and urging of pious acts (al-nadb wa-l- aḍḍ ʿalā al-khayr) or the 
permissibility of something that had previously been prohibited (ibā at  ā qad  āna 
 aẓarahu qabla dhāli a). Each of the three possibilities is followed by two Qurʾānic 
proof texts illustrating the relevant use of the imperative.
766
 In other chapters, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
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discusses an additional possible meaning of the imperative: the threat whose apparent 
meaning (ẓāhir) is a command (amr) and whose true meaning (bāṭin) is a prohibition 
(nahy).
767
 Similarly, he analyzes Q 17/al-Isrāʾ:64 (“And startle with your voice any of 
them you can”) by stating that “its linguistic form (lafẓ) is the form of a command, and its 
true meaning is a prohibition and a threat.”768 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of the term lafẓ (linguistic 
form) in this passage anticipates later theorists’ emphasis on the lafẓ or ṣīgha (wording) 
of particular grammatical forms and provides further evidence that al-Ṭaḥāwī understands 
amr to be a grammatical, and not a purely semantic, phenomenon.
769
  
 Like al-Ṭaḥāwī, theorists of the mature uṣūl tradition would discuss a range of 
possible meanings of the imperative. In addition to the four possibilities envisioned by al-
Ṭaḥāwī in his hermeneutical works, al-Jaṣṣāṣ argues that the imperative can express 
guidance (irshād) or a rebuke and assertion of powerlessness (al-taqrīʿ wa-l-taʿjī ).770 
Unlike al-Ṭaḥāwī, however, jurists of the mature uṣūl tradition were concerned with 
establishing a baseline meaning of amr in a way that would allow them confidently to 
                                                                                                                                                 
(“Such of those whom your right hands possess who seek the document, write it for them ( ātibūhu ) if 
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land and seek (abtaghū) some of God’s bounty”) and Q 5/al-Māʾida:2 (“When you leave the pilgrim state, 
then hunt (aṣṭādū)”) (   ā , 1.184-185).  
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derive law from scripture. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, citing al-Karkhī, argues that the literal meaning of 
amr is obligation, and other meanings are figurative ( ajā ). His argument is based on 
linguistic and rational considerations: every language must have a linguistic form (ṣīgha) 
originally coined for designating obligation, just as it must have forms to designate 
predication (khabar), interrogatives (isti hbār), and generality (ʿu ū ).771 His claim that 
the only literal meaning of amr is obligation would become the majority position of the 
Ḥanafī school. Other jurists argued that recommendation or permission was the primary 
meaning of amr, that amr had multiple primary meanings, or that it was not possible to 
know the primary meaning of amr, a position labeled waqf (hesitation).
772
 
 Like later theorists who held that it is not possible to know the primary meaning 
of amr, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not indicate a literal meaning for the imperative in his extant 
works. However, where jurists of the mature uṣūl tradition arrived at waqf as the result of 
theological, pragmatic or linguistic considerations that prevented them from assigning a 
primary meaning,
773
 al-Ṭaḥāwī does not attempt to establish one. The question does not 
appear to be pressing for him in the way it would be for later jurists, suggesting that for 
al-Ṭaḥāwī, the association of the imperative with a command had not yet resulted in the 
formalist conviction that grammar should be fully determinative of meaning.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī does appear to be familiar with the concept of exclusively associating 
amr with obligation, however; in several passages he feels it necessary to state that amr 
can have meanings other than obligation. In these passages, as in those discussed above, 
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al-Ṭaḥāwī’s evidence consists solely of Qurʾānic verses which he holds self-evidently use 
amr to express a meaning other than obligation.
774
 However, it is not clear whether he is 
countering other jurists who were already arguing in his time that the primary meaning of 
amr is obligation, or whether he is merely addressing general perceptions about the use of 
amr that do not yet rise to the level of a clearly articulated legal formalism. In either case, 
it is clear that al-Ṭaḥāwī was not constrained by the formalist assumption that grammar 
should or could be fully determinative of meaning, an assumption that underlies 
discussions of the meaning of amr in mature uṣūl works, whether jurists were able to 
arrive at a primary meaning for the term or not.  
Beyond considering the range of possible meanings of the grammatical amr, al-
Ṭaḥāwī does not address any of the other issues concerning amr that were so pressing for 
later theorists.
775
 The only related theoretical questions he treats concern the relationship 
between commands, legal responsibility and the consequences of actions: he argues that 
it is permitted to disobey God’s command if obeying will lead to doing something 
prohibited, and that, while God’s prohibitions are absolute, His commands are dependent 
on the capacity of legal actors to obey.
776
 These questions concern theology rather than 
the derivation of law from language.
777
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To some extent, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s disinterest in establishing formalist rules for the legal 
effects of the imperative must be understood as a consequence of his orientation toward 
practical hermeneutics. Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī is primarily concerned with 
demonstrating that texts of revelation, including those containing commands and 
prohibitions, are not in conflict with each other. While formalist discussions of 
grammatical forms and particles in legal theory texts make a strong theological claim that 
God’s will is knowable through the medium of language, such rules are likely to be less 
useful for a jurist engaged in removing apparent contradictions from texts, an enterprise 
where considerable interpretive flexibility is called for. The theory construction of the 
legal theorists has different requirements than practical exercises in interpretation, even if 
exercises such as those of al-Ṭaḥāwī reveal an underlying theory. It is thus important to 
note that in every case cited above in which al-Ṭaḥāwī discusses the possible meanings of 
the imperative, he does so not in order to establish a primary meaning, as would later 
jurists, but in order to claim interpretive flexibility. Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the imperative 
has more meanings than simply obligation, and so his interpretation of the text is not in 
fact constrained by grammar.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
nahy (narrow prohibitions on generally permissible activities) in that they tend to concern matters of 
etiquette. Al-Shāfiʿī views the contravention of such prohibitions as a lesser transgression than violating the 
first category of prohibition, but still a sin (see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 136). In contrast, al-
Ṭaḥāwī appears to categorize such prohibitions as forming part of the body of Prophetic statements that do 
not constitute revelation, a topic discussed in Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna.” Concerning the selling of 
dogs, he suggests that the Prophet’s prohibition may not mean that this action is prohibited in the way that 
things are prohibited in the Sharīʿa ( arā   a-l-ashyāʾ al-mu rama bi-l-sharīʿa), suggesting that not all of 
the Prophet’s prohibitions fall within the scope of religious law (Mushkil, 12.77). In another chapter, he 
argues that the Prophet’s nahy on giving unequal gifts to one’s children was merely by way of advice 
(mashwara). Thus, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to classify this form of nahy as falling outside the scope of 
revelation, where al-Shāfiʿī views it as fully within religious law.   
252 
 
 
Ijtihād (Legal Reasoning) 
 In the preceding sections we have been concerned with unrestricted and restricted 
meaning (ʿāmm: hāṣṣ) as well as apparent and non-apparent meaning (ẓāhir:bāṭin), two 
rubrics which the introduction to A  ā  al-Qurʾān portrays as crucial for understanding 
equivocal ( utashābih) texts. As mentioned previously, however, a chapter of Shar  
mushkil al-āthār also explicitly connects the interpretation of equivocal texts to a third 
hermeneutical procedure: ijtihād al-raʾy (legal reasoning). In this chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī is 
asked by an unnamed interlocutor whether the existence of  utashābih texts prevents 
judges from ruling on the matters contained in them. Al-Ṭaḥāwī replies: 
Our answer is that it is incumbent upon judges to engage in legal reasoning 
(ijtihād raʾyihi ) and then to rule based on the results of that reasoning, as God’s 
Messenger commanded them. 
 
In illustration of this command, al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces a Prophetic  adīth stating that judges 
receive two rewards if they reach the objectively correct answer (ṣawāb) through their 
ijtihād, but still receive one reward if they engage in legal reasoning but fail to reach the 
objectively correct answer. Al-Ṭaḥāwī continues: 
 
This indicates that judges have a duty to use legal reasoning in their rulings, and 
that legal reasoning might reach either an objectively correct answer (ṣawāb) or 
an objectively incorrect answer (khaṭaʾ). They are not charged (yu allafū) with 
reaching an objectively correct answer, but are rather charged with engaging in 
legal reasoning.
778
 
 
The effect of this discussion is to draw a direct connection between the role of jurists and 
God’s division of revelation into the equivocal and unequivocal. In addition, it limits the 
scope of a jurist’s legal reasoning to a subset of revealed texts—those that are equivocal.  
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253 
 
 
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī also addresses ijtihād in a number of other passages of Shar  mushkil 
al-āthār and Shar   aʿānī al-āthār, albeit without using the language of mu kam and 
 utashābih. Instead, he frequently sets up a dichotomy between ijtihād and tawqīf 
(instruction). This term, which we have already encountered in Chapter Two, 
“Companion and Successor Ḥadīths,” is closely related to the mu kam: utashābih 
dichotomy. When God expresses His intention fully in a revealed text, it is mu kam; all 
other revealed texts are  utashābih. Mutashābih texts may then be further subdivided 
into two categories: those in which God’s intentions can only be known through a 
subsequent tawqīf, and those concerning which jurists may exercise their ijtihād. As we 
saw above, al-Ṭaḥāwī holds that an occurrence of tawqīf may be known or inferred from 
a variety of sources, including a Qurʾānic verse, a Prophetic  adīth, scholarly consensus, 
scholarly practice, or the opinion of a Companion or Successor on matters where ijtihād 
would be inappropriate.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that ijtihād is permissible not only in cases where no tawqīf 
exists,
779
 but also when an individual jurist is simply unaware of its existence, usually 
because he does not know of a certain Prophetic  adīth.780 He emphasizes, however, that 
tawqīf is superior to ijtihād, and that the results of ijtihād must be abandoned if its 
practitioner subsequently learns of a relevant instance of tawqīf.781 While mu kam and 
tawqīf are closely related ideas, they are also distinct in an important way. As we saw in 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.237. 
780
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 10.278, 8.266. Mushkil 13.58 describes the same situation without using the term 
tawqīf. See also Mushkil, 9.209 for the dichotomy between instruction (in this case using the active Form I 
verb, waqafa ʿalā) and ijtihād. 
781
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī holds up the examples of Companions engaging in ijtihād before subsequently learning of a 
relevant tawqīf as evidence for the general permissibility of ijtihād, in keeping with his tendency to look to 
the Companions as the model for later jurists. 
254 
 
 
the first section of this chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī understands mu kam as a description of God’s 
use of language, and whether or not that language conveys God’s intent. In contrast, 
tawqīf refers merely to the act of instruction—that is, to the existence of revelation 
concerning a certain matter—without making any claims about language, signification, or 
intent. In addition, there is an important structural difference between mu kam and 
tawqīf: mu kam implies a single text, while tawqīf requires one text (or other form of 
revelational authority) to act upon another. 
Despite these differences, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s division of Qurʾānic verses and Prophetic 
 adīths into mu kam texts whose meaning God has made clear and  utashābih texts 
which must be interpreted through legal reasoning, is echoed by his two-tiered system of 
authority for Prophetic  adīths, post-Prophetic  adīths, and consensus based upon 
whether he holds them to represent revelatory instruction or juristic legal reasoning. 
Together, these two dichotomies form a binary structure of the law that cuts across 
traditional categories of legal sources. At its heart, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s binary vision of the law is 
concerned with defining the role of jurists and delimiting the permissible scope of legal 
reasoning by claiming that some areas of the law and texts of revelation simply are not 
subject to juristic reasoning. 
In all of his discussions of ijtihād, al-Ṭaḥāwī consistently emphasizes the same 
ideas that we have already encountered in the passage from al-Mukhtaṣar analyzed above 
concerning judges’ use of ijtihād. There, he asserted both that there is an objectively 
correct answer to every legal question, and that jurists’ ijtihād is praiseworthy regardless 
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of whether they reach that objectively correct answer.
782
 Versions of this argument 
appear in every passage in which al-Ṭaḥāwī addresses ijtihād, suggesting that it 
represents an important polemical concern for him.
783
 Indeed, this dispute gives rise to 
one of the very few occasions on which al-Ṭaḥāwī directly names an opponent on a 
question of legal theory. After stating his own theory of ijtihād, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes: 
Others have exceeded the proper bounds and claimed that anyone who possesses 
the tools of ijtihād and rules according to them will reach the truth that would 
have been stated by the Qurʾān, were there a revelation on this matter. The 
proponents of this argument are refuted by undeniable evidence. One of those 
who went too far in this was Ibrāhīm ibn Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUlayya.  
 
Ibn ʿUlayya (d. 218/834) supports a strong version of juristic infallibilism—the idea that 
every mujtahid is correct (kull mujtahid muṣīb).784 In Ibn ʿUlayya’s view, this principle 
means that every jurist will reach the objectively correct answer. Conversely, advocates 
of the strongest versions of juristic fallibilism held that jurists are not rewarded for or 
justified in undertaking ijtihād when that ijtihād does not reach the objectively correct 
answer. In his more moderate claim that an objectively correct answer exists, but the 
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 Questions concerning who is authorized to undertake ijtihād are almost entirely absent from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
hermeneutical works; in two passages of Shar  mushkil al-āthār, he mentions that ijtihād is always 
praiseworthy when undertaken by those who possess its tools (ālāt) without further specifying the nature of 
those tools (Mushkil, 9.207, 13.40). In Shar   aʿānī al-āthār he asserts that “ijtihād is permissible to 
everyone” (al-ijtihād lil-nās ja īʿan), although he would presumably qualify this statement by limiting it to 
those possessing the tools mentioned above (Maʿānī, 3.237).  
 Likewise, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not know the division of jurists into the ranks of mujtahids and 
muqallids which function to maintain school authority in the later madhhab tradition and to project that 
authority back onto earlier centuries. For al-Ṭaḥāwī, anyone may perform ijtihād as long as he possesses 
the correct tools, and his understanding of himself as a follower of Abū Ḥanīfa does not entail that he may 
not oppose Abū Ḥanīfa and all other Ḥanafīs on questions where his ijtihād leads him to a different 
conclusion. Al-Ṭaḥāwī would not recognize himself in later Ḥanafī biographers’ assignment of him to the 
third rank of mujtahids, qualified to exercise ijtihād in questions not addressed by the Ḥanafī founders (e.g., 
Qinālīzādah, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīya, 1.148-149). Like the jurists of the 2nd/8th century, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
understands taqlīd as the imitation of the Companions only.  
783
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 8.266, 8.273, 9.206, 9.210, 10.278, 13.40; Maʿānī, 3.237, 4.270.  
784
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 13.40. Ibrāhīm ibn ʿUlayya was a Baṣran jurist and theologian who settled in 
Egypt, where his ideas were influential. On the debates between Ibn ʿUlayya and al-Shāfiʿī, see El Shamsy, 
Canonization of Islamic Law, 55-57.  
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jurist is not tasked with finding it, al-Ṭaḥāwī upholds a doctrine associated with both al-
Shāfiʿī and early and later Ḥanafīs.785  
Surveying the discussions of ijtihād that appear in many chapters across al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works, we may observe that they fall into two categories. In one 
group of chapters, a Prophetic  adīth bearing some connection to the concept of legal 
reasoning leads al-Ṭaḥāwī to justify the practice of ijtihād. His discussion of ijtihād in 
response to the Prophetic  adīth about mu kam and  utashābih, already discussed 
above, is one example of this type of chapter.
786
 A similar discussion appears in response 
to a Prophetic  adīth stating that judges who judge based on ignorance will go to hell. An 
unnamed interlocutor suggests that this  adīth refutes the validity of ijtihād, but al-
Ṭaḥāwī responds that humans are not charged with more than they can achieve (lam 
yu allifnā  ā lā nuṭīq), and it is not possible for humans to be certain of achieving an 
objectively correct answer through ijtihād. Therefore, this  adīth does not threaten 
hellfire for judges who employ ijtihād appropriately but fail to reach the objectively 
correct answer.
787
 In the course of refuting his interlocutor, al-Ṭaḥāwī once again 
reiterates the major points of his theory of ijtihād already encountered in the previous 
example. 
In contrast, in the second type of chapter on ijtihād al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts its 
praiseworthiness in order to account for the actions of one or more Companions. Two 
such chapters concern occasions on which Companion committed violence in apparent 
direct violation of a Prophetic  adīth. Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not argue that no rule existed on 
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 On fallibilism and infallibilism in ijtihād, see Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 258-272.  
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.221-225.  
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 9.209. For more examples of this type, see Mushkil, 9.199-206, 13.37-41.  
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the matter, but rather that the Companions understood themselves to be employing an 
appropriate form of ijtihād. Their actions should therefore be considered praiseworthy, 
even though they were in fact in error.
788
 In the first such chapter, the Companion Usāma 
ibn Zayd kills an infidel combatant despite the man’s profession of the shahāda, on the 
grounds that his last-minute conversion to Islam does not lift the punishment already due 
to him. The Prophet clarifies that Usāma was incorrect in his legal reasoning; however, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī notes, Usāma was permitted to use his raʾy on this matter, and therefore the 
Prophet did not blame him for the unjust killing.
789
 In the second chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
appeals to ijtihād in order to reconcile the intra-Muslim violence of the Battle of the 
Camel with a Prophetic  adīth stating that whenever one believer takes up arms against 
another, both will be condemned to Hell.
790
 In a related example, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that 
the actions of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar in a certain Companion  adīth should not be taken as 
binding upon later scholars, because they were merely employing ijtihād. In the absence 
of a confirmatory tawqīf, their ijtihād is no more binding than that of anyone else, and so 
al-Ṭaḥāwī feels himself justified in reaching a different conclusion.791 
This second category of chapter on ijtihād represents a variation on al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
treatment of the Prophet’s ijtihād, analyzed at length in Chapter One, “Qurʾān and 
Sunna.”792 His discussions of the ijtihād of both the Prophet and his Companions serve 
two functions within his works: first, to account for otherwise inexplicable behavior 
(readers will recall the Prophet’s prohibition on pollinating date palms, a predictably ill-
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 8.262-267. 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 8.262-267.  
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 10.275-280. 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.337.  
792
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 4.270.  
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advised order which he later excused by observing that he is no farmer—al-Ṭaḥāwī 
explains this episode as an example of the Prophet’s permissible but ultimately 
unsuccessful use of ijtihād);793 and second, to deny that a certain action constitutes a 
legally binding example.
794
 In the latter case, appeals to ijtihād effectively serve as a 
mechanism for harmonizing a Prophetic or Companion  adīth with another revealed 
source or with al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own understanding of the law. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does state 
more than once that ijtihād is employed in cases where nothing is found in the Qurʾān, 
Sunna or consensus,
795
 it is notable that none of his examples of ijtihād are particularly 
concerned with filling legal gaps.
796
 Instead, his appeals to ijtihād serve a primarily 
harmonizing function.  
 
Raʾy, Isti hrāj and Istinbāṭ (Legal Reasoning; Derivation) 
The remarks above all pertain to passages in which al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly discusses 
ijtihād or ijtihād al-raʾy. I now turn to some of the more important terms and techniques 
which fall under the umbrella of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of ijtihād. Raʾy, isti hrāj and 
istinbāṭ are three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s most common terms for legal reasoning. In the 
discussion of post-Prophetic reports in Chapter Two, “Companion and Successor 
Ḥadīths,” we encountered many examples of an argument that al-Ṭaḥāwī relies upon to 
expand the corpus of texts for which he may claim Prophetic authority: a certain 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 4.423-425.  
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 That al-Ṭaḥāwī considers it necessary to deny the binding authority of Companion ijtihād in the same 
way he denies the binding authority of Prophetic ijtihād is testament to the importance of the Companions 
within his hermeneutics. 
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 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 9.210, 13.40; Maʿānī, 3.237.  
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 Modern overviews of ijtihād often portray the primary purpose of legal reasoning as filling in gaps in 
the law as new cases and circumstances arise; e.g., Vikør, Between God and the Sultan, 53; Hallaq, History 
of Islamic Legal Theories, 82; Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 468.  
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apparently non-Prophetic statement—almost always from a Companion—must in fact 
have been made on the basis of the Prophet’s tawqīf (instruction), because the statement 
is not of a type that may be supported by raʾy, isti hrāj or istinbāṭ. This argument 
contrasts instruction from the Prophet—a form of revelation—with human legal 
interpretation. Despite his use of multiple terms for legal reasoning, however, what 
concerns al-Ṭaḥāwī in this argument is not a precise technique represented by each term, 
but rather the general concept of legal reasoning. This point is confirmed by the fact that 
al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the three terms singly and in combination when making this argument, in 
ways that are unrelated to the legal issue at hand.
797
   
 To determine the kind of legal reasoning indicated by each of these terms, then, 
we must look to passages that show each functioning in context. Raʾy (legal reasoning, a 
legal opinion) is by far the most common of the three terms, appearing over 150 times in 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works.798 Al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the term to denote both the act and 
the end result of engaging in ijtihād.799 Its distinguishing characteristic is that its results 
may be opposed by any jurist whose ijtihād leads him to a different conclusion.800 Indeed, 
individual references to raʾy within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works most often serve 
the purpose of denying any binding authority to a report containing a legal rule by 
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 For different combinations of raʾy, isti hrāj and istinbāṭ in the context of this argument, see    ā , 
1.186, 1.191, 1.338-339, 1.416, 2.91, 2,135, 2,167, 2,208, 2.227; Mushkil, 1.55, 2.284, 3.71, 4.248, 5.426, 
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 This number represents only the noun form, raʾy; just as common is the verb raʾā in the sense of 
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 For an example of raʾy meaning the process of reasoning, see Mushkil, 13.40; for an example of raʾy 
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800
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 4.411.  
260 
 
 
labeling it as merely one person’s conclusion. For example, al-Ṭaḥāwī regularly follows 
Companion  adīths with the observation that the rule stated therein is the Companion’s 
raʾy.801 This claim permits al-Ṭaḥāwī to harmonize reports containing contradictory rules 
by stating that one or both represent raʾy.  
 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī denies binding authority to earlier jurists’ raʾy, these denials 
are not meant to suggest criticism of raʾy or its practitioners. During the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th 
centuries, the term raʾy had acquired increasingly negatively connotations among the ahl 
al- adīth, traditionists who accused the proponents of raʾy (ahl al-raʾy) of abandoning 
Prophetic traditions in favor of their own reasoning.
802
 Although reliance on raʾy was 
primarily associated with the proto-Ḥanafī school, al-Ṭaḥāwī shared with the ahl al-
 adīth a commitment to legal argument based on  adīth; he is widely acknowledged as 
having provided Ḥanafī positive law a basis in  adīth.803 Despite his commitment to 
 adīth, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not share in the ahl al- adīth’s attacks on raʾy as 
unregulated human reason. Instead, he fully identifies raʾy with ijtihād, an authorized 
and, indeed, commendable process in which legal reasoning is employed not in 
competition with revelation, but rather in service to it. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s rare criticisms of raʾy 
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therefore attack jurists who rely on raʾy in situations where it is not authorized, rather 
than rejecting raʾy itself.804 
 In contrast to raʾy, the terms isti hrāj (extraction) and istinbāṭ (derivation) appear 
most frequently when al-Ṭaḥāwī is expressing a binary opposition between tawqīf and 
legal reasoning, as discussed above. Like raʾy, isti hrāj and istinbāṭ are closely related to 
ijtihād; they describe the process of a jurist deriving positive legal rules from revealed 
sources or from other known rules. In the introduction to Shar  mushkil al-āthār, for 
example, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that one of his objectives is to derive (istakhraja) rules of law 
from Prophetic  adīth.805 When he approves of the results of someone’s legal reasoning, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī sometimes praises it as a good ( asan, laṭīf) isti hrāj from a particular 
source.
806
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī uses isti hrāj and istinbāṭ synonymously, sometimes switching 
between them when describing a single act of derivation.
807
 Broadly speaking, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
employs the terms isti hrāj or istinbāṭ in cases where he explicitly discusses the text or 
rule upon which a process of legal reasoning is based; if he is merely conveying the result 
of legal reasoning, he prefers the term raʾy. Isti hrāj and istinbāṭ are thus not technical 
terms indicating a specific variety of legal reasoning, but are rather general labels for the 
process by which jurists derive the law from its sources in the absence of Prophetic 
tawqīf.  
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Naẓar and Qiyās  
 While al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the terms raʾy, isti hrāj and istinbāṭ primarily in reference 
to others’ acts of legal reasoning, he largely reserves naẓar and qiyās to label his own 
interpretive endeavors. Naẓar, which had served among early jurists as a general term for 
systematic reasoning, had already by the time of Ibn Qutayba come to be associated 
specifically with the systematic reasoning of the speculative theologians ( uta alli ūn) 
and of the Muʿtazilīs in particular.808 Naẓar in the sense of systematic reasoning was later 
adopted into the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition; al-Jaṣṣāṣ argues in al-Fuṣūl for the 
obligation to use naẓar to establish matters such as the unity of God and the existence of 
a wise creator (ṣāniʿ  a ī ).809 For al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, naẓar is always directed 
toward deriving a legal rule or interpreting a revealed text on the basis of other texts and 
previously established rules.
810
 Indeed, naẓar is distinguishable from ijtihād in al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s thought only by the context in which he employs each term: he appeals to 
ijtihād in all of his theoretical discussions establishing the permissibility of legal 
reasoning, but he labels his own acts of reasoning naẓar.811 
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 Naẓar plays a major role in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works; in Shar   aʿānī al-
āthār, almost every chapter contains a section in which al-Ṭaḥāwī supports his 
conclusions by appealing to naẓar. Within the chapters of Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and 
elsewhere in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, naẓar has two major functions. First, it provides a 
resolution when al-Ṭaḥāwī is otherwise unable to resolve a conflict between revealed 
texts or between competing opinions on how a text should be interpreted.
812
 Second, even 
when al-Ṭaḥāwī is able to resolve a conflict satisfactorily by other means, he routinely 
demonstrates that naẓar would have led him to reach the same conclusion.813 That is not 
to say that al-Ṭaḥāwī claims that the results of legal reasoning are identical to revelation 
in every case; in a small number of chapters, he notes the conflict between the rule stated 
in a Prophetic  adīth and the results of legal reasoning, while affirming his own 
commitment to  adīth.814 Nonetheless, the preponderance of chapters in which al-Ṭaḥāwī 
confirms a rule found in revelation by appealing to legal reasoning suggests that, overall, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī understands the law as a coherent, internally consistent system. 
 In most passages mentioning naẓar, al-Ṭaḥāwī simply makes an argument based 
on legal reasoning without labeling his techniques further.
815
 In other passages, however, 
                                                 
812
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 4.412, 8.73, 10.108; Maʿānī, 1.113. In this type of chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī often 
introduces his naẓar argument with some variation on the following formula: “since they disagreed on this 
matter and the reports differ, we resorted to naẓar in order to determine which is the correct opinion” (e.g., 
Maʿānī, 1.113).  
813
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.191, 10.59, 10.118, 10.427, 11.372-373, 12.531. In many chapters, al-
Ṭaḥāwī signals the transition to naẓar by stating that “This is the ruling on this matter by means of āthār. 
As for naẓar…” (e.g., Maʿānī, 1.31).  
814
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 6.97, 10.15, 11.209; Maʿānī, 1.53. In most of these chapters al-Ṭaḥāwī refers 
specifically to the conflict between  adīth and qiyās; for the equivalence of qiyās and naẓar, see below.  
815
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 4.407, 7.162, 8.73, 10.108, 11.195.  
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he calls his reasoning qiyās.816 Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not define qiyās in his extant works, and 
he makes only a few comments on its proper use: qiyās must be used when no evidence 
for a question is found in the Qurʾān, Sunna or consensus;817 qiyās is obligatory for 
matters on which we do not have tawqīf (instruction);818 punishments cannot be 
determined through qiyās, only through tawqīf;819 linguistic knowledge is not subject to 
analogy.
820
 These few theoretical statements place some limits on the use of qiyās and 
affirm that it is to be used in the situations in which al-Ṭaḥāwī also affirms the use of raʾy 
and ijtihād.  
 In the absence of any definition or classification of qiyās, however, we must look 
to its use in context in order to compare al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of qiyās to that of 
other jurists. For this purpose, al-Shāfiʿī’s typology of qiyās serves as a useful starting 
point. In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī identifies three kinds of qiyās: causal analogy, the analogy 
of resemblance and the a fortiori argument.
821
 My analysis of the arguments that al-
Ṭaḥāwī labels qiyās shows that he concurs with al-Shāfiʿī in labeling all of the above 
arguments qiyās, and also adds a fourth type: the disjunctive syllogism. My analysis 
further shows that naẓar is functionally equivalent to qiyās for al-Ṭaḥāwī; every kind of 
argument that he labels naẓar is also sometimes called qiyās, and vice versa. 
                                                 
816
 The term qiyās is often translated as ‘analogy’ (e.g., Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2). 
However, for many jurists, including al-Ṭaḥāwī, qiyās encompassed a number of non-analogical 
arguments, and only certain types of analogy constituted permissible qiyās. For that reason, I leave the term 
un-translated here. On the meaning of qiyās, see Wael Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni 
Juridical Qiyās,” Arabica 36, no. 3 (1989): 286-289.  
817
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 10.142; Mushkil, 15.230 mentions Qurʾān and Sunna only.  
818
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 8.427. 
819
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.152. It is generally held among jurists that punishments, enumerations of 
quantities and basic ritual matters cannot be the basis of analogy.  
820
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.240. 
821
 Al-Shāfiʿī, Risāla, 16, 238. On al-Shāfiʿī’s discussion of qiyās, see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 
149-163; Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 122-126; Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal 
Theories, 29.  
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 In some passages, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s appeals to qiyās and naẓar take the form of causal 
analogy (qiyās al- aʿnā, qiyās al-ʿilla), a type of argument in which jurists identify the 
reason ( aʿnā, ʿilla) behind a legal injunction and then apply that injunction in a new 
case. For instance, jurists debate the case of a man who has entered into a state of i rā  
(ritual purification) while wearing a qa īṣ, a garment prohibited during i rā . Some 
jurists hold that he must cut off the qa īṣ, because removing the garment in the normal 
way means briefly covering the head, another action prohibited during i rā . By 
examining the known rules for a variety of situations involving covering the head during 
i rā , al-Ṭaḥāwī determines that the prohibition falls only on garments specifically worn 
on the head, such as a turban. Since the head is not ‘wearing’ (lābis) the qa īṣ during its 
removal, there is no prohibition.
822
 In this example, al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly identifies the 
cause of the prohibition—donning an item of clothing meant to be worn on the head—
and determines that it does not apply to the new case. Therefore, the prohibition of one 
does not entail the prohibition of the other. 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī makes the above argument without employing any of the technical 
terms—aṣl (the original case), farʿ (the new case), ʿilla/ aʿnā (the cause of the ruling) or 
 ukm (the ruling)—that mature legal theorists would rely upon to describe formally the 
structure of causal analogies. Most of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other appeals to causal analogy are 
similarly non-technical, although he uses the term  ukm regularly, both in the context of 
qiyās and more generally. In a limited number of passages, al-Ṭaḥāwī does employ the 
terms aṣl and ʿilla in the context of qiyās although their usage seems still to be informal 
                                                 
822
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 2.138-139. Other examples of causal analogy in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works 
include Maʿānī, 1.26, 3.73;    ā , 1.264. 
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and so they may not yet represent technical terms specific to qiyās in his usage.823 More 
frequently, al-Ṭaḥāwī introduces qiyās using non-technical terms to suggest equivalence 
between two cases. These terms include mithl (the like of something),  a/ a ā (like, as) 
and istawā (to be equivalent to).824 
 Further, in many, if not most examples of causal analogies, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not 
explicitly state the shared rationale that allows him to transfer a rule to the new case. For 
instance, al-Ṭaḥāwī analogizes concerning whether a Muslim must make the same 
recompense for causing bodily harm to a non-Muslim who has concluded a treaty with 
the Muslims, as he would to a Muslim. He observes that Muslims are forbidden to harm 
either the body or the property of such a person, but that harm to both was permitted to 
Muslims before the non-Muslim concluded his treaty. We know that a Muslim who steals 
the property of someone with such a treaty is subject to the  add punishment for theft. 
Therefore, someone who causes bodily harm to such a person should also be subject to 
the same punishments as if they had harmed a Muslim.
825
 From this passage, we may 
infer that the concluding of a treaty is the cause of being protected by the law in the same 
way that Muslims are protected, although al-Ṭaḥāwī never states that cause directly. 
Instead, here and in most of his analogical arguments, al-Ṭaḥāwī emphasizes the multiple 
legal effects common to two cases as a reason for bringing all of the rulings related to 
                                                 
823
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 1.254, 1.386, 1.428; Mushkil, 13.308, 13.355. 
824
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.140, 5.437, 8.205, 10.351, 10.352, 11.507, 15.358-359. 
825
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 3.278.  
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them into alignment. That is, his analogical arguments rely on the identification of 
consistency of legal effects more than they emphasize the rationale of a specific ruling.
826
 
 In addition to causal analogy, al-Ṭaḥāwī also labels other types of argument qiyās. 
In this, al-Ṭaḥāwī is at odds with the mature legal theory tradition, in which causal 
analogy was the predominant form of qiyās.827 More importantly, the mature Ḥanafī 
tradition would insist that causal analogy was the only valid form of qiyās; although 
Ḥanafī theorists accepted some of the other forms of argument that al-Ṭaḥāwī labeled 
qiyās, they classified them as linguistic or rational inferences (istidlāl).828 In addition to 
causal analogy, al-Ṭaḥāwī relies on the analogy of resemblance (qiyās al-shabah), a type 
of argument identified and defended by al-Shāfiʿī and later disputed within the Shāfiʿī 
school.
829
 As al-Shāfiʿī describes it, the analogy of resemblance consists of determining 
which of two known cases a new case more closely resembles in order to apply the ruling 
from the most relevant case to the new case.
830
 Whereas causal analogy relates two cases 
in terms of the reason behind the ruling in each, the analogy of similarity is concerned 
with the likeness of the things to which the rule is applied.  
 In a clear example of the analogy of similarity, al-Ṭaḥāwī describes how the 
dispute between scholars concerning the amount and timing of  a āt (alms) due on waraq 
                                                 
826
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s appeals to consistency should not be confused with the doctrine of ṭard/iṭṭirād 
(consistency) propounded by some 4
th
/10
th
 century jurists, including Abū Bakr al-Ṣayrafī (d. 330/941) and 
Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918), and vigorously rejected by most later Ḥanafīs (Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 
215-222). Ṭard is a formal method for identifying the cause of a legal ruling by determining that a certain 
cause is consistently present when a particular legal effect is produced. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, is simply 
uninterested in explicitly identifying the effective cause in many of his analogies.  
827
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 159.  
828
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 192ff.  On al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s theory of qiyās, see Shehaby, “ʿIlla and Qiyās in 
Early Islamic Legal Theory,” esp. 30ff.  
829
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 194-195.  
830
 Al-Shāfiʿī, Risāla, 16. For a discussion of al-Shāfiʿī’s use of qiyās al-shabah, see Lowry, Early Islamic 
Legal Theory, 150-155, 157-158.  
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(coined silver, sheets of metal) hinges upon whether waraq is more similar (ashbah) to 
herds of animals or to agricultural produce. Proponents of analogizing waraq to 
agricultural produce point out that both produce and waraq are weighed in determining 
 a āt, while animals are counted. Their opponents retort that a minor or a mentally 
incompetent person is required to pay  a āt on agricultural produce from land they own, 
just as if they were a legally competent adult. However, such individuals are exempted 
from the normal alms requirement for both waraq and livestock. Therefore, waraq is 
more similar to livestock for the purposes of determining  a āt.831  
 Less frequently, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s appeals to qiyās take the form a fortiori 
arguments.
832
 Jurists as early as Abū Ḥanīfa argued that the prohibition of a small degree 
of something entails the prohibition of a larger degree of it, just as permission for a large 
degree of something entails permission for a smaller degree of it. In considering the a 
fortiori argument a form of qiyās,833 however, al-Ṭaḥāwī stands apart from later Ḥanafīs, 
most of whom classified it as a language-based inference.
834
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ treats a fortiori 
arguments in his chapter on textual implications (dalīl al-khiṭāb), while al-Sarakhsī 
emphasizes that no rational inference is needed to understand this kind of meaning from a 
                                                 
831
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.267-268.  
832
 As with the forms of argument treated above, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works include no formal discussion or 
classification of the a fortiori argument; it is recognizable in context from his consistent use of the terms 
awlā and a rā to indicate that what follows is even more suitable or more appropriate than what preceded.  
833
 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 8.411; Maʿānī, 3.117. 
834
 Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 99, 110-111; Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 96-100; 
Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments,” 289-290. 
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text.
835
 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī is in agreement with both early Ḥanafīs and al-Shāfiʿī in 
treating a fortiori claims as a form of rational argument.
836
  
 In the course of his hermeneutical works, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs the a fortiori 
argument in both its a minore ad maius and a maiore ad minus forms. In one example of 
the former, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that if clasping the hands in front of oneself is praiseworthy 
in supererogatory prayers as a posture of humility ( hushūʿ), it is likewise praiseworthy 
during obligatory prayers, because humility is even more appropriate (awlā) there.837 An 
example of the latter is found in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s response to al-Shāfiʿī’s claim that fasting 
during seclusion in a mosque (iʿti āf) is optional. Al-Shāfiʿī argues that scholars’ 
agreement that the  uʿta if (a person in a state of iʿti āf) does not fast at night, and yet 
remains in iʿti āf, indicates that fasting is not necessary to enter into iʿti āf. Al-Ṭaḥāwī 
retorts that the  uʿta if may leave the mosque to relieve himself without canceling his 
iʿti āf, although he may not enter into iʿti āf while outside a mosque. If exiting the 
mosque does not cancel iʿti āf, then even more so (a rā) should the arrival of night (and 
the concomitant end to fasting) not affect his iʿti āf, because the first is an action taken 
by him while the second is not of his own volition. Therefore, the permissibility of 
certain events or actions during iʿti āf cannot serve as evidence for what is required to 
enter into the state initially.
838
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 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 1.153; al-Sarakhsī, al-Mu arrar, 1.177-178.  
836
 Al-Shāfiʿī in fact considers the a fortiori argument the strongest or clearest form of qiyās (Risāla, 238), 
a valuation which cannot be determined for al-Ṭaḥāwī on the basis of his extant works. For discussions of 
al-Shāfiʿī’s use of a fortiori arguments, see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 153-154, 158-163; 
Schacht, Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence, 124-125.  
837
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,    ā , 1.189. For another example of the argumentum a minore ad maius, see Mushkil, 
1.81. 
838
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 10-351-352. For other examples of the argumentum a maiore ad minus, see 
Mushkil, 11.303; Maʿānī, 1.18. 
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 Although the passages above do not fully conform to the a fortiori argument as 
described by legal theorists in that they do not involve different degrees of a single 
permitted or prohibited action, they are nonetheless closely related to classical 
descriptions of the a fortiori argument in that they concern the permissibility of actions. 
In other passages, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs the same language (awlā, a rā) to 
determine not the permissibility of actions but the applicability of a rule to a group.
839
 For 
example, al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that a man who acknowledges having had sexual 
intercourse with his wife may still deny paternity of her child. Therefore, it is even more 
so the case (a rā) that a man who acknowledges having had sexual intercourse with his 
slave may deny paternity of his slave’s child.840 That is, the rule for husbands also applies 
to men owning concubines. In this passage, as in most a fortiori arguments of this type, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī does not state explicitly what it is about the new group that makes the rule 
even more appropriate than in its original application, although the connection between 
the two cases is generally simple to work out. In this case, for instance, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
argument hinges on the relative statuses of wives and concubines. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī 
states his reasoning explicitly when arguing that men may not cover their faces with their 
garments while in a state of i rā  (ritual consecration). He observes that women are not 
permitted to cover their faces during i rā , even though women are permitted to cover 
more than men while in that state. Therefore, it is even more so that case that men may 
not cover their faces.
841
 Here, al-Ṭaḥāwī reasons that, given what we know about 
                                                 
839
 I have not identified any discussions of the a fortiori argument by legal theorists envisioning this 
possibility.  
840
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.117.  
841
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 8.411.  
271 
 
 
women’s wider latitude to cover themselves in i rā , a rule that prohibits a particular 
garment to women is even more appropriately applied to men.  
 To this point, the arguments that al-Ṭaḥāwī has labeled qiyās have followed the 
division proposed by al-Shāfiʿī in the Risāla. However, al-Ṭaḥāwī also employs a fourth 
form of argument under the heading of qiyās: the disjunctive syllogism. In one example, 
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that, although Muḥammad, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar all shortened their 
prayers during the Hajj while halting at Minā, residents and imams of Mecca do not 
shorten their prayers, because their travel does not meet the length requirement for 
shortening prayer. Qiyās requires this conclusion, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, because Muḥammad, 
Abū Bakr and ʿUmar can only have shortened their prayer for one of three reasons (lā 
ya hlū  in  aʿnā  in thalāthat  aʿānin): the length of their travel, their participation in 
the Hajj or the place they were in (i.e., Minā). There is no other possibility. He continues: 
We considered whether the shortening might be because of the place itself, but 
found that scholars agree that non-pilgrims do not shorten their prayers [at Minā], 
and so we knew that God’s Messenger and his Companions cannot have 
shortened their prayer for that reason. Then we considered whether the shortening 
was due to the pilgrimage. However, we found that pilgrims from Minā do not 
shorten their prayers at Minā during the pilgrimage, and so we knew that they 
cannot have shortened their prayers because of the pilgrimage. Because those two 
reasons have been eliminated as the cause for their shortening their prayers and 
only one other reason—travel—remains, we know that they shortened their 
prayers because of the length of their travel.
842
  
 
This argument follows the form of a disjunctive syllogism. First, al-Ṭaḥāwī establishes a 
list of possible causes for the Prophet’s actions and claims exhaustiveness for it. Next, he 
excludes all but one possibility. Finally, he affirms that the remaining possibility must be 
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true, without needing to provide any other evidence to support his claim. Arguments of 
this form appear regularly in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutic works.843 
 To date, little has been written on disjunctive syllogisms within Islamic legal 
thought before al-Ghazālī. Among later theorists, the disjunctive syllogism would come 
to be known as al-sabr wa-l-taqsī  (“probing and division”), and its validity as a method 
for determining the ʿilla (effective cause) of an analogy would be accepted by many 
jurists, although it was rejected except in a very limited form by almost all Ḥanafīs.844 
Hallaq suggests that this form of argument was assimilated into legal thought in the 
4
th
/10
th
 and 5
th
/11
th
 centuries from Greek logic, although most jurists did not label it a 
form of qiyās.845 Larry Miller, in contrast, associates the disjunctive syllogism and other 
techniques from the Greek logical tradition with 6
th
/12
th
-century jurists beginning with al-
Ghazālī.846  
It is unlikely, however, that the regular appearance of arguments in the form of 
the disjunctive syllogism in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works is evidence of an earlier 
incorporation of Greek logic into jurisprudence than has until now been assumed. Indeed, 
there are important differences between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of the disjunctive syllogism and 
the way it in which it is discussed by later jurists. For example, Miller has analyzed a 
manuscript of the Muqaddima of Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 684/1286) in which the 
disjunctive syllogism is described in terms of the logical incompatibility of P and Q.
847
 In 
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 E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.75-77, 3.157, 10.59;    ā , 1.180, 1.194. 
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 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 217.  
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 Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments, and the Formalization of Arguments,” 316-317. I have found no 
other evidence of the influence of Greek logic in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works.  
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contrast, in the example concerning shortening prayers during the Hajj discussed above 
and in other passages employing disjunctive syllogisms, al-Ṭaḥāwī is not arguing based 
on the logical incompatibility of the premises, but rather on the fact that they are premises 
that the community has agreed upon. That is, there are three reasons that jurists have 
identified as possible explanations for why Muḥammad, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar shortened 
their prayers, and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument rests on the assumption that one of those 
explanations must be correct. That assumption in turn appears closely connected to 
notions of a kind of consensus (ij āʿ) that encompasses known juristic disagreements, 
and to the insistence of many jurists that, once established, such disagreements cannot be 
expanded to permit new opinions.
848
 While the formal features of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments 
may thus closely resemble those of later scholars who embraced Greek logic, the 
assumptions underlying his arguments are quite different. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of the 
disjunctive argument is therefore probably best understood within the context of the pre-
Aristotelian logic juristic dialectical movement identified by Walter Young and 
embracing jurists including al-Shāfiʿī.849 
 In total, then, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs four clearly identifiable types of argument 
under the heading of qiyās, only one of which would be recognized as qiyās by later 
members of his legal school. Rather than concluding that al-Ṭaḥāwī conceives of qiyās as 
consisting of four types of argument, however, it would be more accurate to say that he 
uses the term qiyās as a general label for the kind of rational argument that he believed 
God had licensed jurists to employ in determining the law. It is not apparent from al-
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 See, e.g., Lowry, “Is There Something Postmodern about Uṣūl al-Fiqh?,” 287, 301ff.  
849
 Walter Young, “The Dialectical Forge: Proto-System Juridical Disputation in the Kitāb i htilāf al-
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Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works that he clearly differentiates between different types of arguments; 
indeed, it is frequently difficult to assign particular examples of his qiyās to one of the 
four categories mentioned above. Where both al-Shāfiʿī and later jurists are concerned 
with classifying and defining qiyās, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s primary concern is the harmony between 
qiyās and legal rulings found in revealed texts. 
   
Isti sān (Departure fro  Qiyās) 
 In al-I  ā  fī uṣūl al-a  ā , Ibn Ḥazm names al-Ṭaḥāwī as his only example of a 
Ḥanafī jurist who rejected isti sān, a hermeneutical procedure closely associated with the 
Ḥanafīs in which jurists depart from the results of their qiyās because they consider 
another position better (ista sana, lit., to deem good).850 Ibn Ḥazm denounces isti sān as 
a practice devoid of any proof from revelation (burhān) and one that allows jurists to 
follow their own whims in rejecting any inconvenient or undesirable results of qiyās.851 
The critique of isti sān was first articulated by al-Shāfiʿī in al-Risāla and Ibṭāl al-
isti sān.852 Al-Shāfiʿī emphasizes that qiyās is a procedure based upon evidence from 
revelation; isti sān, in contrast, is simply an invention by the jurist without any basis in 
revelation. If jurists may depart from divinely-sanctioned qiyās, then they may as well 
devise their own legal rulings in cases where no text has been revealed.
853
 For al-Shāfiʿī, 
then, isti sān represents a rejection of the authority of revelation. This understanding of 
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isti sān is in turn the consequence of al-Shāfiʿī’s larger project of anchoring all law in 
revelation.
854
 For the early Iraqi jurists among whom isti sān first become a technical 
term denoting departure from qiyās on the basis of some other important consideration,855 
however, it was not yet apparent that qiyās was binding to the exclusion of other kinds of 
authority.
856
 
 Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī is committed to the idea that all law must be derived 
from revelation and, further, that no true conflict can exist between sources of legal 
authority. It is therefore instructive to examine how he treats isti sān, a procedure 
condemned by al-Shāfiʿī but closely associated with al-Ṭaḥāwī’s fellow Ḥanafī jurists.857 
In fact, none of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works contain any statement of principle in support or 
rejection of isti sān; if Ibn Ḥazm based his report on al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own statement, then the 
work in which that statement appeared is presumably lost to us. It is also possible that Ibn 
Ḥazm (or his source) based his conclusions on the almost total absence of any mention of 
isti sān in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works. I have identified only a single passage in 
which al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the term isti sān in a technical sense. In a chapter of Shar  mushkil 
al-āthār on whether the qārin (a pilgrim combining the Hajj and ʿUmra) must perform 
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 Schacht identifies al-Shāfiʿī’s limitation of legal reasoning to methods authorized by revelation as “one 
of the important innovations by which his legal theory became utterly different from that of the ancient 
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the required circumambulations of the Kaaba for each type of pilgrimage individually, al-
Ṭaḥāwī writes that Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī held that qiyās led to a 
certain conclusion, but they professed a different position on the basis of isti sān. Al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s response is telling: 
We do not agree with them; rather, we hold that qiyās obligates what they held to 
be isti sān.858 
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwī here avoids either accepting or condemning isti sān by arguing instead that 
the position of his Ḥanafī predecessors is, in fact, supported by qiyās.  
 Mentions of isti sān appear considerably more frequently in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
Mukhtaṣar, an epitome of Ḥanafī positive law.859 The Mukhtaṣar, like al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 
hermeneutical works, contains no statement of principle accepting or rejecting isti sān. A 
similar reticence is apparent here, however. When al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Ḥanafī predecessors 
disagree on whether to follow the results of qiyās or to base their position on isti sān, al-
Ṭaḥāwī habitually states his agreement with the position based on qiyās.860 In cases 
where his Ḥanafī predecessors unanimously agree that the ruling should be based on 
isti sān rather than qiyās, he refrains from adding the affirmation “[I] adopt this position” 
(wa-bihi naʾ hudh), so common within the pages of the Mukhtaṣar.861  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s treatment (or absence of treatment) of isti sān both in Shar  aʿānī 
al-āthār and in his Mukhtaṣar suggests considerable discomfort with the procedure, but 
also an unwillingness to publicly oppose a technique so closely associated with the 
Ḥanafīs. Later Ḥanafīs, too, would become subject to pressure from the criticism of 
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isti sān when the principle that law must be based in revelation came to be widely 
accepted, including by the Ḥanafīs themselves.862 In contrast to al-Ṭaḥāwī, Ḥanafī legal 
theorists of the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition would respond to criticism of isti sān not by 
silence but rather by reimagining isti sān to conform to mature uṣūl expectations about 
revelation as the basis for all law. Ḥanafīs including al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī would 
vehemently deny that isti sān is based on the jurist’s whim; instead, they argued, it is a 
divinely-sanctioned method for determining the correct solution when the initial results 
of qiyās do not produce the objectively correct answer, or else for determining the correct 
way to proceed when a question can be approached through competing analogies.
863
 
Despite the differences between their approaches, both al-Ṭaḥāwī and later Ḥanafī jurists 
share the objective of accommodating their hermeneutics to changing conceptions of 
legal authority without directly criticizing the Ḥanafī tradition.  
 In this chapter I have examined a number of key hermeneutical topics discussed 
theoretically or put into practice in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works. The list of topics covered is far 
from exhaustive, however; much work remains to be done on subjects including al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s isnād and matn criticism, his analysis of figurative language, and his overall 
approach to  adīth harmonization, among others. In selecting the topics that I have, I 
have tried to suggest how al-Ṭaḥāwī draws connections between the different aspects of 
his hermeneutics such that every idea is bound to one fundamental, underlying binary: 
that between mu  a / utashābih and tawqīf/ray. In analyzing each topic, I have also 
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noted where al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought most closely resembles that of earlier jurists during the 
formative period, and where it anticipates the mature uṣūl tradition that would be firmly 
established within fifty years of his death. Writing at the very end of the formative 
period, al-Ṭaḥāwī is a transitional figure, and a close examination of how he defines 
hermeneutical concepts and employs them in context provides important information 
about how legal thought changed during this critical period. Notably, although al-Ṭaḥāwī 
anticipates the mature uṣūl tradition in important ways, we have seen in this chapter that 
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought is more often closest to that of al-Shāfiʿī, even if not to the extent or 
in the same way that previous analyses have suggested.  
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Conclusion 
 
 When I embarked upon this study, I hoped to piece together the uṣūl al-fiqh work 
that the Egyptian Ḥanafī jurist, traditionist and theologian Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad al-Ṭaḥāwī 
(d. 321/933) would have written, had he composed a work in that genre. During the year 
that I spent reading al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant oeuvre, I had been struck by the wide range of 
discussions on the interpretation and relative authority of legal sources in three of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s major works,    ā  al-Qurʾān, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and Shar  mushkil al-
āthār. Although the discussions in question were scattered and brief, ranging from a 
sentence to a few paragraphs in most cases, they encompassed almost all of the major 
topics of a mature uṣūl al-fiqh work. By analyzing these passages and bringing them into 
dialogue with each other, it seemed, I could shed light on the development of uṣūl al-fiqh 
in the late 3
rd
/9
th
 and early 4
th
/10
th
 centuries, a crucial period of transformation from 
formative to post-formative Islamic law, but one that remains largely opaque to 
researchers due to the paucity of surviving sources.  
 It quickly became apparent, however, that what I was piecing together was not an 
uṣūl work. Instead, these passages in    ā  al-Qurʾān, Shar   aʿānī al-āthār and Shar  
mushkil al-āthār represented a different kind of intellectual activity. Where works of the 
uṣūl al-fiqh genre are primarily interested in elaborating an elegant system by bringing 
principles of legal theory into relationship with each other, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s three works are 
concerned with the relationship between individual revealed texts and specific theoretical 
principles. In all of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant oeuvre, only the seven-page introduction to    ā  
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al-Qurʾān makes any attempt to bring a coherent structure to a set of theoretical 
principles, and even there al-Ṭaḥāwī does not aim at a complete account of legal theory. 
That is not to say that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory lacks coherence; he invokes the same 
concepts and principles repeatedly across his works, often using the same language, and 
these concepts and principles are not in conflict with each other. However, the drive to 
identify or elaborate an overarching, complete system characteristic of mature uṣūl al-
fiqh works as well as the earlier Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī, is simply not a major feature of al-
Ṭaḥāwī’s interest in legal theory. Neither are al-Ṭaḥāwī’s three works comparable to 
earlier or later works of fiqh, which cite principles of legal theory in the course of setting 
out the rules of positive law, but without explaining or justifying those principles.  
 Instead, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of legal theory appear in the context of an 
intellectual project and form of writing that I have termed ‘practical hermeneutics,’ 
whose major theological concern is to affirm the essential coherence and 
comprehensibility of the Divine Message by demonstrating how God’s intent may be 
derived from revealed sources. In the field of law, which is the exclusive topic of Shar  
 aʿānī al-āthār and    ā  al-Qurʾān and a major topic in Shar  mushkil al-āthār, 
practical hermeneutics additionally affirms that God’s intent in fact has been derived 
from revelation by showing how established rules of positive law are grounded in 
revealed sources. In terms of their literary form, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s texts of practical 
hermeneutics consist of a series of chapters in which he first adduces one or more 
revealed texts and then resolves the necessary interpretive issues in order to produce a 
statement of God’s intent, usually in the form of a rule of positive law. Discussions of 
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legal theory appear where al-Ṭaḥāwī needs to justify particular, perhaps controversial, 
interpretive moves.  
 Al-Ṭaḥāwī was not unique in composing texts of practical hermeneutics. 
Surviving works by al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn Qutayba and al-Ṭabarī serve a similar function and 
take a similar literary form, and it is likely that other 3
rd
/9
th
-century a  ā  al-Qurʾān 
works, all of which are now lost, also belong to practical hermeneutics, as may other, yet-
to-be-identified works. Indeed, the emergence of practical hermeneutics is best 
understood as a response to the particular challenges jurists faced in the late formative 
period of Islamic law. By the turn of the 3
rd
/9
th
 century, the rules of fiqh had been 
articulated in the first major compendia, even if they were not yet stated as systematically 
as they would be in later centuries. Those compendia, along with the major late 2
nd
/8
th-
 
and early 3
rd
/9
th
-century jurists to whom they were attributed, would become associated 
with the emerging madhhabs a century later, around the lifetime of al-Ṭaḥāwī.   
Also in the 3
rd
/9
th
 century, the rising authority of Prophetic  adīth and the 
growing conviction, most famously associated with al-Shāfiʿī, that all law must be based 
in revealed texts, created an imperative to demonstrate that Islamic law had in fact been 
derived exclusively from revelation, even if those connections had not previously been 
explicitly articulated. When al-Ṭaḥāwī wrote his works of practical hermeneutics 
asserting the connection between Ḥanafī fiqh and revelation at the turn of the 4th/10th 
century, the Ḥanafīs were widely perceived as ahl al-raʾy, jurists whose positive law was 
based on mere opinion rather than revelation. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical 
hermeneutics thus in some sense represent the culmination of a project first clearly 
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articulated by al-Shāfiʿī. By tethering the fiqh of the first major Ḥanafī compendia to 
revelation, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works also pave the way for the consolidation of the madhhabs in 
the mid-4
th
/10
th
 century.  
 The legal theory that emerges from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics 
is closely related to, and yet distinct from, the legal theory of the uṣūlīs. While he 
addresses most of the major topics of uṣūl al-fiqh works—legal sources such as the 
Qurʾān,  adīth and consensus, and concepts including ijtihād, abrogation, ʿāmm: hāṣṣ, 
ẓāhir:bāṭin and others—his approach to most topics is less detailed and more flexible 
than that of the uṣūlīs. Where the uṣūlīs’ theological pre-commitments and desire for 
comprehensiveness and elegance drive them to explore a range of subsidiary questions 
for most topics, al-Ṭaḥāwī only addresses concrete interpretive problems where led to by 
his sources, and then only explores topics in sufficient detail to produce a resolution of 
the interpretive difficulty at hand. Indeed, the flexibility of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory 
appears to be required by the project of practical hermeneutics; the corpus of revealed 
sources that al-Ṭaḥāwī treats is messy and sometimes apparently conflicting. His theory, 
therefore, must in some sense be responsive to the sources in front of him. 
 On its surface, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory assigns varying levels of authority to a 
series of clearly distinguished sources of the law in the same manner as the mature uṣūl 
al-fiqh tradition. Both his hermeneutical discussions and his repeated appeals to the list 
‘Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus’ imply a hierarchy among three major sources of interpretive 
authority. In cases where no guidance is found in these three sources, al-Ṭaḥāwī tells us, 
we must look to ijtihād or qiyās. Although they do not generally appear in his lists of 
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legal sources, post-Prophetic  adīths and ʿamal also constitute sources of law. For al-
Ṭaḥāwī then, the relative authority of sources ostensibly depends on their formal 
characteristics. Degrees of legal authority are assigned to entire categories of sources. In 
this way, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s rhetoric concerning the sources of the law anticipates that of the 
mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition. 
 A closer examination of his hermeneutical arguments, however, reveals that al-
Ṭaḥāwī attributes authority to individual textual and non-textual sources in ways that 
cannot be predicted based upon this hierarchy. Companion  adīths and instances of 
consensus are frequently claimed to represent revelational authority sufficient to compete 
with that of an established Prophetic  adīth, while at other times a Prophetic  adīth is 
deemed merely to convey Muḥammad’s personal opinion and is thereby stripped entirely 
of its authority as a binding legal source. Each of these interpretive moves rests upon an 
underlying binary concept of legal authority which draws a crucial distinction between 
knowledge that might permissibly be reached by inference, and knowledge that can only 
have come from revelation. Where a Companion states an opinion or jurists reach 
consensus on a rule that al-Ṭaḥāwī claims may not permissibly be based upon inference, 
he accepts implicitly that the rule must originally have been based upon revelational 
instruction, even if that instruction is not indicated in the source. This binary is often 
made explicit in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments about the status of post-Prophetic  adīth, where 
he appeals to the terms tawqīf (Prophetic instruction) and raʾy (inference). In other areas, 
such as the status of consensus and some Prophetic  adīths, the same binary is latent in 
his arguments.  
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 The authority that al-Ṭaḥāwī grants any given source, then, is not a function of its 
formal characteristics, but rather the result of a judgment about content and origins. In the 
body of this study I have noted places where al-Ṭaḥāwī offers rules concerning the types 
of legal rulings that require revelational instruction. However, the rules he enumerates are 
far from adequate to account for all the cases in which al-Ṭaḥāwī claims Prophetic 
authority for non-Prophetic legal sources. I have further argued that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s elevation 
of non-Prophetic sources to Prophetic status appears to stem from a sincere deference to 
the special knowledge of the Companions and the Successors, as evidenced by his 
willingness to depart from Ḥanafī law in order to comply with Companion legislative 
statements. Nonetheless, in the absence of a comprehensive set of principles defining 
exactly which types of Companion legislative statements or juristic consensus require 
tawqīf, the declaration that any particular statement must be based on an original tawqīf 
is, at its core, arbitrary.  
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory does not aspire to the same type of formalism as that 
aspired to by later uṣūlīs; as I have demonstrated, only hints of a linguistic formalism 
appear in his arguments. Nonetheless, the literary form of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of 
hermeneutics, moving inexorably from text to law, is designed to imply that a known 
hierarchy of sources and a predictable set of hermeneutical principles allow jurists to 
derive the law from revelation. Yet, within his arguments, al-Ṭaḥāwī sometimes invokes 
the instruction/inference binary in ways that reveal that those hermeneutical principles 
are in fact malleable and dependent on his determination of whether a particular 
legislative statement represents instruction or inference.  
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics thus represent crucial sources for 
conceptualizing the relationship between legal theory and positive law in the Islamic 
legal tradition. While works of uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh largely separate legal theory and 
positive law into distinct genres, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics represent a 
separate, hybrid genre that portrays legal theory in action, if not precisely the legal theory 
of the later uṣūl tradition. Taken at face value, his works show that the Ḥanafīs are not, in 
fact, ahl al-raʾy, and that their fiqh is grounded in revelation. The idea of ‘portrayal’ is, 
however, fundamental to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s project. Although his works purport to show how 
law was derived from revelation, they are in fact ex post facto recreations of a process 
whose historicity cannot be proven by his works alone. There is thus an unresolved 
tension between the literary form of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works and their function in providing a 
retrospective justification of Ḥanafī fiqh.  
The evidence that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works offer concerning the relationship between 
legal theory and positive law is, therefore, ambiguous. At multiple points in his works, al-
Ṭaḥāwī adheres to his stated hermeneutical principles at the cost of failing to support an 
established rule of Ḥanafī fiqh. However, the flexibility of his legal theory in most cases 
allows him to claim support from his hermeneutics for Ḥanafī law. It is neither the case 
that his legal theory fully determines his positions on positive law, nor that his positive 
law is always advanced at the cost of his hermeneutical principles. In the end, perhaps 
texts of practical hermeneutics are best understood as a meeting point in which revealed 
text and law are brought together by means of a hermeneutic of sufficient flexibility to 
accommodate them both.  
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